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EUROPEAN COMPETITION DA Y 
LISBON, JUNE 9th 2000 
Following a proposal of Commissioner Monti, a European Competition Day will 
be organised in Lisbon, on June 9 t h . This event is dedicated to the citizens of the 
European Union who are not really aware of the positive impact of European 
competition policy on their day-to-day life. 
The Conference will take place in : 
Forum Telecom 
Av. Fontes Pereira de Melo 38c 
1050 Lisbon 
For more information, please contact : 
European Commission-DG Comp 
Directorate A - Unit Al 
Mr. Eric Cuziat (tel: 32 2 295 77 62) 
Direcçao-Geral do Comercio e da Concorrencia 
Av. Visconde Valmor, 72 
1050-242 Lisboa 
Mr. A. Bangy (21/ 791 92 62) 
JOURNEE EUROPENNE DE LA CONCURRENCE 
LISBONNE, LE 9 JUIN 2000 
A la suite d'une proposition du Commissaire Monti, une Journée européenne de 
la concurrence sera organisée le 9 juin à Lisbonne. Cet événement est destiné aux 
citoyens de l'Union européenne qui n'ont pas toujours conscience des incidences 
positives de la politique européenne de concurrence sur leur vie quotidienne. 
La conférence se tiendra: 
Forum Telecom 
Av. Fontes Pereira de Melo 38c 
1050 Lisbonne 
Pour de plus amples informations, vous pouvez contacter: 
Commission Européenne-DG Comp 
Direction A - Unité Al 
M. E. Cuziat ( tel: 32 2 295 77 62) 
Direcçao-Geral do Comercio e da Concorrencia 
Av. Visconde Valmor, 72 
1050-242 Lisboa 
M. A. Bangy (21/ 791 92 62) 
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The case TotalFina / Elf Aquitaine: 
preserving a contestable and 
competitive market in an industry that 
is of a particularly sensitive nature to 
the consumer 
By Alexander SCHAUB, Director General, 
Claude RAKOVSKY, Henri PIFFAUT and 
Peter DE LUYCK, DG COMP-B-1 
On 24 August 1999 the 
Commission was notified of the 
proposed acquisition by 
TotalFina of Elf Aquitaine. 
These two companies are the 
French national players in the oil 
industry. This transaction gave 
birth to the world's fourth-
largest oil group valued at 
around € 101 billion. After a full 
investigation, the Commission 
adopted on 9 February 2000 a 
clearance decision conditional 
on the realisation of various 
divestitures in France. 
TotalFina's public takeover bid 
was initially hostile and 
triggered a counter offer by Elf 
Aquitaine. This created the 
unprecedented situation of two 
competing notifications. Elf 
eventually recommended Total-
Fina's offer and the transaction 
was successfully completed in 
the Autumn. Both groups carry 
out their principal activities in 
the sectors of exploration and 
production of petroleum and 
natural gas, refining, distribution 
of petroleum products, petro-
chemicals, speciality chemicals 
and in the case of Elf, 
healthcare. 
On 6 October 1999, the 
Commission announced its 
intention to initiate a detailed 
investigation of the proposed 
operation. 
The Commission's investi-
gation revealed a number of 
serious competition problems, 
firstly on the wholesale markets 
for motor fuels and heating oil, 
secondly on the retail market 
for the sale of motor fuels on 
motorways, thirdly on the 
liquefied petroleum gas market 
(LPG) and lastly on the market 
for Aviation fuel sales at the 
Lyon and Toulouse airports. 
The wholesale market. One of 
the main peculiarities of the 
French motor fuel market has 
been the emergence, over the 
last decade, of the hyper- and 
supermarket chains as major 
retailers, accounting today 
together for 52% of total sales. 
This has led to price-levels 
(before taxes) among the lowest 
within the EU. However, retail 
chains are only resellers and 
they must procure fuels from 
the integrated refiners who are 
also their competitors on the 
retail market. Prior to the 
concentration this situation was 
not problematic as refiners 
were themselves in competition 
on the wholesale market and 
for the provision of logistic 
services. In fact competition 
existed at the wholesale level 
firstly between the refiners 
based in France and secondly 
because of European-wide 
over-capacities in the refining 
industry that made possible the 
import of refined products. It 
could however only take place 
because of the ability of the 
resellers to access the logistics 
necessary to import, stock and 
transport refined products... 
The Commission found that the 
concentration between TotalFina 
and Elf would have put in 
jeopardy every element of the 
competitive balance of these 
markets. The notified transaction 
would have put an end to the 
rivalry between the two main 
national refiners (Totalfina and 
Elf) and would have placed in 
their hands 55% of the refining 
capacities (and an equivalent 
market share on the wholesale 
market), control over a majority 
of the French import terminals, 
control over the three principal 
pipelines supplying French 
territory and over a substantial 
part of the local terminals. This 
combination would have 
conferred on TotalFina/Elf a 
substantial market power on the 
wholesale market that could not 
be contested either by demand 
(supermarkets or large final 
customers) or by competing 
refiners or even by imports. It 
would have, in turn, allowed 
TotalFina/Elf to contain any 
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competitive pressure on the retail 
market from the retail chains 
and, ultimately, to increase retail 
prices for motor fuels and 
domestic heating oil. 
In order to obtain the agreement 
of the Commission to their 
proposed concentration, 
TotalFina has therefore 
committed to divest the majority 
of the assets of the new 
combined entity in logistics. 
These divestments, if fully 
complied with, will open 
facilities for importing, storing 
and transporting refined products 
on French territory. In fact, only 
such a significant opening of the 
infrastructure could enable third 
parties to contest efficiently 
TotalFina/Elfs market power 
through recourse to imports and 
to independent transport and 
storage facilities. 
In practice, TotalFina gives up 
all presence it has or abandons 
its control positions in the 
majority of French import 
terminals, and in particular in 
those that supply the major 
pipeline systems supplying 
French territory. Moreover, 
TotalFina/Elf will keep only 
minority shares in the two 
principal French pipeline 
systems and completely 
withdraw from the third pipeline 
system as well as from all 
adjacent terminals . Finally a 
number of inland terminals 
(terminals located in the most 
important urban areas) will be 
divested. 
The opening of the logistics, up 
to now dominated by the major 
refiners, was considered 
sufficient to allow the 
maintenance of the competitive 
conditions on the retail market 
and will have a dissuasive effect 
on those refiners who would be 
tempted to raise prices for motor 
fuel and domestic heating oil. 
Motorways.The Commission 
also found that the merger would 
eliminate competition in the 
market for retailing motor fuel 
on the French motorways. As the 
Commission had already noted 
in previous cases (the Total/Fina 
and Exxon/Mobil case), motor 
fuel sales on the motorways 
constitute a separate market with 
prices being significantly higher 
than prices charged off-
motorways. The supermarkets 
are almost absent from this 
market, which was essentially 
shared between five operators, 
all being integrated refiners. The 
investigation conducted by the 
Commission has shown that 
competition, already reduced 
before the TotalFina/Elf 
concentration, would be nearly 
eliminated as the combined 
entity would hold almost two 
thirds of the market. 
TotalFina proposed to divest 70 
service stations, a figure roughly 
corresponding to Elf s motorway 
network, bringing the total down 
to 144. The elimination of the 
overlap was considered by the 
Commission as necessary to 
preserve the free choice of the 
motorists, and as the only means 
of preserving effective 
competition on a market 
characterised by partially captive 
customers. 
LPG. Liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) is used by households for 
cooking and heating as well as 
by industry. The market was 
already very concentrated prior 
to the concentration. In fact, the 
four principal operators hold 
between 20 and 28% of market 
shares each, and two smaller 
competitors are linked with 
TotalFina and Elf through 
participation or joint venture. 
The investigation of the 
Commission revealed that, post 
concentration, the new entity 
would acquire a dominant 
position on the market and 
would control an important part 
of the import logistics, storage 
and bottling infrastructure (for 
conditioned LPG), all of which 
would guarantee the new entity 
full autonomy throughout 
French territory, freeing it from 
dependency on infrastructure-
access exchanges with its 
competitors. As the French LPG 
logistics situation is tense, it 
would be difficult for 
competitors to increase supply if 
the dominant group should 
increase its prices. In such a 
scenario, competitors of 
TotalFina / Elf would then 
follow the market leader rather 
than risk a confrontation. 
TotalFina proposed the 
divestment of Elf Antargaz, the 
second actor on the LPG market 
in France. This eliminates the 
overlap between TotalFina and 
Elf. Also in this market, the 
implementation of the 
commitments will allow the 
maintenance of an accessible and 
competitive market in an 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 1 February 
» ARTICLES 
economic sector that is of a 
particularly sensitive nature for 
consumers. 
Airports. Finally, the 
Commission raised concerns that 
the new entity would have the 
possibility to foreclose the 
supply of aviation fuels at the 
Lyon and Toulouse airports as 
the operation would concentrate 
the essential infrastructure in the 
hands of the merging parties. 
The Commission found that each 
of these two airports, which rank 
respectively as the third and 
fourth French airports, 
constituted substantial parts of 
the Common market . Indeed, 
they ensure an extended 
geographical cover of important 
urban and industrial areas as 
well as isolated regions. 
Moreover, Lyon - Satolas and 
Toulouse - Blagnac are both on 
the list of airports for priority 
liberalisation under the directive 
on groundhandling services.1 
Under this directive, the 
Commission publishes four lists 
of airports covered by the 
liberalisation requirements laid 
down in it. 
Conclusion 
The review of this transaction 
was of a particular importance 
for at least two reasons. First, 
the markets (motor fuel, energy 
sources, etc.) where the notified 
operation led to competition 
problems are vital in the daily 
life of most individuals. Second, 
this case illustrates the approach 
followed by the Commission 
where national majors are liable 
to combine to form a national 
champion. Such operations may 
result in the partitioning of the 
common market. In such 
circumstances, the Commission 
has to ensure the elimination of 
the activity overlaps (as the case 
for fuel retail on motorways, 
LPG and aviation fuel sales) and 
of all the bottlenecks that could 
enable the new entity to 
foreclose the market to its profit 
(control of the import logistics, 
transport and distribution of 
refined petroleum products). 
TotalFina committed itself to 
divest the 50% share acquired 
from Elf in the supply of these 
two airports. 
Council Directive 96/67/EC of 15 
October 1996 on access to the 
groundhandling market at 
Community airports, OJ L 272, 
25.10.1996. 
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Nordic Satellite Cases 
By Andrew HOBBS,DG COMP-C-2 
During the later part of 1998 
and most of 1999 the 
Commission examined a series 
of notifications2 involving 
agreements relating to satellite 
transponder capacity in the 
Nordic region. As well as 
raising issues in their own right, 
these cases were of particular 
interest because of their 
connections to two merger cases, 
Telia/Telenor3 and NSD.4 
The first of these merger cases 
involved the combination of 
Telenor, the leading supplier of 
satellite transponder capacity in 
the Nordic region and a 
shareholder in a Nordic pay-TV 
- The 1999 cases were: Case No. 
IV/35.650 - NSAB, Kinnevik and 
Tele Danmark transponder lease 
agreement; Case No. IV/C-2/36.517 
- NSAB, MTG, MTV Europe, Sci 
Fi Channel Europe LLC, and 
Nickelodeon International Ltd; Case 
No. IV/36.895 Tele Danmark and 
Canal Digital; Case No. IV/C-
2/37.303 - NSAB and SES Sirius 3 
lease; Case No. IV/C-2/37.406 -
NSAB, Terracom, SSC and Tele 
Danmark operations agreement; and , 
Case No. IV/C-2/37.517 - NSAB 
and SVT. Two related cases with in 
1998 were: Case No. IV/35.891 -
NSAB+GECSI: Transponder 
Purchase Agreement; and, Case No. 
IV/36.150 - NSAB and Telenor Joint 
Marketing Agreement. 
3 Case No M.1439 - Telia/Telenor, 
13/10/99 
4 Case IV/M490 Nordic Satellite 
Distribution, Official Journal L053, 
02/03/96, page 20. 
operator, and Telia. Telia 
controls a major cable operator 
and leases a significant amount 
of transponder capacity from 
NSAB, the only other operator in 
the Nordic region. The 
examination of the merger 
benefited from the knowledge of 
the market gained by examining 
the notifications, in particular on 
market power in relation to 
satellite transponder capacity 
and the structure of pay-TV 
operations in the Nordic region. 
The second merger case, NSD, 
related to various parties 
involved in the provision of pay-
TV. It was prohibited by the 
Commission in 1995. The joint 
venture would have foreclosed 
the market for satellite 
transponder capacity in the 
Nordic region, as well as having 
an anti-competitive impact on 
pay-TV, cable-TV operators and 
the related markets for 
technological and administrative 
services. As NSD and the 
notifications involved a similar 
set of parties (a satellite 
transponder capacity provider, a 
pay-TV operator and a cable TV 
operator) and markets, it was 
considered whether the 
agreements constituted an 
attempt to replicate what that 
Decision had prohibited. 
Accordingly the agreements 
were considered collectively and 
a Notice was published in the 
Official Journal5 to see if any 
third parties had made similar 
connections. 
All the notifications involved 
NSAB, or its parents. NSAB 
owns and operates satellites, 
primarily providing transponder 
capacity for broadcasting 
services to the Nordic and Baltic 
regions. It is owned by two state-
owned Swedish companies, SSC 
and Teracom, and Tele 
Danmark, Denmark's largest 
cable-TV operator. 
The first concern was to ensure 
that there was no collusion 
between existing Nordic satellite 
operators, NSAB and Telenor, or 
restriction on potential new 
entrants. Co-operation with 
Telenor to promote the sales of a 
dual-antenna capable of 
receiving from both NSAB and 
Telenor satellites, as well as a 
agreements with SES (the 
operator of the Astra satellites) 
to lease an NSAB satellite and 
the GECSI (a satellite builder) to 
jointly finance a new satellite, 
were examined. It was found that 
there was no restriction of 
competition. 
The next concern was with 
competition between parents of 
NSAB, in particular whether 
Tele Danmark could have 
provided its own satellite 
capacity and whether the limits 
placed on the parents use of 
NSAB's transponder capacity 
were a form of market sharing. 
The later was of particular 
5 Official Journal C168 16/06/99. 
page 9 
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concern as it involved unfamiliar 
markets and led to the 
publication of the Notice in the 
Official Journal. 
Another issue involved NSAB's 
agreements with broadcasters 
(SVT) and pay-TV operators 
(MTG/Viasat). It was necessary to 
ensure they were neither tied to 
NSAB, or in a position where 
they controlled sufficient 
transponder capacity to deny 
access to other customers. This is 
particularly of concern when, as is 
the case in the Nordic region, 
there are only two satellite 
operators and two pay-TV 
operators in the relevant markets. 
In such a market there must be 
strong justification for any 
exclusivity. 
Finally, in relation to an issue 
raised in NSD, it was considered 
whether any party could use 
control of transponder capacity to 
impose a proprietary conditional 
access and encryption system on 
broadcasters, pay-TV operators 
and cable television operators. 
Again this issue warranted the 
publication of a Notice in the 
Official Journal. 
The conclusion of the 
examination was that, despite the 
similarities, the agreements did 
not replicate NSD. Having 
examined the notifications on an 
individual basis as well they all 
received comfort letters. 
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OPINION AND COMMENTS 
In this section DG IV officials outline developments in community competition procedures. It is important 
to recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. 
They have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as a 
statement of the Commission's or DG IV's views. 
Who can be the beneficiary of a 
State aid ? 
By Ben SLOCOCK, DG COMP-G-1 
The title of this article is 
deliberately ambiguous: it can 
mean at the same time: "who is 
entitled to benefit from a state 
aid?" and also "for a given state 
aid, who can be said to be a 
beneficiary for the purpose of 
assessing its compatibility with 
the Treaty and for deciding the 
consequences if the aid is 
incompatible?" 
This article identifies a number 
of linked issues which arise in 
answering these questions in the 
exercise of the Commission's 
state aid control under articles 
87-89 EC, and signals some 
recent developments. The article 
does not attempt to list all cases 
in which these issues arise or to 
provide a definitive analysis. 
However, it will argue that a 
coherent picture is emerging on 
the Commission's view of such 
issues. 
The assumption of a single 
beneficiary 
State aid analysis traditionally 
operates on the assumption that a 
given individual grant of aid has 
a single beneficiary, which is, 
crudely put, the name to whom 
the cheque is made out. There is 
of course an element of fiction in 
the implied belief that only this 
enterprise enjoys the benefit of 
the aid. In most cases not only 
this enterprise but also its 
shareholders, suppliers, 
creditors, clients and employees 
may be better off as a result of 
the aid than they would have 
been without it. However, the 
assumption of a single 
beneficiary is entirely defensible 
as a means of carrying out state 
aid control in a manageable way. 
It is also fair to say that 
distortion of competition, at least 
in the markets of suppliers and 
clients, is likely to be limited, on 
the assumption that these 
markets are open (in particular 
because their competitors always 
have the option to trade with the 
aid beneficiary)6. 
" In some recent decisions, the 
Commission found that an analysis 
on the assumption that there was a 
single beneficiary, namely the direct 
recipient of the advantage conferred 
by the Member State, could not 
adequately assess the measure's 
distortive effect. This is the case 
where Member States have devised 
schemes granting incentives to one 
set of economic operators to provide 
finance, services, premises etc to 
another set. Examples are section 
52(8) of the German Income Taxes 
Act (OJ L 212/50 of 30.7.1998) and 
the Partnerships Investment 
Programme of English Partnerships 
(Case C 39/99, decision of 22 
December 1999, not yet published). 
Such measures, often described as 
public/private partnerships, present 
their own difficulties in terms of 
state aid control. They are not 
however the subject of this article. 
However, although it is usually 
reasonable to regard a measure 
as having a single beneficiary, 
the question can arise what is 
actually the precise meaning of 
the term. Is it the legal person? 
Is it the economic activity? 
What if one or both of these has 
disappeared or changed 
ownership? 
New guidelines on rescue and 
restructuring aid 
Such issues often arise in the 
analysis of state aid granted to 
restructure a company in 
difficulty. In the recent revision 
of the relevant guidelines 
covering such aid7, the 
Commission clarified its position 
on two points. Firstly, it 
observed that the justification for 
accepting such aid is to allow a 
potentially viable enterprise to 
rid itself of the "weight of the 
past". It concluded from this that 
a new enterprise could not be 
eligible for such aid, including in 
that term an enterprise which 
emerges from the liquidation of 
a previous firm or merely takes 
over a previous firm's assets. 
Thus the Commission was 
effectively saying that the legal 
entity receiving the aid had to be 
the same as the one whose 
difficulties justified public 
intervention. 
This position can be justified in 
several ways. From an economic 
point of view, the new enterprise 
has decided to buy the assets of 
the old one at a particular price 
OJ C 288 of 9.10.1999 
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which will take into account the 
restructuring costs which will 
follow. Adding aid simply 
distorts the market for those 
assets. It may help the creditors 
but makes little or no difference 
to the continuation of the activity 
in question, which is of course 
the aim of (and reason for 
authorising) a restructuring aid. 
So such aid is likely in any case 
to fail the necessity test. Against 
this it can be argued that assets 
may have a negative value and 
will not be purchased at all 
without aid: but then that is a 
good indication in a market 
economy that they will never be 
viable - so another important 
test applied to such aid is likely 
not to be met8. 
From a legal point of view also, 
the new and old legal entities are 
entirely separate. Under national 
insolvency law the new one is 
rarely if ever responsible for the 
actions or omissions of the last 
one, even under special 
procedures (such as the French 
system of "reprise après 
redressement judiciaire") where 
The Commission has accepted a 
limited exception to the "new 
companies" rule in the New Laender 
of Germany (sec footnote 10 in the 
new guidelines). The economic 
argument for doing so is that the 
rule that assets sold for €1 without 
debt and still not viable, have little 
or no chance of ever being viable, 
holds because market forces would 
normally have ensured that the use 
of viable assets is optimised. Where 
there have been no market forces, it 
is more likely to happen that viable 
assets can be extracted from a non-
viable whole but that the costs of 
doing so exceed the future profits 
from doing so. 
the continuation of the activity, 
rather than the reimbursement of 
creditors, is the prime objective. 
If the Commission were to allow 
restructuring aid in such cases, 
successive liquidations and aided 
"Phoenix" companies, keeping 
alive non-viable operations 
through the creation of new legal 
vehicles, would be much more 
likely. 
The Commission was thus 
identifying the legal entity, 
rather than the economic 
activity, as the important concept 
for the purpose of state aid 
analysis. It maintained this 
position in the second point to 
note in the new guidelines, 
namely in the application of the 
newly-introduced "one time last 
time" rule to successor 
companies purchasing the assets 
of previous aid beneficiaries. It 
indicated that such successor 
companies would not "inherit" 
the ban on a second restructuring 
aid from the previous 
beneficiary, provided that certain 
safeguards to prevent abuse were 
met. These are that the 
purchaser is clearly separate 
from the old firm; that the 
purchaser has acquired the old 
firm's assets at market prices; 
and that the winding-up or 
court-supervised administration 
and purchase of the old company 
are not merely circumvention 
devices (the Commission could 
decide that this is the case if, for 
example, the difficulties 
encountered by the purchaser 
were clearly foreseeable when it 
took over the assets of the old 
company). These safeguards are 
referred to further below. 
Recovery of incompatible aid 
from successor companies 
When a Member State has 
granted state aid illegally (ie 
without Commission 
authorisation) and the 
Commission finds this aid to be 
incompatible with the common 
market, it normally decides that 
the Member State must recover 
the aid. In normal circumstances 
(ie where the original beneficiary 
still exists and is continuing its 
activity) there is no doubt over 
where recovery should be sought 
from. However the Commission 
has been confronted with other 
circumstances and has had to 
decide from where recovery 
should be sought. 
An important case in this area is 
Finmeccanica/Alfa Romeo. The 
Commission decided in 1989 
that capital injections to Alfa 
Romeo made in 1985 and 1986 
through public holding company 
Finmeccanica were illegal and 
incompatible state aid9. It 
ordered recovery. In the 
meantime the main productive 
assets of Alfa Romeo had been 
sold to Fiat. The legal entity 
(Alfa Romeo SpA) which had 
received the aid initially 
remained in Finmeccanica's 
ownership but had its remaining 
assets (apart from tax credits) 
transferred to Finmeccanica and 
was then sold. It was liquidated 
in December 1987. 
The Commission had to decide 
from whom the recovery should 
OJL 394/9 of 1989. 
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be sought. The Commission 
decided that recovery should be 
sought from Finmeccanica and 
not from Fiat, even though the 
latter was now carrying out the 
economic activity in respect of 
which the aid had been granted. 
This decision was upheld by the 
ECJ10. 
Here too we can see a 
concentration on the legal entity 
rather than the economic 
activity. But the concentration is 
not total and dogmatic. Strictly 
speaking the legal entity which 
had received the aid no longer 
existed at the time of the 
Commission decision, having 
had all its remaining assets 
transferred to its parent. That 
being the case the Commission 
sought recovery from the parent. 
The point tested by the Court 
was whether recovery should 
have been sought from Fiat. 
Noone contested that recovery 
was by then impossible because 
the legal vehicle had ceased to 
exist. 
The Commission has dealt with 
similar issues more recently. In 
the Gröditzer decision" the 
Commission indicated that 
recovery should be made from 
Gröditzer or "any other 
undertaking to which assets have 
been transferred in such a way as 
to deprive paragraph 1 [the 
recovery decision] of any 
effect". The Commission took 
this unusual step because it had 
1 0 Case C-305/89, judgment of 21 
March 1991,1-1603 
11 OJL 292/27 of 13.11.1999 
been hinted that the assets of 
Gröditzer might be transferred to 
another legal vehicle, in the 
same ownership, to evade the 
recovery decision. Thus the 
Commission saw a possibility 
that a future operator of the 
original beneficiary's assets 
might be liable to pay recovery. 
This possibility was also raised 
in the case of the French 
shipyards ACH and in the Italian 
case Seleco. 
So would the Commission 
always "pursue the assets" in 
order to effect recovery when the 
original legal entity no longer 
exists or is not in a position to 
repay the aid? The answer must 
be no. The obligation on the 
Member State is to use all 
available remedies to recover the 
aid from the entity which 
received it. Assuming it is a 
company, this may extend to 
forcing the company's 
liquidation. Even if the 
liquidation does not produce 
enough proceeds to repay the aid 
in full, this could not in itself 
justify pursuing any future 
owner of the assets. Such a 
liquidation has a significant 
value in terms of the conditions 
of competition, since competing 
undertakings, which may have 
been harmed by the incompatible 
state aid, will have the 
opportunity to fill the market 
void left and/or to acquire the 
assets being sold12. (There is 
12 This is true even in the worst case 
scenario that the liquidation has 
already happened before the 
Member State tries to seek recovery 
also a salutary lesson for 
creditors and shareholders of the 
dangers of trading with and 
owning businesses receiving 
incompatible state aid.) 
The question, then, is where the 
line is drawn between cases 
where assets can be pursued and 
those where they cannot. In all 
candour the line is not yet 
precisely defined. A parallel can 
however be drawn with the 
safeguard conditions mentioned 
above in connection with the 
"one time last time" rule13. One 
important test is whether the 
assets are still in the same 
ultimate ownership, as was the 
case both in Finmeccanica, in 
relation to the "remaining assets" 
of Alfa Romeo, and - potentially 
- in Gröditzer (cf the "clearly 
separate" condition above, which 
is clearly not met by the old and 
new owners of assets which are 
in the same ultimate ownership 
as before)14. Another is whether 
the transfer of assets was at 
market conditions. A third is 
whether the specific aim of the 
in compliance with the Commission 
decision. 
'-' The kind of situation which would 
lead the Commission to pursue the 
assets canalso be compared with 
national insolvency provisions on 
fraud on creditors etc. 
1 4 A further interesting example from 
the world of anti-trust is the case of 
SAGA Petrokjemi which had its 
assets transferred to, and was then 
liquidated by, a new parent Statoil 
between the time of its participation 
in the polypropylene cartel and the 
imposition of fines. The 
Commission imposed the fine on 
Statoil. See OJ L 230/1 of 
18.8.1986, recitals 97ff. 
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transfer was to frustrate recovery 
of the aid, though the 
Commission would probably not 
feel it necessary to prove this 
was the case if other tests 
showed that the recovery 
decision had, in fact, been 
deprived of effect. But these 
may not be exhaustive. 
The "pass-through" doctrine 
Underlying all this thinking is 
the view that assets transferred at 
market conditions between 
independent economic operators 
are "cleansed" by the transaction 
both of the difficulties of their 
previous owners - assets carry no 
debts with tem - and of any 
continuing advantage conferred 
by previous aid (but not if 
transferred at other conditions). 
There is a certain logic in this: it 
is hard to argue, at least in the 
majority of cases, that the price 
of those assets, and therefore the 
situation of the new owner, 
would have been lower in the 
absence of the previous owner's 
difficulties or higher in the 
absence of the state aid. By 
contrast there is nothing in the 
arguments and examples above 
which would suggest that change 
of ownership of a given legal 
entity, such as a company, on 
whatever terms, would affect the 
assessment that that entity 
continued to enjoy the benefit of 
a previous state aid. This 
different treatment of "asset 
sales" and "share sales" is 
further referred to below. 
The view that a benefit continues 
to be enjoyed after a change of 
ownership, whether of assets or 
of shares, is known as the "pass-
through" doctrine. A version of 
this doctrine was recently tested 
in a different context from 
Community state aid control, 
namely an appeal to the World 
Trade Organisation by the 
Community against imposition 
by the USA of countervailing 
duties on certain hot-rolled lead 
and bismuth carbon steel 
products from the UK15. In 1992 
the USA imposed duties against 
a company called UES which 
was previously 50% owned by 
the public (and subsidised) 
British Steel Corporation (BSC). 
BSC established UES in 1986 in 
association with another 
company GKN. British Steel pic 
was the successor of BSC in the 
sense that the former assumed 
the property, rights and liabilities 
of the latter in September 1988. 
The UK government privatised 
British Steel pic in December 
1988 through a sale of shares. It 
was not disputed that the 
privatisation of British Steel pic 
was at market conditions. The 
US found that a portion of the 
alleged subsidies in question (in 
the form of capital contributions 
dating from 1977-1985, which 
the US allocates over an 18 year 
period) "passed through" from 
BSC to UES and remained with 
UES after privatisation of British 
Steel pic. The US therefore 
imposed countervailing duties on 
imports of leaded bars produced 
by UES (later renamed BSES) 
based on that portion of "benefit" 
1 5 Panel decision dated 23.12.1999. 
Available at http://www.wto.org/ 
wto/ddf/ep/public.html. 
from prior subsidies that was 
deemed to have passed through 
to UES. 
The US argued that the 
determinative factor is the 
productive assets, not the 
owners, citing relevant WTO 
texts referring to the "subsidy" as 
being "bestowed, directly or 
indirectly, upon the manufacture, 
production or export of' the 
product. In focusing on the 
productive assets, the US 
asserted that the successor firm 
really is "no different" from the 
subsidy recipient. Clearly, this 
is a very different logic from the 
one which emerges from 
Community state aid texts and 
decisions described above, even 
if the case in question is 
complicated by the chain of 
transactions before and after the 
privatisation, and even if the 
concepts and aims of WTO 
disciplines are not directly 
parallel to those of Community 
state aid law. 
The WTO panel's finding is an 
interesting one. Essentially it 
rejects the pass-through doctrine. 
It has, however, been appealed 
by the US (the WTO appellate 
body is due to report by late 
April 2000). It finds in the first 
instance that "fair market value 
was paid for all productive 
assets, goodwill etc. employed 
by UES and BSplc/BSES in the 
production of leaded bars 
imported into the United States 
in 1994, 1995 and 1996" (the 
period of the measures in 
question). In these 
circumstances, the panel failed 
to see "how pre-1985/86 
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"financial contributions" 
bestowed on BSC could 
subsequently be considered to 
confer a "benefit" on UES and 
BSplc/BSES during the relevant 
periods of review". Thus it can 
certainly be seen that in the 
circumstances where the 
Commission would generally, 
for state aid purposes, see no 
transfer of advantage (sale of 
assets at market conditions 
between independent economic 
operators), the WTO panel 
would also do so. 
The panel goes on to make a 
further statement, in connection 
with the argument that the 
privatisation of British Steel on 
market terms also eliminated any 
aid effects. The panel said "in 
our view, it is irrelevant that the 
aforementioned fair market value 
was paid by the (new) owners of 
UES and BSplc/BSES 
respectively, rather than those 
companies themselves. Any 
approach requiring that fair 
market value be paid by the 
company itself, rather than its 
owners, would elevate form over 
substance. In the context of 
privatizations negotiated at arm's 
length, for fair market value, and 
consistent with commercial 
principles, the distinction 
between a company and its 
owners is redundant for the 
purpose of establishing 
"benefit"". 
On this point it can be argued 
that the panel diverges with 
Commission practice in state aid 
cases. As a rule, the Commission 
does distinguish between a 
company and its owners. Since 
quoted companies change their 
ownership many times a day, it 
is hard to see how it could be 
otherwise. There is however 
established practice in the area of 
privatisation which suggests that 
the outcome in this particular 
case is not divergent. In the 
Commission's 23rd (1993) 
annual competition report the 
Commission noted that "When 
the privatisation is effected by 
the sale of shares on the stock 
exchange, it is generally 
assumed to be on market 
conditions and not to involve 
aid. Before flotation, debt may 
be written off or reduced without 
this giving rise to a presumption 
of aid as long as the proceeds of 
the flotation exceed the 
reduction in debt". Thus where 
a business is owned by the state 
and afterwards sold, debt write-
off before the sale - which, 
without the sale, would certainly 
be considered to be aid to that 
enterprise - is no longer held to 
confer an advantage on the 
business after it. 
Conclusion 
The author of this article is not a 
lawyer (this may already be clear 
to those who are). As such he 
tends to dislike the elevation of 
legal form over economic reality 
(or "form over substance" as the 
WTO expressed it). But it is too 
easy to fall into thinking that 
economic reality consists of 
activity, assets, employees while 
legal entities are mere chimeric 
constructions. Legal entities, and 
in particular companies, are in 
fact collections of economic 
interests organised in a particular 
way. There is an economic 
logic, as well a legal one, in the 
view that the beneficiary of a 
state aid should generally be 
held only to be the legal entity 
which has received, or is 
proposed to receive it. 
This general view can be seen to 
be maintained coherently by the 
Commission in the various 
examples cited above. The 
Commission does not, and 
should not, elevate this view to 
the level of dogma. Nor is there 
a strict logical need that this 
view should apply equally in all 
instances. It would, for example, 
be possible to defend a stricter 
position on the "one time last 
time" rule - no second aid for 
the same economic activity using 
the same assets - while 
maintaining the same view as 
now in relation to recovery and 
eligibility. 
There are of course possible 
objections to the general view. In 
relation to eligibility for 
restructuring aid, it can be 
observed that when an enterprise 
buys the shares of a company in 
difficulty then the price will take 
into account the restructuring 
costs which will follow just as 
much as if it had purchased the 
assets. The crucial difference, 
however, is that a buyer of 
shares acquires an enterprise 
complete with liabilities. It is of 
course possible to construct an 
example where, perhaps 
following a concordat of 
creditors, an enterprise in 
difficulty has rid itself of most 
liabilities and the economic 
difference between a share and 
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an asset sale is minimal. But 
these cases are exceptional if 
they ever exist in practice at all. 
The Commission took the view 
in the new guidelines that the 
need to avoid abuse through 
drawing a clear line overrode 
any potential "hard cases" which 
could be theoretically imagined. 
The general view should 
certainly not be maintained when 
it denies state aid decisions of 
effect (hence the need to retain 
the possibility of "pursuing 
assets" in cases of aid recovery, 
even if the circumstances in 
which this can be done have not 
been precisely defined by the 
Commission). Against this, it 
can be argued that if the rule is 
not absolute, or if the exceptions 
are not clear, there is a lack of 
legal certainty. However in state 
aid, legal certainty comes from 
notification and approval. In the 
recovery situation it should be 
remembered that we are by 
definition dealing with cases of 
illegality. Some doubt may be 
unavoidable - absolutely clear 
rules would need to be extremely 
complex (and would be an 
invitation to devise ways to get 
round them). 
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Application of Articles 81 & 82 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between Is' November 1999 and 31s' January 2000 
Commission approves an 
agreement to improve energy 
efficiency of washing machines 
By Manuel MARTINEZ LÓPEZ, DG COMP-F-1 
On 24 January 2000, the 
Commission adopted an 
exemption decision16 regarding 
an agreement notified by the 
European Council of Domestic 
Appliance Manufacturers 
(CECED). 
The agreement gathers the 
principal European producers 
and importers of washing 
machines and aims at reducing 
energy consumption of domestic 
washing machines thereby redu-
cing polluting emissions from 
power generation. To achieve 
this, participants, which hold in 
excess of 95% of the EC market, 
will stop producing for and 
importing into the EU the least 
energy-efficient machines17. The 
parties also undertake to achieve 
a common target of efficiency, 
promote technology and 
awareness on environmentally 
friendly use of machines and 
monitor implementation with 
annual reports. 
1 6 Not yet published. Publication 
pursuant to article 19(3) of 
Regulation 17 in OJ C/382 of 
9.12.98, p.6. Press release IP/00/148 
of 11 February 2000. 
' ' Such machines are labelled under 
categories D to G, pursuant to 
Commission Directive 95/12 (EC) 
This is the first time that a 
formal decision of application of 
Article 81 concerns a horizontal 
agreement between almost all 
EC manufacturers and importers 
aiming at eliminating products 
which do not meet 
environmental criteria. It is 
therefore useful to summarise 
the criteria set forth in it. 
Among the four commitments, 
only the discontinuation of 
production and import of certain 
categories of washing machines 
is found to fall under Article 81 
(1). The three others, in view of 
their modalities of 
implementation, are unlikely to 
appreciably restrict competition 
and affect trade between 
Member States. 
The commitment to promote 
information and technology 
dissemination is formulated in a 
general way and does not limit 
the parties' autonomy of 
behaviour in the market. The 
exchange of information takes 
place in a non oligopolistic 
market and concerns one year 
old aggregated data. The 
contribution to a common 
efficiency target is formulated in 
a general way. Since there are no 
«quotas» on the basis of which 
individual contributions are 
allocated, the commitment to 
contribute to the target is not 
deemed restrictive. 
However, the discontinuation of 
production and imports of some 
categories of washing machines 
covers 10-11% of the machines 
sold in the EC. These machines 
amounted to a considerable 
proportion of the sales of some 
manufacturers prior to the 
agreement. Moreover, energy-
efficiency is an important 
purchase criterion, on which 
manufacturers focus advertising 
and, therefore, on which 
competition takes place in the 
market. Finally, technical 
improvements may also increase 
prices in the short run. 
Such an agreement between 
almost all producers and 
importers in the market falls 
under the prohibition of Article 
81 (1). The decision concludes in 
respect of Article 81 (3) as 
follows: 
- The agreement objectively 
contributes to technical and 
economic progress, by 
focusing production on more 
efficient machines. Such 
benefits would be unlikely or 
would occur less quickly 
without the agreement. 
- Consumers derive benefits at 
the same time individually 
and for society as a whole : 
likely higher purchase costs 
of more efficient washing 
machines are quickly 
compensated by savings in 
electricity bills; the 
agreement contributes to EC 
environmental objectives and 
the benefits very largely 
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exceed potential cost 
increases triggered as a result 
of the agreement. Even if 
individual purchasers were 
not to derive the financial 
benefits that they actually 
attain, the magnitude of 
environmental benefits is 
such that the net contribution 
to society's economic welfare 
would still be positive. 
- The restrictions of 
competition are indispensable 
to attaining those benefits. 
Consumers do not 
sufficiently take external 
costs into account in their 
purchase decisions. The 
application of a minimum 
efficiency ratio mitigates this 
market failure. Alternatives 
such as public awareness 
campaigns or application of 
ecolabels would be 
complementary, rather than 
substitutable to the 
agreement. 
- The agreement does not 
eliminate competition. 
Various technical means to 
improve energy efficiency of 
washing machines are 
economically available to all 
manufacturers; competition 
remains also on important 
purchase criteria such as 
prices, technical 
effectiveness, brand 
image etc; finally, 90% of 
sales of washing machines 
are not directly concerned. 
Three additional aspects need to 
be stressed in connection with 
the exemption decision. First, the 
decision illustrates the Treaty 
principle of integration of 
environmental concerns in 
competition policy, taking into 
account quantitatively the costs 
and the benefits for the 
environment18. It also recognises 
the contribution of initiatives on 
the part of industry to achieve 
EC environmental objectives, in 
particular as regards energy 
efficiency and reduction of air 
pollution. Finally, the existence 
of a de facto minimum energy 
efficiency ratio renders 
superfluous legislation in this 
respect. 
The exemption is granted for a 
short duration, from the date of 
notification until 31 December 
2001, which is the expiry date of 
the agreement. Thereafter, it will 
become apparent whether the 
actual results and effects of the 
agreement are, on balance, 
satisfactory. 
Article 174 of the EC Treaty and 
Articles 3(1 )(f) and 7 of EP and 
Council Decision 2179/98/EC of 24 
September 1998 on the review of 
the European Community 
programme of policy and action in 
relation to the environment and 
sustainable development "Towards 
sustainability" (OJ L 275, 
10.10.1998, p.l). 
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La Commission inflige des amendes à 
un cartel de producteurs de tubes 
d'acier sans soudure pour partage de 
marchés 
Par Ingrid BREIT, DG COMP-E-1 et 
Francisco PÉREZ FLORES, DG COMP-H-1 
(1) Introduction 
Le 8 décembre 1999 la 
Commission a adopté une 
décision sur base de l'article 81 
CE imposant des amendes 
totalisant 99 millions d'euros à 
huit producteurs de tubes d'acier 
sans soudure. Ils se sont concertés 
jusqu'en 1995 sur le respect de 
leurs marchés domestiques 
respectifs en ce qui concerne 
certains tubes sans soudure 
destinés à la prospection et au 
transport de pétrole. 
Cette décision s'inscrit dans le 
cadre de la lutte de la 
Commission contre les ententes 
illégales dans le secteur 
sidérurgique19. 
(2) Rappel des faits 
(a) Les produits 
Les produits ayant fait l'objet du 
cartel sont les tubes de sondage 
en acier (communément appelés 
1 9 Décision du 16.02.1994 dans l'affaire 
«Poutrelles» (JO L 116 du 
6.5.1994, p.l), décision du 
26.11.1997 dans l'affaire 
« Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl » (JO 
L 1 du 31.01.1998) et décision du 
21.01.1998 dans l'affaire «Extra 
d'alliage» (JO L 100 du 01.04.1998, 
p.55) 
OCTG) "standard" et les tubes 
de transport (communément 
appelés linepipe) "project" qui 
constituent une partie des tubes 
utilisés pour le sondage et le 
transport du pétrole et du gaz. 
(b) Les producteurs de tubes 
d'acier sans soudure concernés 
Les huit entreprises concernées 
figurent parmi les plus grands 
producteurs de tubes sans 
soudure au niveau mondial. Il 
s'agit de quatre entreprises 
communautaires (British Steel 
Limited, Royaume-Uni, Dalmine 
S.p.A., Italie, Mannesmann-
röhren Werke A.G., Allemagne, 
et Vallourec S.A, France) et de 
quatre entreprises japonaises 
(Kawasaki Steel Corporation, 
NKK Corporation, Nippon Steel 
Corporation et Sumitomo Metal 
Industries Limited). 
(c) Le fonctionnement du cartel 
En vue de coordonner leur 
comportement sur les marchés 
des OCTG standard et des 
linepipe project, les producteurs 
européens et japonais ont mis sur 
pied un cartel qu'ils ont appelé le 
« Club Europe -Japon ». 
Ce cartel a restreint la 
concurrence dans le marché 
commun en prévoyant le respect 
des marchés domestiques des 
différents producteurs (c'est-à-
dire les marchés allemand, 
français, italien, britannique, 
japonais) dans la mesure où 
l'offre de tubes sans soudure 
dans les Etats de la Communauté 
où était établi un producteur 
national a été limitée par 
l'abstention des autres 
producteurs parties à l'accord de 
livrer des tubes sur ces marchés. 
D'autres volets de l'accord de 
cartel concernant certains 
marchés tiers n'ont pas fait 
l'objet de décision puisque la 
Commission n'a pas pu apporter 
la preuve d'un effet restrictif à 
l'intérieur de l'UE. 
En ce qui concerne la durée de 
l'infraction, la Commission a 
retenu la période 1990-1995 
(sauf pour British Steel Limited 
qui a abandonné la production 
des tubes en question en 1994). 
(d) Amendes 
Lors de la fixation des montants 
des amendes la Commission a 
tenu compte du fait qu'un accord 
visant le respect des marchés 
domestiques des entreprises 
participantes constitue par nature 
une infraction très grave au droit 
communautaire puisqu'il porte 
atteinte au bon fonctionnement 
du marché intérieur. De plus, les 
quatre Etats membres en cause 
représentent la majorité de la 
consommation des OCTG et des 
linepipe sans soudure dans la CE 
et, dès lors, un marché 
géographique étendu. 
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Cependant, la Commission a 
aussi tenu compte du fait que les 
OCTG standard et les linepipe 
project vendus par les entreprises 
destinataires de la décision dans 
la Communauté ne représentent 
qu'environ 19% de la 
consommation communautaire 
des OCTG et linepipe sans 
soudure. En outre, une partie de 
la demande d'OCTG et de 
linepipe sans soudure pouvait 
être couverte par des tubes 
soudés de moyen diamètre. 
Enfin, les ventes de ces produits 
par les entreprises destinataires 
de la décision dans les quatre 
Etats membres concernés ne 
s'élevaient qu'à environ 73 
millions d'euros par an pendant 
la période 1990-1995. L'impact 
concret de l'infraction sur le 
marché est dès lors resté limité. 
La Commission a retenu comme 
circonstance atténuante la crise 
de longue durée qu'a connu le 
secteur et le fait que depuis 1991 
la situation du secteur s'est 
détériorée ce qui, combiné à 
l'afflux croissant des 
importations, a entraîné des 
réductions de capacités et des 
fermetures d'usines. 
contenu de l'entente et a ainsi 
permis à la Commission de 
constater l'infraction à l'article 
81, paragraphe 1, CE avec moins 
de difficulté. Cette coopération a 
justifié une réduction de 40 % du 
montant de l'amende. Dalmine, 
qui n'a pas contesté la 
matérialité des faits sur lesquels 
la Commission avait fondé ses 
accusations, a obtenu une 
réduction de 20 % du montant de 
l'amende. 
La décision fait une nette 
distinction entre ces deux 
entreprises qui ont réellement 
coopéré et celles au 
comportement ambigu comme 
Mannesmannröhren Werke et 
British Steel: bien qu'elles 
n'aient pas contesté les faits, 
elles n'ont jamais clairement 
exprimé leur position ou mis en 
doute l'existence de l'accord tel 
que décrit dans la 
communication de griefs. Un tel 
comportement ne constitue pas 
une coopération effective qui 
aurait pu justifier une application 
de la communication précitée. 
Il a enfin été fait application de 
la communication concernant la 
non-imposition d'amendes ou la 
réduction de leur montant dans 
les affaires portant sur les 
ententes20. 
Vallourec a été la seule 
entreprise à fournir des éléments 
substantiels sur l'existence et le 
20 JO C 207 du 18 juillet 1996, p.4 
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The Commission fines FEG, the Dutch 
association of electrotechnical 
equipment wholesalers and its biggest 
member TU 
By Ernst FERDINANDUSSE, DG COMP-F-1 
On 26 October 1999, the 
Commission adopted a Decision 
by which fines have been 
imposed on the Dutch association 
of electrotechnical equipment 
wholesalers (FEG) and its biggest 
member Technische Unie (TU) 
for violating Article 81(1) of the 
EC Treaty21. The Commission 
found that FEG and TU restricted 
competition by operating a 
system of collective exclusive 
dealing in combination with a 
system of price co-ordination on 
the Dutch wholesale market for 
electrotechnical equipment. The 
Commission therefore imposed 
fines of euro 4.4 million on FEG 
and euro 2.15 million on TU. 
The case started as a result of a 
complaint in 1991 by the UK 
based wholesaler in 
electrotechnical equipment City 
Electrical Factors and its Dutch 
subsidiary ("CEF"). It concerns 
two infringements of Article 
81(1) of the EC Treaty on the 
Dutch wholesale market for 
electrotechnical equipment, 
essentially over the period 1986-
1994. Electrotechnical 
equipment includes a wide range 
of electrical products such as 
cables, plugs, lightsources, 
switches and sockets used for 
creating an electrical system in 
buildings, houses and industries. 
The first infringement regarded 
the operation of a collective 
exclusive dealing arrangement 
involving the FEG, the 
association of importers of such 
products in the Netherlands 
("NAVEG") and a large number 
of individual suppliers of such 
products. 
Under this agreement FEG 
prohibited members of the 
NAVEG and individual 
suppliers from selling to 
wholesalers which were not 
members of FEG. The 
prohibition deprived these 
wholesalers of many of their 
sources of supply and 
complicated and delayed the 
entry to the Dutch market of 
foreign wholesalers such as the 
complainant. At the same time, 
the arrangement prevented 
suppliers from selling their 
products on the Dutch market 
via wholesalers who were not 
FEG members. As the turnover 
of the NAVEG members, 
especially depended for a large 
part on sales to FEG members it 
was difficult for them to ignore 
the wishes of the FEG. 
21 OJ L 39 of 14 February 2000, p. 1 
The arrangement was based on a 
gentleman's agreement between 
the FEG and the NAVEG which 
was joined by individual 
suppliers. It appeared that until 
the late fifties the collective 
exclusive dealing arrangement 
had been based on a formal 
written agreement. The 
Commission found evidence that 
after its prohibition by the Dutch 
competition authorities the parties 
had decided to convert the formal 
written agreement into the above-
mentioned more covert 
gentleman's agreement. 
The second infringement 
identified by the Commission 
regarded the interference by FEG 
in the pricing policy of its 
members. It appeared from many 
documents that FEG and its 
members aimed at lessening price 
competition among themselves 
and at creating artificial price 
stability to ensure healthy 
margins. In order to achieve these 
goals FEG and its members had 
recourse to the following 
instruments: 
a binding FEG decision 
prohibiting its members from 
advertising using specially-
reduced prices; 
a binding FEG decision 
obliging the FEG members 
to pass on to their customers 
price increases implemented 
by the supplier after they 
have ordered the products; 
discussions among FEG 
members on prices and 
discounts in the context of 
FEG meetings; and 
price recommendations 
issued by FEG to its 
members. 
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The effects of the price 
arrangements were enhanced by 
the collective exclusive dealing 
arrangement. As the exclusive 
collective dealing arrangement 
intended to deprive potential 
price cutters such as non­FEG 
wholesalers from their sources of 
supply, the possibility that the 
artificial price stability created 
by FEG and its members would 
be put at risk by outsiders was 
strongly reduced. 
Considering that FEG members 
account for 96% of the Dutch 
wholesale market for 
electrotechnical equipment, the 
violations have appreciably 
restricted competition. As 
between 30­50 % of all 
electrotechnical products sold on 
the Dutch market are imported, 
trade between Member States 
has also been appreciably 
restricted. 
The decision orders the parties to 
put an end to the above 
infringements in so far as this 
has not yet occurred and imposes 
fines on both FEG and TU. The 
Commission has calculated the 
fines on the basis of its published 
fining guidelines22. In 
determining the amounts of the 
fines the Commission has taken 
into account that the 
infringements were serious and 
of long duration. 
The Commission has identified 
FEG as the initiator and 
controller of both the collective 
2 2 Guidelines on the method of setting 
fines, OJ No. C 9 of 14.1.1998 
exclusive dealing arrangement 
and the pricing arrangements. 
The Commission has also fined 
FEG's biggest and most 
important member TU for two 
reasons, namely for supporting 
the infringements through: 
its active and long­term 
participation in the board of 
FEG and its committees; and 
its individual behaviour in 
support of both restrictions 
in its contacts with 
individual companies. 
The Commission decided not to 
act against the 6 other members 
of the FEG which also received 
the Statement of objections. The 
information provided by those 6 
parties in their written 
observations to the Statement of 
Objections and their comments 
during the hearing showed that 
in their case the Commission 
possessed insufficient evidence. 
The procedure which started in 
1991 has taken a considerable 
amount of time. Although the 
Commission considers that it is 
not solely responsible for the 
length of the proceedings, it has 
accepted its responsibility by 
taking into consideration the 
case law of both the Court of 
First Instance and the European 
Court of Justice in setting the 
amount of the fine23. The fines 
for both FEG and TU were 
therefore reduced by 100.000 
euro each. 
2 3 See the Court of Justice, case Ο­
Ι 85/95 Ρ, Baustahlgewebe [1998] 
ECR 1­8485 and the Court of First 
Instance in the joined cases T­213/95 
and T­18/96, SCK and FNK ν 
Commission [1997] ECR 11­1739. 
At the start of this year FEG (T­
05/00) and TU (T­06/00) lodged 
appeals with the Court of First 
Instance against the Commission 
Decision. 
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Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 
Recent developments and 
important decisions 
By Tiina PITKÄNEN, DG COMP-B-2 and 
Neil MARSHALL, DG COMP-B-1 
Introduction and statistical 
overview 
The number of incoming 
notifications continued at record 
levels between 1 September and 
31 December 1999. A total of 
107 operations were notified and 
92 decisions were adopted on 
cases under the Merger 
Regulation's main provisions 
(Articles 6 and 8). This was nine 
decisions more than over the 
previous four month period. The 
Commission also adopted one 
partial referral decision under 
Article 9 of the Merger 
Regulation. 
In total, the Commission cleared 
63 transactions in the first phase 
of the investigation. Of these 4 
were approved in the first phase 
only after the parties submitted 
undertakings. A detailed enquiry 
in accordance with Article 6(1 )c 
of the Merger Regulation was 
opened in a record number of 10 
cases. One further operation was 
abandoned. The Commission 
took a decision after a detailed 
investigation in 5 cases. This 
included one prohibition 
decision. The others were 
approved subject to divestiture 
and other commitments, none 
was cleared without some form 
of commitment 
The Commission imposed fines 
for providing incorrect 
information in merger 
proceedings in 2 cases. Nine 
decisions were taken involving 
joint ventures where the risk of 
parental co-ordination was 
analysed under Article 2(4). One 
of these was cleared subject to 
commitments, the remainder 
cleared without commitments. 
The Commission issued a 
decision under Article 7(4) in 4 
cases. 
Decisions adopted following a 
detailed investigation (Article 
8) 
Decision adopted under Article 
8(3) (declaring the operation 
incompatible with the common 
market) 
Following a detailed 
investigation, the Commission 
decided to prohibit the proposed 
merger between Airtours pic and 
First Choice^ in the UK 
package holiday sector, as 
competition in the short-haul 
package tour market in the UK 
would have been significantly 
reduced. The transaction would 
24 Case No. IV/M.1524 
Airtours/First Choice; Article 8(3) 
decision 22 September 1999 
have led to the creation of a 
situation of collective dominance 
between the merged 
Airtours/First Choice and the 
two other large, vertically 
integrated suppliers, Thomson 
and Thomas Cook. This was the 
first occasion on which the 
Commission prohibited a merger 
on the grounds of collective 
dominance among more than 
two firms. 
The Commission found that all 
four companies were fully 
vertically-integrated, both 
upstream into charter airline 
operation, and downstream into 
distribution via the chains of 
travel agents which they owned. 
This tended to align their cost 
structures and increase the 
transparency of the market by 
making the large firms' costs 
more easily visible to each other, 
reducing the likelihood of strong 
price competition between them. 
It also increased the scope for 
commercial links between them. 
Another key feature of the 
market was the relative 
inflexibility of supply, which 
created an incentive for the 
larger, integrated tour operators 
to keep the market 'tight' and 
not to expand capacity in order 
to compete aggressively with 
each other for market share. The 
Commission also found that 
there were potentially significant 
barriers to expansion by the 
many smaller tour operators to a 
size comparable to that of the 
four large firms. 
The Commission found that the 
risk of an oversupplied market 
would act as a deterrent for the 
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oligopolists to compete for 
market share. The Commission 
also found that there would be 
scope for retaliation among the 
oligopolists if one of them were 
to do so. Against this 
background, the removal of First 
Choice as a competitor in tour 
operation and travel agency, and 
its likely loss as a major supplier 
of airline seats to third parties 
would, in the Commission's 
view, lead to the creation of a 
collective dominant position 
among the three remaining large 
firms, with significant 
anticompetitive consequences. It 
would strengthen their 
interdependency, further 
marginalise the 'fringe' of 
smaller players, and increase 
market transparency. That would 
raise the incentives for the 
oligopolists to restrict their 
capacity, and facilitate the 
adoption of effective strategies 
for doing so. 
Airtours proposed undertakings 
to remedy the Commission's 
competition concerns. The 
proposal was to divest certain 
tour operating assets - including 
brand names and existing 
bookings - to a suitable third 
party. However, this was found 
to be inadequate largely because 
it did not address the problem of 
access for the prospective buyer 
to a suitable channel of 
distribution for its holidays. It 
would not, therefore, have 
remedied one of the main 
competition detriments of the 
merger., Subsequently the 
operation was prohibited. 
Decisions adopted 
Article 8(2) 
under 
In the five cases summarised 
below, the transactions were 
cleared subject to undertakings 
following in-depth investi-
gations. 
In Exxon/Mobil2^, the operation 
as notified would have created or 
strengthened dominant positions 
in a large number of markets. 
Serious competition concerns 
arose, amongst others, on the 
markets for wholesale 
transmission of natural gas in the 
Netherlands and Germany, 
motor fuel retailing in several 
Member States, group I base oils 
(an ingredient for the production 
of lubricants) in the EEA and 
aviation lubricants world-wide. 
In order to remedy these 
concerns, the parties offered 
what is the most comprehensive 
remedy package accepted under 
the Merger Regulation to date. 
Several of these remedies raised 
particularly difficult issues. For 
example, Mobil agreed to 
withdraw from its joint venture 
with BP covering motor fuel and 
lubricants retailing in Europe. 
But the Commission had to 
balance the need for a quick 
resolution of its competition 
concerns against the need for the 
parties to get a proper 
consideration for Mobil's 
interests in a sale to a 
monopsonist buyer. In relation to 
aviation lubricants, the 
Commission obtained the 
divestiture of Exxon's business 
after the parties had initially 
proposed to divest Mobil's 
aviation lubricants business. The 
Commission considered the sale 
of Mobil's business to be 
inadequate because even though 
it would have eliminated the 
overlap between the parties, the 
Commission found that Mobil's 
business was more integrated 
with the Mobil group than that of 
Exxon. Therefore, Exxon's 
aviation lubricants business was 
considered to be more viable as a 
stand-alone entity, allowing the 
eventual purchaser to compete 
independently from the parties. 
At the same time as the 
Commission was investigating 
Exxon/Mobil, it was also 
investigating another important 
merger in the oil and chemicals 
sector: the take-over by BP 
Amoco of Atlantic Richfield26. 
To illustrate the rapid pace of 
consolidation in this sector, the 
BP Amoco Group had itself only 
been formed after the merger 
between The British Petroleum 
Company and Amoco 
Corporation in December 1998. 
As initially notified, the 
operation would have created 
dominant positions on the 
market for the transport of 
unprocessed natural gas to the 
UK mainland through off-shore 
pipelines from fields in the 
Southern North Sea ('SNS') 
25 Case No. IV/M.1383 
Exxon/Mobil; Article 8(2) decision 
with undertakings of 29 September 
1999 
26 Case No. IV/M.1532 BP 
Amoco/Atlantic Richfield; Article 
8(2) decision with undertakings 29 
September 1999 
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sector of the UK Continental 
Shelf and also on the market for 
processing natural gas in 
processing facilities on the UK 
mainland servicing the SNS 
area. In order to eliminate the 
competitive concerns, BP 
Amoco undertook to divest 
certain pipeline and processing 
interests which had the effect 
that the merged entity's position 
remains similar to that of BP 
Amoco's beforehand. 
In its investigation into the 
merger between the Swedish 
Telia and the Norwegian 
Telenor21, the Commission 
concluded that the concentration 
as originally notified would have 
caused serious competition 
concerns in a number of 
telecommunications and related 
services markets in both Sweden 
and Norway. The operation 
would have also led to adverse 
competition effects in the Irish 
mobile telephony market, where 
the merged entities would have 
had control over both of the only 
two operator's active on the Irish 
market. Lastly, there were 
serious competition concerns in 
a number of Nordic, Swedish 
and Norwegian television 
services markets. The operation 
was subject to far-reaching 
commitments to open up access 
to the local access networks for 
telephony as well as to divest 
Telia and Telenor's respective 
cable-TV businesses and other 
overlapping business. In 
particular, Telia and Telenor 
committed to divest all existing 
overlaps in the field of telecom 
services. The parties also 
undertook to sell either 
company's stake in one of the 
two existing Irish mobile 
telephony operators. The parties 
also undertook to divest their 
respective interests in cable-TV 
networks in Sweden and Norway 
and to implement a set of 
measures to introduce local loop 
unbundling (LLU) in both 
countries. 
In the form notified to the 
Commission, the transaction 
between Sanitec and Sphinx2^ 
would have led to adverse 
competition effects in ceramic 
sanitary-ware and other bathroom 
products in the Nordic countries. 
The high market shares (up to 
90%), an absence of 
countervailing buying power and 
only marginally present 
competitors led the Commission 
to conclude that the operation 
would have had a particularly 
negative effect on the Nordic 
customers. Sanitec offered 
subsequently a full divestiture of 
Sphinx's Gustavsberg business 
in the Nordic countries. A 
notable feature of these 
undertakings is that while the 
Commission did not find 
competition problems in taps and 
mixers as such, the possibility 
for the potential buyer to buy 
this business as well was 
considered important for the 
viability of the divested 
business. The option to acquire 
this taps and mixers business 
will ensure that the buyer will be 
able to offer a full range of 
products and compete fully with 
Sanitec on the Nordic market. 
Finally, in Honeywell/ 
AlliedSignaß9, the Commis-
sion's investigation focused on 
the markets for avionics for 
commercial applications 
(products generally found in the 
aircraft cockpits, such as 
communication and navigation 
equipment). The operation 
combined the first and the third 
largest world-wide suppliers of 
commercial avionics with major 
presence in all aviation 
segments. The combined market 
shares produced by the merger in 
some markets were as much as 
100 % in weather radars for civil 
helicopters. The combined entity 
would have reached market 
shares up to 74 % in Airborne 
Collision Avoidance Systems 
(ACAS) processors and ModeS 
Transponders and there would 
have been only one remaining 
competitor in this market which 
exhibited high barriers to entry. 
Furthermore, the parties' strong 
position in the market for 
Terrain Awareness Warning 
Systems (TAWS) would have 
had an effect on the future 
market for Integrated Hazard 
Awareness Systems (IHAS), 
since the TAWS is a key part of 
this system. The new entity 
would have been able to 
27 Case No IV/M.1439 
Telia/Telenor; Article 8(2) decision 
with undertakings 13 October 1999 
2 8 Case No 
Sanitec/Sphinx; 
decision with 
December 1999 
IV/M.1578 
Article 8(2) 
undertakings 1 
29 Case No IV/M.1601 
AlliedSignal/Honeywell; Article 
8(2) decision with undertakings 1 
December 1999 
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technically link its engineering 
force and technology for the next 
generation of IHAS and thereby 
foreclose competition. In order 
to remedy their resulting 
dominant positions, the parties 
offered to divest Honeywell's 
entire ACAS business and 
AlliedSignal's weather radar 
business. With respect to TAWS, 
commitments were given to 
supply third parties with details 
of the open interface standards 
of other avionics products of the 
new entity, so that new suppliers 
can have their products installed 
on aircraft equipped with other 
avionics from the new entity. 
Regarding IHAS, there will be 
an obligation to supply third 
parties with TAWS technology 
as well as interface data so that 
future product development by 
competing suppliers can 
continue to take place. 
Decisions adopted 
Article 6(l)c 
under 
The period saw a record number 
of ten proceedings opened under 
Article 6(1 )c of the Merger 
Regulation. 
The Commission decided to 
open a full investigation in two 
operations in the industrial gases 
industry. In Air Liquide/BOC^, 
the main competition concerns 
arose from the strong position 
Air Liquide would obtain in 
particular in markets for the 
supply of oxygen and nitrogen in 
large quantities to industrial 
3 0 Case No. IV/M.1630 - Air 
Liquide/BOC; Article 6(1 )c decision 
of 16, September 1999 
users (so-called tonnage 
markets), in the markets for 
helium and for speciality gases 
used in the electronics industry. 
The proposed acquisition of the 
Swedish company AGA AB by 
the German company Linde 
Aktiengesellschaft (Linde/ 
AGA^) raised serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with the 
common market in particular in 
Germany, the Netherlands and 
Austria. 
Competition concerns arise also 
in case TotalFina/Elf 
Aquitane^2. The concentration, 
as notified to the Commission, 
could lead to dominant positions 
on the French territory, in 
particular on the markets of 
wholesale of fuel (petrol, gas oil, 
LPG), fuel retail sale of fuel on 
the motorways, production and 
the sale of LPG and the jet fuel 
supply of the Toulouse and 
Lyons airports. TotalFina 
presented undertakings, but these 
were judged insufficient both in 
scope and in substance so as to 
eliminate the serious doubts raised 
by the operation. For these 
reasons, the Commission decided 
to open a full investigation into 
the notified operation. 
The proposed acquisition by the 
Canadian Onex Corporation of 
Air Canada and Canadian 
3 1 Case No. IV/M.1641 - Linde/AGA; 
Article 6(1 )c decision of 1, October 
1999 
3 2 Case No. IV/M.1628 - Totalfina/Elf 
Aquitane; Article 6(1 )c decision of 
5 October 1999 
Airlines Corporation^ would 
have brought the two main 
Canadian airlines serving routes 
between Canada and London 
under common control. It would 
also have resulted in the 
Oweworld airline alliance 
becoming the only one serving 
UK-Canada direct routes. The 
Commission was concerned that 
the operation would have led to 
anticompetitive effects as the 
two Canadian airlines, together 
with British Airways (BA) are at 
present the only ones allowed, 
under bilateral government 
agreements, to fly scheduled 
direct services between Canada 
and London Heathrow, and all 
three have substantial shares of 
this traffic. Moreover, the 
Commission's enquiries sugges-
ted that potential competitors 
may experience difficulty in 
obtaining appropriate take-off 
and landing 'slots' at Heathrow. 
The operation was abandoned a 
month after the Commission 
opened its detailed investigation. 
A detailed investigation was 
begun into the acquisition by 
Volvo of Scania^4, both leading 
European suppliers of trucks, 
buses and engines in the EEA 
and world-wide. The 
Commission's initial investi-
gation suggested that the merger 
would lead to adverse 
competition effects in the sectors 
of heavy trucks and buses. For 
3 3 Case No. IV/M.1696 - Onex/Air 
Canada/Canadian Airlines; Article 
6(1 )c decision of 15 October, 1999 
3 4 Case No. IV/M.1672 
Volvo/Scania; Article 6(1 )c decision 
of 25 October 1999 
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both sectors, the combined 
market share of Volvo/Scania 
after the merger would be 
extremely high, especially in the 
whole of the Nordic area of 
Europe (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden), as well as in 
the UK and Ireland, in particular 
in buses. 
The Commission also opened in­
depth investigations into three 
operations affecting the world­
wide aluminium markets. The 
proposed merger between 
aluminium producers Alean, 
Alusuisse and Pechiney^ 
represented two of these 
operations since Alean had made 
two separate and independent 
share exchange offers, one for 
the shares of Alusuisse and the 
other for the shares of Pechiney. 
Although the ultimate aim of the 
companies was a three­way 
merger, the two offers were not 
conditional upon each other so 
that it was possible for one 
merger to happen without the 
other. The initial investigation of 
the Commission identified a 
number of markets where the 
operation would raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility 
with the common market. More 
particularly, the Commission 
was concerned that competition 
problems could arise in alumina 
trihydrate, several flat rolled 
aluminium products (e.g. 
lithographic sheet, beverage can 
35 Cases No. IV/M.1663 
Alcan/Alsuisse; Article 6(1 )c 
decision of 10 November 1999; No. 
IV/M.1715 ­ Alcan/Pechiney; 
Article 6(1 )c decision of 10 
November 1999 
stock, food can stock, 
automotive sheet and architec­
tural sheet), and packaging 
products (e.g. flexible alumi­
nium packaging, semi­rigid 
aluminium containers, alumi­
nium cartridges and aluminium 
aerosol cans). 
The third case in the aluminium 
sector was the proposed merger 
between Alcoa and Reynolds^ 
that would create one of the 
largest integrated aluminium 
companies in the world. The 
Commission's initial investiga­
tion identified a number of 
markets where the merger would 
raise serious competition 
concerns. Competition concerns 
would arise in smelter­grade 
alumina (SGA), commodity 
hydrate, aluminium flouride and 
synthetic zeolite, high purity 
aluminium and in particular 
P0404 aluminium. 
In MMS/DASA/Astrium31, the 
Commission had concerns that 
the creation of Astrium, a joint 
venture of the German 
DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG 
(DASA) and the Netherlands­
based Matra Marconi Space 
N.V. (MMS) could lead to the 
creation of a dominant position 
on certain institutional markets 
for space systems in Europe. On 
the prime contracting level, 
Astrium would have a leading 
position in observation and 
3 6 No. IV/M.1693 ­ Alcoa/Reynolds; 
Article 6(1 )c decision of 20 
December, 1999 
3 7 Case No. IV/M.1636 
MMS/S'DASA/Astrium; Article 
6(1 )c decision of 3 December 1999 
scientific satellites and space 
infrastructure and is an important 
supplier of certain components 
to its main competitors, i.e. 
Alcatel Space and Alenia 
Aerospazio. Astrium might 
therefore be in a position to 
foreclose these prime contracting 
markets. Similarly, there were 
risks that the operation could 
have adverse effects at the 
component level, as Astrium 
could use its strong position as a 
purchaser to favour in­house 
suppliers and therefore foreclose 
such markets to third party 
suppliers. 
Finally, the Commission decided 
to open a full investigation into 
the proposed acquisition by Dow 
Chemical of Union Carbide 
(UCC)38. The operation would 
result in the creation of one of 
the world's largest polyolefin 
companies. Serious doubts as to 
the compatibility of the 
operation with the common 
market arose on the polyethylene 
resins, polyethylene technology 
and ethyleneamines sectors. 
More particularly, on the 
polyethylene resins sector, the 
parties would have high market 
shares for all linear low density 
polyethylene (LLDPE) resins 
and in particular in C6 LLDPE 
and C8 LLDPE. The operation 
also gave rise to serious 
concerns also in relation to the 
market for polyethylene 
technology. In the ethyle­
neamines sector, the merger 
would result in significant 
3 8 Case No. IV/M.1671 ­ Dow 
Chemical/Union Carbide; Article 
6(1 )c decision of 22 December 1999 
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overlaps, giving the parties high 
market shares both in the EEA-
wide and globally. 
Decisions adopted under 
Article 6(l)b involving 
remedies 
The Commission cleared, subject 
to undertakings, four operations 
in the initial phase of the 
investigation. 
In Pakhoed/Van Ommeren^, the 
Commission cleared a merger 
between the Dutch companies 
Pakhoed and Van Ommeren 
following the undertakings of the 
merging firms to divest part of 
their liquids storage terminals in 
Rotterdam and Antwerp. A 
merger proposal between the two 
companies had already been 
filed to the European 
Commission one and a half years 
ago, but at that time the 
divestment proposals were not 
sufficient to remove the 
competition problems that had 
been identified and the merger 
was called off. As a result of the 
current divestment proposals, the 
competitive overlaps in the 
storage markets in the ARA area 
(Antwerp - Rotterdam 
Amsterdam) will be eliminated 
and the merger therefore does 
not raise competition concerns. 
The Commission further 
approved the creation of a joint 
venture, EdF Trading Ltd, by 
Electricité de France (EdF) and 
3 9 Case No. IV/M.1621-Pakhoed/Van 
Ommeren; Article 6(1 )b decision of 
10 September 1999 
Louis Dreyfus40 in the field of 
energy trading. As a result of its 
investigation, the Commission 
found that the proposed 
operation could strengthen the 
dominant position of EdF on the 
market for the supply of 
electricity to eligible customers 
in France, during the period 
between the establishment of 
EdF Trading and the legal and 
effective opening of this market. 
In order to remove the 
Commission's serious doubts as 
to the compatibility of the 
operation with the common 
market, the parties agreed that 
EdF Trading would not directly 
or indirectly assist EdF in 
establishing prices or structuring 
contracts for eligible customers 
in France, nor would it assume 
the risks associated with such 
complex offers until the French 
market had been opened. 
The Commission approved the 
transaction between New 
Holland and Case41 in the 
agricultural machinery and 
construction equipment sectors 
following far-reaching 
commitments. The concentration 
as originally notified would have 
caused serious competition 
concerns in the agricultural 
machinery sector by threatening 
to create or strengthen dominant 
positions in the markets for 
standard tractors, combine 
harvesters and large square 
4 0 Case No. IV/M.1557 - EDF/Louis 
Dreyfus; Article 6(1 )b decision of 
28 September 1999 
4 1 Case No. IV/M.1571 - New 
Holland/Case; Article 6(1 )b 
decision of 28 October 1999 
balers in a number of Member 
States. The Commission's 
concerns related in particular to 
the parties' high combined 
market shares, to the substantial 
brand and/or dealer loyalty in the 
agricultural machinery sector, 
and to the high barriers to entry 
caused by the need for dense 
distribution and aftersales 
networks. In the construction 
equipment sector, the 
concentration would have caused 
serious competition concerns by 
threatening to create a collective 
dominant position on the EEA 
market for backhoe loaders. In 
order to address these serious 
doubts, the parties committed to 
divest various ranges and brands 
of tractors, combine harvesters, 
large square balers and backhoe 
loaders. Moreover, the parties 
committed to open up their 
dealer networks in the EEA for 
all of the products divested. 
These undertakings will 
materially reduce the market 
shares of the merged entity in 
each of the markets where 
competition concerns were 
identified by the Commission. 
The Commission approved the 
transaction between Akzo Nobel 
and the Hoechst Roussel Vet 
Group42 subject to substantial 
commitments to divest of 
products for veterinary 
pharmaceuticals and biologicais. 
The Commission's investigation 
showed that the concentration 
would have caused serious 
4 2 Case No. IV/M.1681 - Akzo 
Noble/Hoechst Roussel VET; 
Article 6(1 )b decision of 22 
November 1999 
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competition concerns by 
threatening to create or 
strengthen dominant positions in 
the markets for mastitis 
treatments as regards dry cow 
products based on 
cephalosporins in France. In the 
market sector of endocrine 
treatments the operation raised 
concerns of collective 
dominance in the market for 
synthetic prostaglandins in 
Portugal and of single 
dominance in the market for 
gonadotrophins in Spain. 
Moreover, competition concerns 
with regard to possible range 
effects also arose as both parties 
hold strong positions in 
particular in France and 
Germany for different endocrine 
treatments. The concentration 
would have also caused serious 
competition concerns by 
threatening to create or 
strengthen dominant positions in 
animal vaccines in several 
Member States. In order to 
address these serious doubts, the 
parties committed to divest 
products, and to licence and 
transfer to a viable independent 
third party the products in those 
markets where the Commission 
had serious competition 
concerns. The undertakings 
given will materially reduce the 
market shares of the merged 
entity in each of the markets 
where competition concerns 
were identified and the 
Commission therefore found that 
the modified concentration no 
longer raised serious doubts. 
Decisions adopted under 
Article 2(4) (co-operative joint 
ventures) 
The Commission issued 
decisions under Article 2(4) of 
the Merger Regulation in nine 
cases. Eight operations were 
cleared without undertakings 
while the co-operative joint 
venture between Fujitsu and 
Siemens4^ was cleared subject to 
the companies' compliance with 
certain commitments. This 
operation combined the 
European businesses of Siemens 
and Fujitsu for the development, 
manufacture and sale of 
computer hardware and related 
products, including desktop PCs, 
laptops, workstations, servers 
and storage systems. The 
Commission found that there 
was a risk of parental co-
operation on the financial 
workstations market. To address 
the Commission's serious 
competitive concerns in that 
market, Siemens undertook to 
divest Siemens Nixdorf Retail 
and Banking Systems GmbH, a 
subsidiary active on that market. 
Decisions adopted under 
Article 9 (referrals to Member 
States) 
The French authorities asked, 
under Article 9 of the Merger 
Regulation, for the referral of 
certain product markets 
considered as local in the case 
TotalFina/Elf Aquitane. These 
were the markets for storage of 
petroleum products, for sales of 
4 3 JV.22 Fujitsu/Siemens 
motor fuels on the French 
motorways and wholesales of 
LPG. In response to this request, 
the Commission granted a partial 
referral, that is, certain local 
markets considered as non 
substantial parts of the common 
market, such as several local 
petroleum storage depots serving 
the areas of Port-La-Nouvelle 
(south-eastern France), the 
northern part of Paris and the 
southern part of Paris and of 
Lyon, in view of the application 
of national legislation. However, 
as the Commission had initiated 
proceedings in relation to the 
other markets covered by the 
request of the French authorities, 
it did not refer the remaining 
markets, pending of a final 
assessment at Community level. 
Eventually, the undertakings 
offered by TotalFina remedied the 
problems indicated by the French 
authorities in those markets. 
Consequently the French 
authorities withdrew their request 
for the markets not included in the 
Commission's referral decision, 
to the extent that the concerns 
raised by the French authorities 
were removed through the 
undertakings offered by the 
parties to the Commission. 
Decisions adopted under 
Article 14 
The Commission imposed fines 
under the provisions of the 
Merger Regulation in two cases. 
In Deutsche Post/trans-o-flex44, 
Deutsche Post AG notified its 
4 4 Case No.IV/M.1610 - Deutsche 
Post/trans-o-flex; Article 14 
decision of 14 December 1999 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 1 February 25 
MERGERS 
planned acquisition of the 
German high-speed delivery 
service, trans-o-flex GmbH in 
February 1999. According to 
Deutsche Post, it had acquired a 
minority shareholding in trans-o-
flex in 1997 but the notification 
contained facts that pointed to an 
acquisition of sole control during 
that time. If that had been the 
case, the Commission would 
have had no jurisdiction to 
assess the transaction as notified 
in 1999 but, instead, the 
evaluation of the acquisition of 
the shares in 1997 would have 
had to be carried out by a 
number of national authorities. 
On the basis of these indications, 
the Commission requested 
additional information from 
Deutsche Post and others 
concerning the 1997 transaction. 
In the course of this 
investigation, it became apparent 
that Deutsche Post had 
deliberately supplied incorrect 
and misleading information to 
deceive the Commission. The 
Commission's investigation 
suggested that Deutsche Post had 
exercised control over trans-o-
flex since 1997 through its 
largest shareholder, Industrial 
Information. The Commission 
found that Deutsche Post had 
committed a serious 
infringement of two provisions 
of the Merger Regulation and 
therefore imposed two separate 
fines, the maximum amount of 
EUR 50 000 permitted under the 
Merger Regulation for each. 
The Commission also imposed a 
fine on KLM for supplying 
incorrect and misleading 
information in case 
KLM/Martinair45. KLM notified 
to the Commission its planned 
acquisition of Martinair in 
September 1998 but this 
notification was withdrawn. The 
operation was re-notified to the 
Commission in December 
199846. The Commission started 
proceedings in that case because 
KLM supplied incorrect 
information in its first 
notification, the one issued in 
September 1998. In that 
notification, KLM submitted 
incorrect information on the 
charter destinations of its 
subsidiary Transavia and 
withheld relevant information on 
scheduled flights of Transavia. 
In particular, KLM gave an 
incorrect description of the 
destinations of Transavia and 
failed to list ten important 
Transavia destinations. KLM 
presented the operations of 
Transavia and of Martinair as 
'largely complementary' while, 
in reality, both airlines operated 
to all Mediterranean 
destinations. Furthermore, KLM 
failed to inform the Commission 
about the fact that Transavia had 
substantial scheduled operations 
to Mediterranean destinations 
and sold a significant number of 
seats on these flights to Dutch 
tour operators, thereby giving a 
misleading description of the 
activities of Transavia. The 
Commission considered the 
4 5 Case No.IV/M.1608 
KLM/Martinair; Article 14 decision 
of 14 December 1999 
The operation was abandoned in 
May 1999 after the Commission 
raised objections against the 
operation. 
behaviour of KLM as grossly 
negligent, at the very least, and 
imposed a fine of EUR 40 000. 
Decisions adopted under 
Article 7 (derogation from 
suspension) 
Pursuant to Article 7(4) of the 
Merger Regulation, the 
Commission may, on request, 
grant a derogation from the 
obligation to suspend the 
implementation of a 
concentration until it has been 
declared compatible with the 
common market. In taking its 
decision, the Commission takes 
into account, inter alia, the 
effects of the suspension on one 
or more of the undertakings 
concerned by the concentration 
or on a third party, and the threat 
to competition posed by the 
concentration. 
The Commission granted a 
derogation from suspension 
under Article 7(4) in four cases. 
In two cases involving the 
dissolution of a joint venture 
between BP Amoco and Mobil in 
fuels and lubricants, both BP and 
ExxonMobil requested a 
derogation from suspension47. 
These requests were directly 
related to the clearance of the 
Exxon/Mobil merger. The 
clearance of this merger was 
conditional upon fulfilment of a 
whole series of commitments, 
including the dissolution of the 
4 7 Case No.IV/M.1820 - BP/JV 
dissolution; Article 7(4) decision of 
22 December 1999; No.IV/M.1822 
- Mobil/JV dissolution; Article 7(4) 
decision of 22 December 1999. 
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BP/Mobil joint venture. The 
joint venture was active in 
certain markets for which the 
Commission considered that the 
merger, without the 
commitment, would have led to 
the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position. The 
Commission considered that the 
speedy transfer of control to BP 
Amoco was the best and most 
effective means of giving effect 
to the commitments secured by 
the Commission as it enabled BP 
Amoco to re-establish itself 
quicker as a competitor to the 
merged entity ExxonMobil. 
The case BBL/BT/ISP Belgium4* 
involved the creation of an 
Internet service provider (ISP) 
joint venture in Belgium. The 
derogation from suspension was 
requested because Skynet, 
Belgacom's Internet subsidiary, 
was about to launch an 
subscription free Internet 
product in Belgium. In the face 
of this, any delay in the 
implementation of the joint 
venture would have resulted in 
Belgacom achieving a very 
strong market share, causing 
significant damage to the parties. 
The Commission considered that 
the derogation from the 
suspension would not pose any 
threat to competition since the 
joint venture was a new entrant, 
which was supposed to challenge 
the incumbent Belgacom. 
In Onex/Air Canada/Canadian 
Airlines49 the parties requested a 
derogation from suspension in 
order to enable Onex to put 
certain matters to Air Canada 
shareholders at a special meeting 
which was essential for the bid 
to be successfully completed and 
which was to take place before 
the expiry of the Commission's 
review of the transaction under 
the Merger Regulation. The 
Commission considered that 
there were grounds to grant the 
derogation as the suspensive 
effect of Article 7(1) could have 
caused serious damage to the 
parties concerned. 
4 8 Case No.IV/M. 1667- BBL/BT/ISP 
Belgium; Article 7(4) decision of 23 
September 1999 
4 9 Case No.IV/M. 1696 - Onex/Air 
Canada/Canadian Airlines; Article 
7(4) decision of 15 October 1999 
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Commission fines Deutsche Post, 
KLM, Anheuser-Busch and Scottish & 
Newcastle for supplying incorrect or 
misleading information in competition 
procedures 
By Holger DIECKMANN, COMP-B-1, 
Gudrun SCHMIDT, COMP-B-3 
Matthijs VISSER, COMP-F-3 and 
Nils VON HINTEN-REED, COMP-F-3 
On 14 December 1999, the 
Commission adopted three 
decisions by which it imposed 
two fines of 50.000 Euro on 
Deutsche Post, a fine of 40.000 
Euro on the Dutch airline KLM 
and fines of 3.000 Euro on each 
of the brewers Anheuser-Busch 
and Scottish & Newcastle. All 
companies had supplied 
incorrect or misleading 
information in competition 
procedures to the Commission. 
In the enforcement of the EC 
competition rules it is an 
essential condition that 
companies provide accurate and 
complete information to the 
Commission. These decisions 
underline the Commission's 
determination to ensure that 
firms comply fully with their 
legal obligations. 
The Commission attaches 
considerable importance to 
ensuring that its role of creating 
and maintaining competitive 
markets, for the benefit of all 
companies and consumers in the 
EU, is not compromised. 
Incorrect or misleading 
information can lead the 
Commission to take flawed 
decisions, with potentially 
serious effects on businesses and 
consumers in the EU. Therefore, 
the Commission is determined to 
strictly apply its procedural rules 
and to impose fines if and when 
these rules are broken. 
Pursuant to article 14 of the 
Merger Regulation50, the 
Commission can impose fines 
between 1.000 Euro and 50.000 
Euro when a company provides 
intentionally or negligently 
incorrect or misleading 
information in a notification or 
in a response to a request for 
information. Pursuant to article 
15 of Regulation 1751 of 1962, 
the implementing regulation for 
procedures under Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty concerning 
5 0 Council Regulation (EC) No 
4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on 
the control of concentrations 
between undertaking (OJ L 395, 
30.12.1989, p. 1 ; corrected version 
OJL 257, 21.9.1990, p. 13) 
5 1 Council Regulation 17/62 of 6 
February 1962, first regulation 
implementing Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty (OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 
204) 
cartels and the abuse of a 
dominant position, the range of 
fines for the same infringements 
is from 100 Euro to 5.000 Euro. 
Deutsche Post 
In February 1999, Deutsche Post 
AG notified, in accordance with 
the Merger Regulation, its 
intention to acquire sole control 
over the German high-speed 
delivery service trans-o-flex 
GmbH. It had acquired a 
minority-shareholding already in 
1997. Deutsche Post withdrew 
this notification some weeks 
after the Commission opened an 
in-depth investigation. In the 
merger proceedings of 1999, 
during its initial examination, 
however, the Commission found 
indications that the notified 
transaction of 1999 might not 
lead to the acquisition of control 
by Deutsche Post, because it 
could have acquired control over 
trans-o-flex already in 1997. If 
that had been the case, the 
Commission would have had no 
jurisdiction to assess the 
transaction notified in 1999. 
On the basis of these indications, 
the Commission requested 
additional information from 
Deutsche Post and others 
concerning the transaction of 
1997. In the course of this 
investigation it became apparent, 
that Deutsche Post had 
deliberately supplied incorrect 
and misleading information to 
deceive the Commission about 
its jurisdiction. Deutsche Post 
withheld information relevant in 
this context. The investigation of 
the Commission showed that 
Deutsche Post may have 
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exercised control over trans-o-
flex since 1997 through a third 
party which had acquired the 
majority of the shares: 
agreements show that Deutsche 
Post carried the economic risk 
for this majority shareholding. 
This intentional supply of 
incorrect and misleading 
information in its notification 
and incorrect information in 
replying to information requests 
of the Commission by Deutsche 
Post, constitutes a serious 
infringement of two provisions 
of the Merger Regulation, which 
made the Commission adopt a 
decision by which two fines of 
50.000 Euro each are imposed 
on Deutsche Post. Meanwhile, 
the German Bundeskartellamt 
has also launched an 
investigation in the matter. 
KLM 
In September 1998, KLM 
notified, in accordance with the 
Merger Regulation its planned 
acquisition of full control of 
Martinair. KLM is the leading 
Dutch airline and Martinair is 
the second largest Dutch airline. 
The notification was withdrawn 
by KLM after the Commission 
had discovered that it contained 
incorrect and misleading 
information. The operation was 
again notified in December 1998 
and finally abandoned in May 
1999 after the Commission 
raised objections against the 
operation. The Commission then 
started proceedings concerning 
the supply of incorrect 
information contained in the 
initial notification of September 
1998. 
In its initial notification, KLM 
submitted incorrect information 
on the charter destinations of its 
subsidiary Transavia and 
withheld relevant information on 
scheduled flights of Transavia. 
In the notification, KLM gave a 
table of the Mediterranean 
charter destinations of Transavia 
and of Martinair. In this table 
KLM failed to list ten important 
Transavia destinations. 
Furthermore, the table was 
presented in conjunction with the 
statement that the operations of 
Transavia and Martinair were 
"largely complementary", 
whereas in reality Transavia 
operated to all Mediterranean 
destinations which were also 
served by Martinair. 
KLM also gave a misleading 
description of the activities of 
Transavia as it referred to 
Transavia only as a charter 
airline and failed to make any 
reference to the fact that 
Transavia had substantial 
scheduled operations to 
Mediterranean destinations and 
sold a significant number of 
seats on these flights to Dutch 
tour operators. In both instances 
the incorrect or misleading 
information was relevant for the 
assessment of the case. The 
Commission considers the 
behaviour of KLM as grossly 
negligent, at the very least and 
therefore decided to impose a 
fine of 40.000 Euro. 
Anheuser-Busch and Scottish 
& Newcastle 
Anheuser-Busch (USA) is the 
world's largest brewing 
organisation and brews the 
American Budweiser brand. 
Scottish & Newcastle is the 
largest UK brewer. The 
companies are party to 
agreements concerning the 
brewing, distributing and 
marketing of Budweiser beer in 
the UK. Scottish & Newcastle 
became a party to the agreement 
following its take-over of 
Courage in 1995. 
In the course of the Commission 
investigation following the 
notification of the agreements to 
the Commission, a formal 
request for information was sent 
to ask the parties whether there 
had been any changes to the 
agreements after Scottish & 
Newcastle signed up to them. In 
their joint response to the 
Commission's request for 
information, the parties omitted 
the so-called Budweiser 
marketing guidelines, which 
were agreed and accepted by 
Scottish & Newcastle. The 
negligence of the parties in this 
case seriously hindered the 
proper instruction of the file. The 
Commission therefore adopted a 
decision imposing fines of 3.000 
Euro on both Anheuser-Busch 
and Scottish & Newcastle.52 
Concluding remarks 
In the cases of Deutsche Post 
and KLM the amount of the fine 
is at or close to maximum 
permitted, reflecting the 
Commission's view of their 
seriousness. The maximum fine 
which can be imposed for an 
infringement of the procedural 
5 2 OJ L 49 of 20.02.2000, p.37 
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rules is relatively low, 50.000 
Euro in Merger cases and only 
5.000 Euro in cases concerning 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty. In view of the 
importance of accurate 
information in competition 
procedures the Commission is 
therefore considering whether it 
might be appropriate to propose 
to the Council to increase the 
amounts for an infringement of 
these rules. 
Subject: Case No COMP/JV.26 
FreeCom./.Dangaard Holding 
The Commission approved the 
creation of a joint venture 
between the German companies 
BHS Holding GmbH & 
CoKG/debitel AG and the 
Danish companies Fleggaard 
Holding AS/Fleggaard Partner 
AS. The parent companies 
transferred to the joint venture 
their respective wholesale 
businesses (FreeCom GmbH and 
Dangaard Holding AS) 
concerning mobile 
telecommunications devices, in 
particular mobile phones, and 
related value added services (e.g. 
hot­line and repair services, 
implementation of promotion 
programmes for retailers, 
packaging for retailers). The 
operation allowed the joint 
venture to offer its customers a 
pan­European company structure 
and to better face increasing 
competition from network 
operators and service providers 
in bringing mobile phones to the 
market. 
The Commission, while 
considering it not strictly 
necessary to define in detail the 
relevant product market, tended 
towards considering the 
wholesaling and the provision of 
related value added services to 
be two distinct markets. As to 
whether the geographical market 
was EU­wide or national could 
be left open. FreeCom had a 
well­established position on the 
German market while Dangaard 
was dominantly active in the 
Scandinavian markets and in 
Switzerland. Therefore, the 
activities of the two companies 
were to a large degree 
geographically complementary. 
In Germany, where the Parties' 
activities overlapped, the 
resulting market share of the 
joint venture in the wholesale 
market did not exceed 15 
percent. 
The Commission concluded that 
the operation did not lead to the 
creation of a dominant position. 
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Commission authorises creation of 
joint venture BOL Spain by 
Bertelsmann AG and Planeta 
Corporación S.R.L. 
By Hubert GAMBS, DG COMP-C-2 
The European Commission has 
cleared the concentration 
between Bertelsmann AG and 
Planeta Corporación S.R.L. 
Through this operation the 
parties will obtain joint control 
over Books On-Line Ibérica, S.A 
(BOL Spain). The operation will 
not lead to the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant 
position. 
Bertelsmann heads a group of 
companies that operate 
internationally in printing, 
publishing and distribution of 
books, music and private 
television as well as related 
services. Planeta belongs to the 
Planeta group that operates in 
publishing and distribution of 
cultural and leisure content by 
means of all types of print and 
other media, mainly in Spanish 
language. BOL Spain is active in 
the sale of books in the Spanish 
language as well as the other 
official languages of Spain 
(Catalan, Galician, Basque) via 
the Internet. 
The parties will concentrate their 
on-line sale activities of books in 
these languages in BOL Spain. 
For this purpose, Planeta will 
acquire an 50% stake in BOL 
Spain, which is currently a 
wholly owned subsidiary of 
Bertelsmann. 
Although the parties are active in 
the markets for distant sales of 
books as well as for Internet sales 
of books in Spain, they are not 
dominant in these markets. There 
is also no indication of co-
ordination in any other market, 
like e.g. the market for the 
publishing of books in Spain. 
The Commission has, therefore, 
decided not to oppose this 
operation. 
Commission authorises takeover of 
CDnow by Time Warner and Sony 
ByAHNIKPAY, DG COMP-C-2 
The European Commission has 
cleared the takeover of Cdnow 
by Time Warner and Sony. 
Cdnow will become a subsidiary 
of a new corporation Holdco 
which will be jointly controlled 
by Time Warner and Sony. 
CDnow's share of the market in 
which it operates is low, as are 
those of Time Warner and Sony. 
At the horizontal level therefore 
the operation will not lead to the 
creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position. It will also 
not alter the competitive 
situation from a vertical 
perspective as Time Warner and 
Sony will need to continue to 
sell music and home video 
products through other third 
party distributors and retailers in 
the EEA and world-wide. The 
operation will also not lead to 
the co-ordination of the 
competitive behaviour of Sony 
and Time Warner either. Time 
Warner is a Delaware 
corporation, which is engaged in 
the media and entertainment 
industries. Sony is a New York 
corporation which is an indirect 
subsidiary of Sony Corporation, 
based in Tokyo, Japan. Sony 
Corporation is an entertainment 
and consumer electronics 
company, providing 
entertainment and electronic 
products and services to 
consumers around the world. 
The Commission has, for the 
above reasons, decided not to 
oppose this operation. 
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La Commission européenne autorise 
la création de l'entreprise commune 
Hearst Mondadori Editoriale SRL 
By Jacques LOVERGNE, DG COMP-C-2 
La Commission Européenne 
donne le feu vert à la création 
en Italie de l'entreprise 
commune Hearst Mondadori 
Editoriale SRL par la société 
américaine HMI International 
Holdings Ine et la société 
italienne Arnoldo Mondadori 
Editore S.p.A. L'objet de la 
filiale commune est d'assurer 
l'édition et la diffusion d'une 
version italienne du magazine 
féminin "Cosmopolitan", 
appartenant au groupe Hearst. 
L'opération n'entraînera ni la 
création, ni le renforcement 
d'aucune position dominante 
et ne soulève donc pas de 
problème de concurrence. 
HMI est une filiale du groupe 
Hearst, une société active 
dans les métiers de la 
communication. Mondadori 
appartient au groupe 
Fininvest, dont il constitue la 
filiale regroupant ses activités 
dans l'édition. 
L'opération concerne le 
marché des magazines 
féminins en Italie, qui se 
subdivise en marché du 
lectorat et en marché de la 
vente d'espace publicitaire. 
Si Mondadori détient un 
certain nombre de magazines 
féminins, il n'est pas en 
position dominante en Italie 
sur le marché concerné. Le 
groupe Hearst n'a aucune 
activité en Italie. 
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Main developments between Is' October 1999 and Γ' January 2000 
The Multisectoral framework on 
regional aid for large investment 
projects: a mid-term review 
By Adolfo BARBERA DEL ROSAL, DG COMP-H-2 
Introduction 
On 16 December 1997, the 
Commission adopted the 
Multisectoral framework on 
regional aid for large investment 
projects53 (hereinafter "the 
Multisectoral Framework"). This 
Framework became applicable 
from 1 September 1998 for an 
initial trial period of three years. 
Before the end of the trial 
period, the Commission will 
carry out a thorough review of 
the utility and scope of the 
Framework, which will inter alia 
consider the question of whether 
it should be renewed, revised or 
abolished. 
The framework is intended to 
limit the amounts of regional aid 
for large investment projects. 
One of the main objectives of the 
new approach under the 
Multisectoral Multisectoral 
framework on regional aid for 
large investment projects is to 
re-focus regional aid on job 
creation. 
It also fits into the Commission's 
broader objective of ultimately 
putting an end to the various 
existing sectoral rules on state 
5 3 OJC 107 of 7.04.1998, p. 7. 
aid with a view to adopting a 
single approach to major awards 
under regional aid schemes 
regardless of the sector involved, 
except in the case of coal and 
steel, which will remain subject 
to the ECSC Treaty until July 
2002. 
The new framework generalises, 
in all sectors not covered by 
sectoral rules on state aid, the 
obligation to notify individually 
any aid planned for large-scale 
projects under regional aid 
schemes where one of the 
following two criteria is met: 
(i) the total project cost comes to 
more than ECU 50 million 101 
and the aid intensity is more 
than 50% of the relevant 
allowable ceiling and the aid per 
job created or safeguarded 
exceeds ECU 40 000; 
(ii) the aid amount exceeds ECU 
50 million. 
For large-scale projects thus 
defined, the framework lays 
down rules aimed at reducing 
any competition-distorting 
effects by lowering the aid 
ceiling compared with the 
maximum ceiling of intensity 
authorised in the region 
concerned, and this on the basis 
of three criteria: 
the capital-labour ratio; 
the degree of competition in 
the relevant market; and 
the impact on regional 
development. 
These three criteria are each 
translated into a coefficient the 
value of which varies with the 
project's characteristics. 
To obtain the theoretical ceiling 
of permissible aid for a large-
scale project, the maximum 
intensity authorised in the region 
concerned must be multiplied by 
the three coefficients obtained, 
provided the product of these 
coefficients is less than one. 
In this latter respect, it is 
important to note that the 
Multisectoral Framework indi­
cates that the maximum aid 
intensity (regional aid ceiling) to 
be used'for the calculations is the 
one a large company could 
obtain in the assisted area 
concerned within the context of 
the authorized regional aid 
system valid at the moment of 
notification. A pre-condition for 
this provision to be applied is 
that a valid regional aid map 
exists at the time of the 
notification. However, this is not 
the case for a number of Member 
States after 31 December 1999. 
However, all the notifications 
received so far have been made 
at a point in time where a valid 
regional aid map existed. 
The Multisectoral Framework 
thus aims at awarding a 'bonus' 
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to aid financing investments 
which generate direct and 
indirect jobs. It has also set out 
to reduce the amount of aid in 
cases where the investment 
creates an increase in capacity in 
a declining sector or where an 
over-capacity situation exists, or 
in cases where the benefiting 
firm owns, before the assisted 
investment is carried out, a 
market share of at least 40%. 
On the procedural level, the 
Commission has either to 
approve aid within two months 
of their notification or, where 
there are doubts, to open an 
inquiry procedure and to take a 
final decision after four months 
maximum. 
The decisions taken on the 
basis of the Multisectoral 
Framework 
Until now (15 February 2000), 
the Commission has received 14 
notifications, of which 4 have 
resulted in a final decision. One 
notification was withdrawn after 
several exchanges of information 
with the Member State 
concerned. 
The four decisions were taken 
without opening the 
investigation procedure, and can 
be summarised as follows54: 
54 A non-confidential version of these 
decisions in the official language of 
the Member State concerned can be 
found at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secret 
ariat_general/sgb/state_aids/inde 
x.htm. 
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Case N 94/99 (Spain) - Aid to Rockwool Peninsular S.A. 
1 
Date of decision 
Type of investment 
Eligible costs 
Amount of aid 
Small and medium size 
company 
Location of the investment 
Type of assisted area 
Regional aid ceiling 
Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) 
Direct jobs creation 
Indirect jobs creation 
Relevant product market 
Relevant geographical market 
> 40% market share 
Market features 
Competition factor 
Capital/Work factor 
Regional development factor 
Conclusion 
21 April 1999 
Factory for the production of stone wool 
€ 64.7 million 
€ 15.2 million 
No 
Caparroso (Navarra, Spain) 
87 (3) c) 
15% NGE 
13.2% 
107 
56 
Mineral wool 
European Community 
No 
Non declining market 
1 
0.8 
1.1 
Proposed intensity accepted 
Case N 582/99 (Italy) - Aid to Marina di Stabia s.p.a. 
^^■■¡^^^^^^^^^^■■■■■■■^^^■^^^^I 
Date of decision 
Type of investment 
Eligible costs 
Amount of aid 
Small and medium size 
company 
Location of the investment 
Type of assisted area 
Regional aid ceiling 
Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) 
Direct jobs creation 
Indirect jobs creation 
Relevant product market 
Relevant geographical market 
> 40% market share 
Market features 
8 December 1999 
Construction of a sea marina 
€ 71.3 million 
€ 50.6 million 
Yes 
Castellmmare di Stabia (Campania, Italy) 
87 (3) a) 
50% NGE plus 15% gross for SME 
47.36% 
141 
374 
Renting or purchase of moorings for recreational 
crafts 
Tirrenian coastline and Côte d'Azur 
No 
Non declining market 
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Competition factor 
Capital/Work factor 
Regional development factor 
Conclusion 
1 
0.8 
1.5 
Proposed intensity accepted 
Case N 583/99 (Italy) - Aid to Benfil s.r.l. 
1 
Date of decision 
Type of investment 
Eligible costs 
Amount of aid 
Small and medium size 
company 
Location of the investment 
Type of assisted area 
Regional aid ceiling 
Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) 
Direct jobs creation 
Indirect jobs creation 
Relevant product market 
Relevant geographical market 
> 40% market share 
Market features 
Competition factor 
Capital/Work factor 
Regional development factor 
Conclusion 
22 December 1999 
Installation of a cotton yarn production site 
€49.56 million 
€ 37.36 million 
Yes 
Airola (Campania, Italy) 
87 (3) a) 
50% NGE plus 15% gross for SME 
50.57% 
154 
131 
Cotton-type weaving market 
European Community 
No 
Structural overcapacity 
0.75 
0.9 
1.25 
Proposed intensity accepted 
Case N 583/99 (Italy) - Aid to Tessival s.r.l. 
■ 
Date of decision 
Type of investment 
Eligible costs 
Amount of aid 
Small and medium size 
company 
Location of the investment 
Type of assisted area 
Regional aid ceiling 
Net Grant Equivalent (NGE) 
Direct jobs creation 
22 December 1999 
Installation of a cotton woven fabrics site 
€ 80.09 million 
€ 65.92 million 
Yes 
Airola (Campania, Italy) 
87 (3) a) 
50% NGE plus 15% gross for SME 
50.7% 
400 
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Indirect jobs creation 
Relevant product market 
Relevant geographical market 
> 40%) market share 
Market features 
Competition factor 
Capital/Work factor 
Regional development factor 
Conclusion 
273 
Cotton-type weaving market 
European Community 
No 
Structural overcapacity 
0.75 
0.9 
1.25 
Proposed intensity accepted 
The application of the 
Multisectoral Framework: 
particular remarks on the 
competition and the regional 
impact factors 
As expected, the experience until 
now has shown that the two 
critical steps in the assessment of 
the maximum allowable aid 
intensity for a project are the 
establishment of the competition 
factor as well as the 
determination of the regional 
impact factor. 
The competition factor 
As regards the competition 
factor, its calculation involves a 
thorough examination of both 
the capacity utilisation in the 
sector concerned and the 
relevant market. The conclusions 
reached in the four decisions are 
as follows: 
N 94/99 (Rockwool) 
The relevant product market 
consists of mineral wool 
insulation materials (mainly 
fibre-glass and mineral wool) 
because most competing plastics 
insulation (e.g. polyurethane and 
polystyrene) and other insulation 
materials (e.g. cellulose, perlite 
and vermiculite) have not the 
combined very high thermal, 
acoustic and fire protection 
values. Moreover, some 
important market participants 
have specialised in one category 
of insulation products so that the 
relative positions of competitors 
differ strongly in different 
product market segments. 
In the notification, Spain 
considered that the relevant 
geographical market corresponds 
to the area which can be served 
in a profitable way from the 
Caparroso. This area 
corresponds to France, Spain and 
Portugal. However, in its 
decision, the Commission took a 
different view. In conformity 
with point 7.6 of the 
Multisectoral Framework, the 
relevant geographic market 
comprises usually the EEA or, 
alternatively, any significant part 
of it if the conditions of 
competition in that area can be 
sufficiently distinguished from 
other areas of the EEA. Given 
the geographical dispersion of 
the European manufacturers, the 
various supply areas can be seen 
as a series of overlapping circles 
with their centres at the mineral 
wool plants. There is relatively 
low concentration of mineral 
wool plants in Southern Europe. 
To a certain extent, the argument 
could be made that this 
represents a different market. 
However, given the dispersion of 
the individual mineral wool 
plants and various degrees of 
overlap for the natural supply 
areas, so that effects can be 
transmitted from one circle to 
another, it seems appropriate to 
consider, in the absence of other 
arguments put forward by Spain, 
that the geographical relevant 
market is the Community as a 
whole. 
In the absence of sufficient data 
on capacity utilisation, the 
Multisectoral Framework 
provides in its point 3.4 that the 
Commission will consider 
whether the investment takes 
place in a declining market. For 
this purpose, the Commission 
has to compare the evolution of 
apparent consumption of the 
product in question (that is, 
production plus imports minus 
exports) with the growth rate of 
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EEA manufacturing industry as a 
whole. 
The average annual growth rate 
for the EC manufacturing 
industry over the period 1992-
1997 was 3.235%. On the basis 
of the information provided by 
the European Insulation 
Manufacturers Association 
"EURIMA", the annual average 
growth rate for mineral wool in 
Europe was 3.475%, for the 
period 1992-1997. To support 
their view that the mineral wool 
market is expected to grow, the 
Spanish authorities indicated that 
other manufacturers of mineral 
wool are also planning to expand 
their capacities. Isover (Saint 
Gobain) is increasing its capacity 
in Orange (MT 15 000), Chalón 
(MT 5 000) and Etten Leurre 
(MT 15 000). Pleiderer is 
planning to increase its output by 
MT 40 000. Poliglas is currently 
building a new factory in St 
Avoid (MT 22 000). According 
to the Spanish authorities these 
increases are intended to cope 
with the expected market 
growth. 
On the basis of the above, the 
Commission considered that the 
mineral wool market could not 
be deemed to constitute a 
declining market. Since the 
Commission was satisfied that 
the market share of Rockwool 
did not exceed 40% whatever the 
product or geographical market 
definition used, it concluded that 
the competition factor was equal 
t o l . 
N 582/99 (Marina di Stabia) 
The Commission decided to 
consider the whole Tirrenian 
coastline of Italy plus Côte 
d'Azur as the relevant market. 
Bar the 18% transit and safety 
moorings, the core of the traffic 
(around 82% of the total) of the 
newly built marina will be 
represented by local yachters, 
mainly from the provinces of 
Naples and Salerno. Marina di 
Stabia will cover only 6.46 % of 
the demand for moorings in 
Campania and just 0.7% of the 
estimated supply nation-wide in 
the year 2005. 
The new marina will favour the 
promoters and operators who 
will either sell or lease the 
moorings. In terms of 
availability of moorings for 
recreational crafts, Italy finds 
itself at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other 
Member States. The project aims 
at filling the existing gap along 
the coasts of Campania, notably 
in the Gulf of Naples. At the 
moment, Italy has just 343 
tourist ports and marinas 
unevenly distributed along a 
coast 8.000 km long. It thus 
appears that there is large scope 
for an expansion of the market 
for these infrastructures, as the 
few moorings which do exist 
offer little or nothing by way of 
facilities. 
The market for recreational 
crafts is strictly linked to the 
marina-building market but will 
not be significantly affected at 
the EU level by the new project. 
As far as the three-star hotel is 
concerned, it is certain that it 
will not affect the intra-EU 
exchanges to an extent that is 
incompatible with the 
competition conditions in the 
internal market since: 
- the relevant market for the 
hotel facilities is essentially 
limited to the marina 
residents, and 
- the promotion or organisation 
of package holidays usually 
sold by international agencies 
and tours operators is 
incompatible with both the 
hotel's standard and the 
marina's business plan. 
On the basis of the above 
considerations, and since Marina 
di Stabia does not hold a market 
share of 40% or more of the 
relevant market, the Commission 
decided to consider a 
competition factor of 1. 
N 583/99 (Benfil) 
The cotton yarn (NACE 17.11) 
produced by Benfil and 
delivered to Tessival Sud Sri and 
Tessival SpA is the basic 
material for the production of 
cotton fabrics. According to the 
Italian authorities, for technical 
reasons the production 
equipment for cotton weaven 
fabrics can not be reconverted 
for the production of alternative 
fabrics, i.e. synthetics or cotton-
mixed. The production of 
synthetics requires looms 
operating at double speed 
compared to the weaving of 
cotton. 
38 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 1 February 
STATE AID 
The cotton fabrics can be used in 
different applications: 
- for the clothing market, 
which can be subdivided in 
the categories velvet, flats, 
denim, fabrics for shirting 
and tissues, used for shirts, 
trousers, and coats. 
- for technical articles to 
imitate leather, footwear, 
wallpaper as well as for the 
furniture sector (upholstery, 
curtains). 
Thus, from the demand-side 
substitution for cotton weaven 
fabrics, many of the afore-
mentioned final applications, 
namely fabrics for technical 
articles, can be thought to admit 
substitution by alternative 
fabrics, i.e. synthetic fibres, by 
reason of their characteristics, 
their prices and their intended 
use. 
Consequently, the Commission 
considered as relevant market 
the cotton-type weaving market 
as a whole, which includes 
manufacture of broad woven 
cotton-type fabrics, either with 
cotton or artificial or synthetic 
yarns. 
On the basis of the information 
supplied by the Italian 
authorities, the Commission 
further decided that the relevant 
geographical market was the 
Community as a whole. 
The Commission scrutinised the 
market for the time period of 
1995 to 1998 instead of a five 
years period, as it was 
impossible to obtain data for a 
longer time period. The data 
comprise the main EU Member 
States. However, due to the fact 
that the data on which the 
Commission based its 
assessment cover 2/3 of the 
installed capacity, it considers 
the figures to be sufficient to 
give a representative picture of 
the market situation. 
Accordingly, the Commission 
assessed the average capacity 
utilisation for the whole 
manufacturing industry for the 
period 1995 to 1998 at 82.2%. 
As to the capacity utilisation 
rate, the Italian authorities 
provided capacity data for the 
weaving sector showing an 
average capacity utilisation of 
90.5% based on a 220 days-a-
year benchmark used as a 
theoretical ceiling to which the 
effective working time of the 
looms is reported. However, 
bearing in mind the above-
mentiond considerations, the 
average capacity utilisation for 
the sector of cotton-type 
weaving in the period 1995-
1998, on the basis of a 240 days-
a-year benchmark, which is the 
usual benchmark in this industry, 
amounts to 77.8%. This 
represents a difference of minus 
4.4 %. Thus, the Commission 
notes that a structural 
overcapacity exists in the 
relevant market segment. 
Based on the above, and taking 
into consideration that the aid 
beneficiary did not have a 
market share of 40% or more in 
the relevant market, the 
Commission decided that the 
competition factor to be applied 
was 0.75. 
N 584/99 (Tessival) 
Cotton fabric is a material made 
from cotton yarn. The fabrics 
can be used in different 
applications. The cotton fabric 
for the clothing market, wherein 
the aid beneficiary will be 
operating, can be subdivided in 
the categories velvet, flats, 
denim, fabrics for shirting and 
tissues. The aid beneficiary will 
produce the category "flats" 
which represents about 70% of 
the market concerned. 
Within the clothing sector, 
fabrics produced by the aid 
beneficiary will be used for 
shirts, trousers, and coats. Other 
applications of beneficiary's 
production are technical articles 
for imitation leather, footwear, 
wallpaper as well as for furniture 
(upholstery, curtains). The 
product competes with 
substitutes which the consumer 
might consider by reason of its 
characteristics, their prices and 
their intended use. 
Thus, from the demand-side 
substitution for woven cotton, 
many of the afore-mentioned 
final applications, namely fabrics 
for technical articles, can be 
thought to admit substitution by 
alternative fabrics, i.e. synthetic 
fibres. In accordance with point 
7.6 of the Multisectoral 
Framework, the Commission 
considered as relevant market 
the cotton-type weaving market 
as a whole which includes 
manufacture of broad woven 
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cotton-type fabrics, either with 
cotton or artificial or synthetic 
yarns. 
In the absence of precise 
information, it seems appropriate 
to consider that the geographical 
relevant market is the 
Community as a whole. 
The Commission scrutinised the 
market for the time period of 
1995 to 1998 instead of a five 
years period, as it was 
impossible to obtain data for a 
longer time period. The data 
comprise the main EU. 
However, due to the fact that the 
data on which the Commission 
based its assessment cover 2/3 of 
the installed capacity, it 
considers the figures to be 
sufficient to give a representative 
picture of the market situation. 
Accordingly, the Commission 
assessed the average capacity 
utilisation for the whole 
manufacturing industry for the 
period 1995 to 1998 at 82.2%. 
The Italian authorities provided 
capacity data for the weaving 
sector showing an average 
capacity utilisation of 85.7% 
based on a 233 days-a-year 
benchmark used as a theoretical 
ceiling to which the effective 
working time of the looms is 
reported. However, according to 
available data provided by 
Eurocoton and the International 
Textile Manufacturers Fede-
ration, the average capacity 
utilisation in the period 1995-
1998, on the basis of a 240 days-
a-year benchmark which is the 
usual benchmark in this industry, 
amounted to 77.8% representing 
a difference of minus 4.4%. 
Thus, the Commission 
considered that a structural 
overcapacity exists in the 
relevant market segment. 
Based on the above, and taking 
into consideration that the aid 
beneficiary did not have a 
market share of 40% or more in 
the relevant market, the 
Commission decided that the 
competition factor to be applied 
was 0.75. 
The regional impact factor 
The regional impact factor is 
based on the number of jobs 
created by first-tier suppliers and 
customers in response to the 
aided investment. The 
conclusions reached in the four 
decisions are as follows: 
N 94/99 (Rockwool) 
The transport of end-product is 
the most important source of 
indirect job creation (45). The 
Spanish authorities justify this 
on the following basis: 
For an estimated production of 
800 000 m3, 10 000 trips are 
scheduled. The average distance 
per trip is estimated at 450/500 
km. One driver is estimated to 
make 220 trips per year. 
The transport of raw material is 
the second source (together with 
the maintenance) of indirect job 
creation. For an estimated 
production of 800 000 m3, 
110 000 MT per year of basalt, 
slag and/or coke are needed. 
Basalt, coke and slag are 
sourced, respectively, from 
suppliers located at 100 km, 200 
km and 400 km from Caparroso. 
A total of 4 500 trips are needed, 
that is 3 000 for basalt (50 MT 
per day over a year), 1 000 for 
slag (25 MT per day) and 1 000 
MT for coke (50 MT per day). 
The extraction of MT 55 000 of 
basalt is expected to result in the 
creation of 2 indirect jobs. 
The manufacturing by a sub-
contractor of MT 40 000 of 
bricks from the recycling of 
waste is expected to result in the 
creation of 4 indirect jobs. 
The Commission considered that 
the justifications provided by the 
Spanish authorities are 
acceptable. Accordingly, a factor 
of 1.1 was applied. 
TV 582/99 (Marina di Stabia) 
The new marina would have a 
capacity of 1 292 moorings and 
create around 515 new jobs, both 
directly (141) and indirectly 
(374). The project also includes 
a three-star hotel with 220 
double rooms, a dry dock for 
161 crafts and an area destined 
for services, commercial and 
leisure activities. The 
Commission also considered that 
the justifications provided by the 
Italian authorities were 
acceptable. Accordingly, a factor 
of 1.5 was applied. 
N 583/99 (Benfil) 
The most important source of 
indirect job creation (80) is in 
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the re-processing sector. About 
4 000 tons/year of cotton yarn 
produced by Benfil need re-
processing before their final 
manufacture by Tessival Sud Sri 
and Tessival SpA. The 
companies Tessilsud, Fil Mer 
and Filatura di Trani, all of them 
located in objective 1 regions 
(Campania and Puglia) will carry 
out the re-processing. 
The second source of indirect 
job creation is in the supply 
services (51). 
The Commission was satisfied 
by the evidence provided by the 
Italian government for the 
causality between the Benfil 
project and these jobs. 
Furthermore, they fulfil the 
criteria of point 7.5 of the 
Multisectoral Framework, 
namely that they are permanent 
full-time jobs or part-time 
equivalents. They are all created 
in objective 1 areas (Campania 
and Puglia). 
Based on these facts, the 
regional impact factor is to be 
calculated from the ratio indirect 
jobs created in assisted 
area/direct jobs created by the 
investment. The above 
mentioned figures account for 
the creation of 131 jobs which 
represents a medium degree of 
indirect job creation, and thus a 
factor of 1.25. 
N 584/99 (Tessival) 
According to the Italian 
authorities, the most important 
source of indirect job creation 
(276) is the customer market. 
This involves dressmaking 
companies. However, the 
Commission noted that the 
beneficiary's production will be 
sold to its mother company, 
Tessival. Although the fabrics 
supplied to the clothing industry 
in the region substitute partly 
Tessival's imports from third 
countries, it seems inconsistent 
to expect that the beneficiary's 
production will generate any 
new job in this industry. 
Consequently, the Commission 
did not consider an increase in 
indirect jobs in the clothing 
industry in the region. 
The most important source of 
indirect job creation provides the 
external final treatment. The 
number of 127 is calculated on 
the basis of 2.05 jobs per million 
m2 out of the envisaged total 
production of 62 million m2. The 
Commission held that the figure 
of 127 indirects jobs created 
through the external final 
treatment of the total production 
of the aid beneficiary was 
realistic. 
The third source of indirect job 
creation is estimated in the 
supplier market. The 
Commission notes that the aid 
beneficiary will buy two types of 
raw material, 8 700 tons of open-
end cotton yarn, supplied by 
Benfil, and 4 500 tons of ring 
cotton yarn, supplied by five 
companies located in the region 
or in adjacent regions. 
According to the Italian 
authorities, the production of 
100 kg of ring cotton yarn 
requests 4 man/hour. On the 
basis of 1 700 man/hour/year, 
the production of 4,500 
corresponds to 106. 
Finally, the Commission 
considered the indirect jobs 
amounting to 55 to be created in 
the supply of services to be over-
estimated and not proportionate 
to the size of the project. 
Therefore, the Commission held 
that only 40 full time jobs should 
be considered. 
Taking into account the above, 
the total number of indirect jobs 
created in the assisted and 
adjacent assisted regions 
amounted to 273. According to 
this figure compared to the direct 
job creation of 400, the ratio is 
between 50% and 100% and 
therefore a factor of 1.25 is 
applicable. 
Conclusion 
As shown above, the 
Multisectoral Framework has 
worked well so far and is 
expected to work properly 
during the 3-year trial period. 
With the exception of the fact 
that at present there is no valid 
regional aid map for some 
Member States, there have been 
no major obstacles with the 
implementation of the 
Multisectoral Framework. 
As expected, the experience until 
now has shown that the two 
critical steps in the assessment of 
the maximum allowable aid 
intensity for a project are the 
establishment of the competition 
factor as well as the determi-
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nation of the regional impact 
factor. 
Whereas the competition factor 
is to be determined in advance 
by the Commission, the regional 
impact factor depends very much 
on the effective creation of the 
anticipated indirect jobs. The 
latter, by definition, can only be 
monitored after the implemen­
tation of the project. That is why 
the ex­post monitoring laid down 
in point 6 of the Multisectoral 
Framework is of the greatest 
importance in order to ensure 
that the Framework works 
properly and that the maximum 
allowable intensity for a project 
is not unduly increased. 
In order to ensure compliance 
with the Commission decision, 
the Member States, in 
cooperation with the aid 
beneficiaries, must provide the 
Commission with an annual 
report on the project, including 
information on the subsidies 
already paid, any interim report 
on the execution of the aid 
contract, and a final report 
indicating the objectives in terms 
of the timetable, the investments, 
and compliance with any 
specific conditions laid down by 
the authority granting the aid. 
In the four above cases, the 
Commission was satisfied that 
the Member States concerned 
explicitly undertook to comply 
with and to accept the obli­
gations resulting from the appli­
cation of point 6 the 
Multisectoral Framework. The 
decisions were therefore adopted 
on the basis of this understan­
ding. Should the monitoring 
show that the execution of the 
project is not in compliance with 
the Commission decision, then 
the Commission shall require the 
Member State to activate the aid 
reimbursement instruments. 
Main developments between 1st September 
and 31st December 1999 
The Commission has adopted a 
notice on the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty to State aid in the form 
of guarantees. 
The Commission adopted on 
24th November 1999 the 
"Commission notice on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to State aid in 
the form of guarantees". Its 
purpose is to give Member 
States more detailed 
explanations about the principles 
on which the Commission 
intends to base its interpretation 
of Articles 87 and 88 and their 
application to State guarantees. 
The Commission intends in this 
way to make its policy in this 
area as transparent as possible, 
thereby ensuring that its 
decisions are predictable and that 
equal treatment is guaranteed. 
The document does in fact not 
set up new rules but only openly 
states the existing principles of 
assessment. 
In 1989 the Commission 
addressed two letters on State 
guarantees to the Member States. 
In the first letter55 it pointed out 
that it regards all guarantees 
given by a State as falling within 
■" Commission letter to the Member 
States, SG(89) D/4328 of 5 April 
1989. 
the scope of Article 87 (1). 
According to this letter, the 
Commission must therefore be 
notified of any plans to give or 
alter such guarantees in 
sufficient time to enable it to 
submit its comments. In the 
second letter56 the Commission 
made it clear that it intended to 
examine the establishment of 
State guarantee schemes, and 
that individual guarantees given 
under an approved scheme 
would not need to be notified. In 
1993 the Commission adopted a 
communication57 which addres­
5 6 Commission letter to the Member 
States, SG(89) D/12772 of 12 
October 1989. 
5 Commission Communication to the 
Member States on the application of 
Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EEC Treaty and of Article 5 of 
Commission Directive 80/723/EEC 
to public undertakings in the 
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sed the subject of guarantees as 
well. Experience gained in the 
meantime suggested that the 
Commission's policy in this area 
should be reviewed. The new 
Notice replaces the two 
Commission letters of 1989 and 
paragraph 38 of the Commission 
communication of 1993. 
Guarantees are usually 
associated with a loan or other 
financial obligation to be 
contracted by a borrower with a 
lender and may be granted as 
individual guarantees or within 
guarantee schemes. If aid is 
involved, this aid is in most 
cases granted to the borrower. 
Typically, with the benefit of the 
State guarantee, the borrower 
can obtain lower rates and/or 
offer less security. In some 
cases, the borrower would not, 
without a State guarantee, find a 
financial institution prepared to 
lend on any terms. The Notice 
explains how the aid element of 
a guarantee should be calculated 
and offers several ways for this 
calculation. 
The Notice does not prejudice 
the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property 
ownership. However, the 
principles explained in the 
Notice apply to all forms of 
public guarantees, regardless 
whether they are fixed in a 
contract or in a law. The 
Commission also regards as aid 
in the form of a guarantee, the 
more favourable funding terms 
obtained by enterprises whose 
manufacturing sector (OJ C 307, 
13.11.1993, p. 3). 
legal form rules out bankruptcy 
or other insolvency procedures 
or provides an explicit State 
guarantee or coverage of losses 
by the State. The same applies to 
the acquisition by a State of a 
holding in an enterprise if 
unlimited liability is accepted 
instead of the usual limited 
liability. 
Under certain circumstances 
(e.g. if a guarantee is given ex 
post in respect of a loan or other 
financial obligation already 
entered into without the terms of 
this loan or financial obligation 
being adjusted, or if one 
guaranteed loan is used to pay 
back another, non­guaranteed 
loan to the same credit 
institution), there may also be an 
aid to the lender. This has to be 
examined on a case to case basis. 
The Notice also states some 
conditions under which the 
Commission a priori assumes 
that no aid element is included in 
a guarantee (and thus no 
notification is necessary). These 
conditions comprise that the 
borrower is not in financial 
difficulty and could in principle 
obtain a loan on market 
conditions from the financial 
markets, that the guarantee is 
linked to a specific financial 
transaction, is for a fixed 
maximum amount and does not 
cover more than 80 % of the 
outstanding loan and that the 
market price for the guarantee is 
paid. For guarantee schemes 
similar considerations apply, 
including that the premiums paid 
by the beneficiary enterprises 
should be calculated in a way 
making the scheme, in all 
probability, self financing. 
However, this enumeration does 
not mean that guarantees 
automatically include aid if not 
all of these conditions are met. 
The Notice does not address the 
question of compatibility of aid 
granted in the form of 
guarantees. In that respect the 
same rules apply as to State aid 
in other forms. 
Furthermore, the Notice explains 
the consequences of failure to 
notify State aid in the form of 
guarantees. Guarantees differ 
from other State aid measures 
(e.g. grants) in so far as in the 
case of a guarantee the State 
does not only enter into a legal 
relation with the beneficiary but 
also with third parties, e.g. the 
lender of a loan which is 
guaranteed by the State. 
Therefore, it has to be examined 
whether the fact that a State aid 
has been illegally granted has 
also consequences for these third 
parties. However, this question is 
a matter which has to be 
assessed under national law; 
national courts may have to 
examine whether national law 
prevents the guarantee contracts 
from being honoured. 
Nevertheless, lenders may have 
an interest in verifying, as a 
standard precaution, that the 
Community rules on State aid 
have been respected, whenever 
guarantees are granted. 
In the past, Member States have 
not always recognised the aid 
content of State guarantees and 
the fact that the aid is granted 
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when a guarantee is given and 
not when it is actually honoured. 
Therefore, Commissioner Monti 
has asked the Member States in a 
separate letter to communicate 
within four months all State 
guarantees falling within the 
scope of Article 87(1) which 
should be, but have not been, 
notified to the Commission as 
well as all State aid in the form 
of State guarantees which might 
constitute existing aid within the 
meaning of Article 88 (1). 
Nouvelles Décisions sur les 
cartes des aides d'Etat à finalité 
régionale 
Tous les Etats membres ont 
désormais communiqué 
officiellement leurs projets de 
cartes des aides régionales. Après 
une première évaluation de ces 
propositions, la Commission a 
cependant été amenée a exprimer 
des doutes sur la compatibilité 
avec le Traité des projets de 
certains Etats membres. Ainsi, en 
juillet 1999, elle a ouvert la 
procédure prévue à l'article 88§2 
du traité CE à l'encontre des 
propositions relatives aux cartes 
de la Belgique, de la France et 
des Pays-Bas, ainsi qu'en ce qui 
concerne la partie de la carte 
relative aux régions éligibles à la 
dérogation de l'article 87§3.c) du 
traité CE en Allemagne. Depuis 
lors, de nouvelles décisions ont 
été prises à l'égard des projets de 
cartes soumis par le Danemark, 
la Grèce, l'Irlande, le Portugal et 
la Finlande. 
En raison de leur notification 
tardive, les cartes des autres Etats 
membres (tout comme, à cause 
des doutes à l'égard de leur 
compatibilité avec les 
dispositions des lignes 
directrices, les parties "87.3.c)" 
des cartes allemande et 
portugaise) n'ont pas pu être 
approuvées avant la fin 1999. En 
attendant leur approbation, les 
Etats concernés ne sont plus en 
mesure d'octroyer ce type 
d'aides depuis le 1er janvier 
2000. 
Danemark 
La Commission a approuvé la 
carte danoise le 26 octobre 1999. 
La part de la population habitant 
dans les régions éligibles, toutes 
retenues au titre de la dérogation 
prévue à l'article 87§3.c) du traité 
CE, diminue de 20% à 17,1%. 
L'aide ne pourra en général pas 
dépasser 10% net de la valeur de 
l'investissement, à l'exception 
des régions de Bornholm et 
Storestrøm (20% net). Ces deux 
dernières régions, constituées de 
multiples îles, rencontrent en 
effet des problèmes spécifiques 
de développement liés à 
l'insuffisance des infrastructures 
de transport. 
Grèce 
La Commission a approuvé la 
carte grecque le 22 décembre 
1999. Compte tenu du fait que le~ 
PIB par habitant reste inférieur à 
75% de la moyenne 
communautaire dans toutes les 
régions grecques, cet Etat 
membre est entièrement eligible 
à la dérogation prévue à l'article 
87§3.a) du traité CE. 
Cependant, les intensités 
maximales des aides diminuent 
de façon significative, et ne 
pourront pas dépasser 50% net de 
la valeur des investissements 
dans les régions Anatoliki 
Makedonia, Thraki, Ipeiros, 
Dykiti Ellada, Peloponissos et 
Voreio Aigaio. Dans toutes les 
autres régions grecques, cette 
intensité maximale a été fixée à 
40% net. En outre, ces taux 
maximaux sont modulés en 
fonction du type de projets 
d'investissement, ainsi que du 
secteur d'activité concerné. 
Irlande 
La Commission a approuvé la 
carte irlandaise le 26 octobre 
1999. Alors que la nécessité 
d'aides régionales continue de se 
faire sentir dans toutes les 
régions irlandaises, le 
développement économique 
impressionnant qu'a connu 
l'Irlande durant les dernières 
années a été pris en compte au 
travers d'une réduction 
importante des intensités d'aide. 
Ainsi, l'intensité maximale des 
aides à l'investissement a été 
fixée à 40% net dans les régions 
Border, Midlands et West. Avec 
un PIB par habitant inférieur à 
75% de la moyenne 
communautaire, ces régions 
continuent d'appartenir aux 
régions les moins développées de 
l'Union, et restent donc éligibles 
au titre de la dérogation prévue à 
l'article 87§3 a) du traité CE. 
En revanche, des intensités moins 
élevées sont prévues pour les 
autres régions irlandaises, toutes 
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éligibles à la dérogation prévue à 
l'article 87§3 c). Ainsi, dans le 
South­East, le Mid­West et le 
South­West, les intensités d'aide 
seront progressivement ramenées 
de 40% (en 2000) à 20% net (à 
partir de 2004), et dans le Mid­
East de 40% à 18% net. Enfin, 
l'intensité d'aide qui s'applique à 
Dublin à partir de 2000 est de 
17,5% net. 
Portugal 
Le 8 décembre 1999, la 
Commission a approuvé la partie 
de la carte qui concerne les 
régions portugaises éligibles à la 
dérogation prévue à l'article 
87§3.a) du Traité CE (Norte, 
Centro, Alentejo, Algarve, 
Açores et Madeira). Les 
intensités maximales d'aide 
autorisées varient de 40% à 62% 
net, tout en étant modulées à 
l'intérieur de chaque région, 
compte tenu de sa situation 
socio­économique. 
En ce qui concerne la région de 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, qui sera 
entièrement eligible à la 
dérogation prévue à l'article 
87§3 c) en tant que «région 
87§3 a) sortante», la notification 
portugaise prévoit que l'entièreté 
de cette région, qui représente 
33,4% de la population nationale, 
bénéficie d'une période de 
transition de 4 ans pour 
l'adaptation des intensités d'aide 
actuelles. Or, au vu des 
limitations établies par les lignes 
directrices à l'égard de la portée 
géographique de cette disposition 
transitoire, seul un pourcentage 
de 10,2% de la population 
portugaise pourrait bénéficier 
d'une telle période. En 
conséquence, la Commission a 
décidé d'ouvrir la procédure 
prévue à l'article 88§2 du Traité 
CE à l'égard de cette partie de la 
carte. 
Finlande 
La Commission a approuvé la 
carte finlandaise le 26 octobre 
1999. Si la part de la population 
habitant dans les régions éligibles 
augmente très légèrement (de 
41,7% à 42,2%), les intensités 
d'aide sont par contre en 
diminution sensible. 
La région de Itä­Suomi, eligible 
au titre de la dérogation prévue à 
l'article 87§3 a) du traité CE, 
bénéficiera des intensités 
maximales les plus élevées (24% 
net), tandis que pour ses autres 
régions la Finlande limitera les 
aides aux grandes entreprises à 
8%, 10% ou 12% net selon les 
cas. 
United­Kingdom ­With regards 
to article 86 S 2 of EC Treaty, 
the Commission authorizes the 
financing of a 24­hour 
advertising­free channel out of 
the licence fee by the BBC, 
"BBC News 24". 
In 1997 a private competitor filed 
a complaint against the launching 
by the BBC of a 24­hours news 
service in the United Kingdom to 
be financed solely by the licence 
fee. BBC News 24 is a channel 
delivered free of advertising and 
free of charge to carriers (cable 
or satellite operators). 
The service was originally 
developed as part of the basic 
tier on the digital satellite 
platform that, at the time of the 
complaint, was being developed 
in the UK by British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd. As the 
launching of the digital satellite 
service was delayed from the 
originally­planned Autumn 
1997, the BBC decided to make 
BBC News 24 available also on 
the free­to­air network during 
night hours, and on the analogue 
cable infrastructure, while 
waiting for the digital satellite 
service. 
According to the complainant, 
the financing of BBC News 24 
by licence fees: 
­ would have constituted State 
aid in the sense of Article 87, as 
comprised of State resources, 
­ was unlawful, as it was not 
notified in accordance with the 
EC Treaty State aid rules, 
­ was not compatible with the 
common market, as it could not 
qualify for any of the 
exemptions provided for in 
Articles 87, paragraphs (2) and 
(3), and Article 86(2). 
The Commission took a decision 
on 29 September 1999. In 
accordance with the 
jurisprudence of the Court58, it 
decided that funds stemming 
from licence fees are in fact to be 
considered State aid in the sense 
of Article 87. Also, it found out 
that such aid was to be granted 
without prior notification and 
approval. 
58 Case T­106/95 FFSA and others ν 
Commission, [1997] ECR 11­229 
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However, the Commission 
rejected the third allegation of 
the complainant, finding out that 
the State aid in question was 
compatible with the common 
market, as it is granted as 
compensation for the delivery of 
"services of general economic 
interest", as defined and 
entrusted by the UK authorities. 
The Commission concluded that 
the four conditions set out by 
Article 86(2) are fulfilled. In 
particular, the Commission 
considered that the United 
Kingdom did not abuse its 
competence by defining a 24-
hour news channel with the 
specific features described above 
as part of the public service 
remit for broadcasting. Also, it 
found that the BBC was 
entrusted with such public 
service task by means of an 
official act of the Government. 
In addition, the financial means 
granted to the channel do not 
exceed its actual costs and are 
therefore proportionate to the 
public service. 
Finally, the Commission 
concluded that trade within the 
EU is not affected by the 
creation and financing of BBC 
News 24 to an extent contrary to 
the common interest. In order to 
reach this conclusion, the 
Commission analysed the effect 
on the market of the UK decision 
to launch a 24-hour news service 
funded solely by the licence fee. 
It found out that competition is 
indeed affected by such decision, 
in that some competitors lost 
market share and revenues in 
consequence of the launching of 
BBC News 24. 
However, the Commission 
considered that, according to 
Article 86(2), a certain distortion 
of competition has to be 
tolerated when a Member State 
decides to provide a service of 
general economic interest. 
Article 86(2) only requires such 
distortion not to be excessive, to 
an extent that it would preclude 
the development of trade in the 
sector concerned. The 
Commission considered this to 
be the case of BBC News 24, in 
that, although it gained some of 
its competitors' market share, it 
did not make it impossible for 
competitors to continue 
operating on the market. 
Therefore, since all the 
conditions of Article 86 (2) of 
the EC Treaty were met, the 
Commission decided that the 
funds from the licence fees 
dedicated to BBC News 24, 
although constituting State aid in 
the sense of Article 87, are 
compatible with the Treaty rules. 
France La Commission 
autorise l'octroi d'aides aux 
petites et moyennes entreprises 
par les collectivités 
territoriales françaises. 
Le 22 décembre 1999, la 
Commission a décidé de ne pas 
soulever d'objection à l'égard 
d'un régime qui permettra aux 
collectivités territoriales 
d'accorder des aides aux PME 
pour des investissements 
matériels ou immatériels, ainsi 
que pour soutenir les efforts de 
de ces entreprises en matière de 
protection de l'environnement. 
Ce régime est appelé à remplacer 
plusieurs régimes d'aides 
existants et précise le cadre 
juridique des interventions des 
collectivités territoriales 
françaises en faveur de leurs 
petites et moyennes entreprises. 
Les bénéficiaires en sont des 
PME définies conformément à 
l'Encadrement communautaire 
des aides d'Etat aux petites et 
moyennes entreprises59. 
La Commission a analysé les 
dispositions du régime et a 
conclu qu'il était conforme à 
l'Encadrement communautaire 
des aides d'Etat aux petites et 
moyennes entreprises et à 
l'Encadrement communautaire 
des aides d'Etat pour la 
protection de l'environnement60. 
Les dispositions des Lignes 
directrices concernant les aides 
d'Etat à finalité régionale61 sont 
également respectées. 
Ainsi, en s'inscrivant clairement 
dans le cadre des dispositions 
applicables en matière d'aides 
d'Etat, le régime d'aide se 
conforme parfaitement au droit 
communautaire et assure une 
pleine transparence des 
interventions économiques des 
collectivités. 
59 J O C 213 du 23.7.1996, p.4 
6 0 J O C 72 du 10.3.1994, p.3 
61 J O C 74 du 10.3.1998, p.4 
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Germany - The Commission 
approved R&D aid for Dornier 
Luftfahrt GmbH for the 
development of a family of 
regional aircraft. 
On 8 December 1999, the 
Commission approved a 
proposal to grant R&D aid to 
Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH. It 
considered that the aid, which 
takes the form of a State 
guarantee and was notified by 
the Federal Government in 
accordance with State aid rules, 
is compatible with the EC 
Treaty. 
On 15 June 1999 the Federal 
Republic notified the 
Commission, under 
Article 88(3) EC, of its intention, 
together with the State of 
Bavaria, to guarantee a loan of 
up to USD 350 million (€ 350 
million) to Dornier Luftfahrt 
GmbH to finance a development 
project. The Federal Government 
guarantees a maximum of 
USD 270 million (€ 270 
million), while Bavaria 
guarantees a maximum of USD 
80 million (€ 80 million). In 
each case the guarantee covers 
80% of the loan volume. 
The aid is granted for a R&D 
project which forms part of a 
wider project for the 
development of a new family of 
regional aircraft, including the 
728JET and two variants, the 
528JET and 928JET. The overall 
development costs far exceed the 
costs of the research and 
development project at issue 
here. The project covers the 
development of the technology 
needed for the 728JET and 
subsequently for the 528JET and 
928JET. It can be classified as 
precompetitive development. 
After examining this ad hoc aid 
in the light of the rules laid down 
in the EC Treaty, the 
Commission concluded that it is 
compatible with those rules and 
in particular with the 
Community framework for State 
aid for research and 
development.62 
Italie - La Commission interdit 
l'octroi d'aides régionales en 
faveur de la Société Fiat pour 
son projet d'investissement 
dans son établissement de 
Mirafïori Meccanica. 
Le 22 décembre 1999, la 
Commission a interdit l'octroi 
d'aides régionales d'une intensité 
de 4,6% en faveur d'un projet 
d'investissement mené par Fiat. 
La Commission a constaté que 
les aides en cause n'étaient pas 
nécessaires à la réalisation du 
projet de Mirafïori Meccanica. 
Fin 1997, en application de la 
Loi 488/92, l'Italie avait notifié 
six dossiers d'aides régionales en 
faveur de Fiat Auto, dont 
Mirafïori Meccanica. Après une 
première analyse des cas, les 
informations fournies par l'Italie 
n'avaient pas permis de 
démontrer que les aides 
régionales envisagées étaient 
conformes aux principes de 
l'encadrement automobile. La 
Commission avait donc ouvert 
6 2 OJC45, 17. 2.1996, p. 6. 
en février 1999 la procédure au 
titre de l'article 88 § 2 du traité 
CE63 à rencontre des 6 projets 
d'aides. Dans le courant du mois 
de mai, trois cas (dont Mirafïori 
Meccanica) avaient fait l'objet 
d'une décision d'extension de la 
procédure64 centrée sur la 
question de la nécessité des aides 
envisagées. 
L'encadrement automobile 
stipule que pour être compatibles 
avec le marché commun, les 
aides régionales doivent être 
nécessaires à la réalisation du 
projet d'investissement dans la 
région assistée concernée. Or, 
d'une part, l'étude de localisation 
qui a amené Fiat à choisir 
Mirafïori pour son 
investissement s'est déroulée 
vers 1993-1994, époque à 
laquelle Mirafïori n'appartenait 
pas encore à une zone assistée. 
Ce n'est qu'en mars 1995 que 
Mirafïori a été classée en région 
assistée au titre de l'article 87 
paragraphe 3 alinéa c du Traité 
CE. Dès lors, Fiat n'a pas pu 
intégrer dans le plan de 
financement de son projet à 
Mirafïori l'obtention d'une aide 
régionale. D'autre part, la 
mobilité du projet n'a pas été 
suffisamment démontrée par les 
autorités italiennes. Mirafïori 
s'avère en effet l'unique site où 
Fiat a envisagé d'implanter son 
projet et aucun autre site crédible 
n'a été indiqué à la Commission. 
Les aides notifiées par l'Italie en 
faveur de Fiat Mirafïori 
Meccanica ne sont donc pas 
63 JO C 120 du 01.05.1999. 
6 4 JOC 288 du 09.10.1999. 
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nécessaires pour atteindre les CE, en l'espèce faciliter le ces aides s'avèrent incompa-
buts prévus par l'article 87 développement de certaines tibies avec le marché commun et 
paragraphe 3 alinéa c du Traité régions économiques. Dès lors, ne peuvent pas être octroyées. 
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Documentation... 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given 
by Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of these 
are available from Competition DCs home page on the World 
Wide Web. Future issues of the newsletter will contain details oi 
conferences on competition policy which have been brought to our 
attention. Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this 
facility should refer to page 1 for the address of Competition DG's 
Information Officer. 
SPEECHES AND ARTICLES 
Global Airline Industry Competition 
and Service Adequacy in an Open 
Market Environment ­ Jean­
François PONS ­ CHICAGO 
BEYOND OPEN SKIES 
CONFERENCE ­ Chicago ­
07.12.1999 
Das Weißbuch der Europäischen 
Kommission über die 
Modernisierung der Vorschriften 
zur Anwendung der Artikel 81 und 
82 EG­Vertrag ­ Die Reform der 
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COMPETITION 
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Communities­Volume IA­Rules 
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Communities­Addendum to 
Volume ΙΑ­Rules applicable to 
undertakings 
Situational 1 March 1995. 
Catalogue No: CM­88­95­436­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIA­Rules 
applicable to State aid 
Situation at 30 June 1998; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. 
Catalogue No: PD­15­98­875­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE; 
EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV; the other 
versions will be available later). 
Competition law in the EC­
Volume II B­Explanation of rules 
applicable to state aid 
Situation at December 1996 
Catalogue No: CM­03­97­296­xx­C 
(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIIA­Rules 
in the international field­
Situation at 31 December 1996 
(Edition 1997) 
Catalogue No: CM­89­95­858­xx­C 
(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Merger control law in the 
European Union­Situation in 
March 1998 
Catalogue No: CV­15­98­899­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Brochure concerning the 
competition rules applicable to 
undertakings as contained in the 
EEA agreement and their 
implementation by the EC 
Commission and the EFTA 
surveillance authority. 
Catalogue No: CV­77­92­118­EN­C 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
Application of EC State aid law 
by the member state courts 
Catalogue No: CM­20­99­365­EN­C 
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Dealing with the Commission 
(Edition 1997)­Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact­
finding, powers under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Catalogue No: CV­95­96­552­xx­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, FI,SV) 
Green paper on vertical restraints 
in EC competition policy ­COM 
(96) 721­(Ed. 1997) 
Catalogue No: CB­CO­96­742­xx­C 
(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NL 
PTSVFI) 
Final report of the multimodal 
group ­ Presented to 
Commissioner Van Miert by Sir 
Bryan Carsberg, Chairman of the 
Group (Ed. 1997). 
Catalogue No: CV­11­98­803­EN­C 
The institutional framework for 
the regulation of 
telecommunications and the 
application of EC competition 
rules ­ Final Report (Forrester 
Norall & Sutton). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­590­EN­C 
Competition aspects of access 
pricing­Report to the European 
Commission 
December 1995 (M. Cave, P. 
Crowther, L. Hancher). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­582­EN­C 
Community Competition Policy in 
the Telecommunications Sector 
(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March 
1997)­volume II Β a compedium 
prepared by DG IV­C­1; it 
contains Directives under art 90, 
Decisions under Regulation 17 
and under the Merger Regulation 
as well as relevant Judgements of 
the Court of Justice. 
­ Copies available through DG IV­
C­1 (tel. +322­2968623, 2968622, 
fax+322­2969819). 
Brochure explicative sur les 
modalités d'application du 
Règlement (CE) Ne 1475/95 de la 
Commission concernant certaines 
catégories d' accords de 
distribution et de service de vente 
et d'après vente de véhicules 
automobiles ­ Copies available 
through DG IV­F­2 (tel. +322­
2951880, 2950479, fax. +322­
2969800) EN, FR, DE 
COMPETITION DECISIONS 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matière d'aides 
d'Etat ­Article 93, paragraphe 2 
(Décisions finales négatives)­
1964­1995 
Catalogue No: CM­96­96­465­xx­C 
[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT (1964­1995); 
EN et DA (73­95); EL (81­95); (ES 
et PT (86­95); FI et SV (95)] 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
94/98 
Catalogue No: CV­90­95­946­xx­C 
(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
93/94 
Catalogue No: CV­90­95­946­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
90/92 
Catalogue No: CV­84­94­387­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
89/90 
Catalogue No: CV­73­92­772­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
86/88 
Catalogue No: CM­80­93­290­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
81/85 
Catalogue No: CM­79­93­792­xx­C 
(xx=DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL.) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
73/80 
Catalogue No: CM­76­92­988­xx­C 
(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.) 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matièrre de 
concurrence ­ Articles 85, 86 et 90 
du traité CEE­64/72 
Catalogue No: CM­76­92­996­xx­C 
(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.) 
COMPETITION REPORTS 
XXVIII Report on Competition 
Policy 1998 
Catalogue No: CV­20­99­785­xx­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV) 
European Community on 
Competition Policy 1998 
Catalogue No: CV­20­99­301­xx­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI SV 
XXVII Report on Competition 
Policy 1997 
Catalogue No: CM­12­98­506­xx­C 
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European Community on 
Competition Policy 1997 
Catalogue No: Cv-12-98-263-XX-C 
(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT, 
SV, DA, FI) 
XXVI Report on Competition 
Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C 
European Community 
Competition Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C 
(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*, 
FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*,FI*, SV*) 
XXV Report on Competition 
Policy 1995 
Catalogue No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C 
European Community 
Competition Policy 1995 
Catalogue No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C 
(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*, 
FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*) 
XXIV Report on competition 
policy 1994 
Catalogue No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C 
(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV) 
European Community 
competition policy 1994 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV ) . Copies available 
through Cellule Information DG IV 
XXIIIe Report on competition 
policy 1993 
Catalogue No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
XXIIe Report on competition 
policy 1992 
Catalogue No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT 
XXIe Report on competition 
policy 1991 
Catalogue No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Fifth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors (Edition 1997) 
Catalogue No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV ) 
Sixt survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors 
Catalogue No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C 
Septième rapport sur les aides 
d'Etat dans le secteur des 
produits manufacturés et certains 
autres secteurs de l'Union 
européenne [COM (1999) 148 
final] 
Catalogue No: CB-CO-99-153-xx-C 
(xx= language code: DE, FR; the 
other versions will be 
available later) 
OTHER DOCUMENTS and 
STUDIES 
Buyer power and its impact on 
competition in the food retail 
distribution sector of the 
European Union 
Cataogue No: CV-25-99-649-EN-C 
The application of articles 85 & 
86 of the EC Treaty by national 
courts in the Member States 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx= 
FR, DE, EN,NL, IT, ES, PT) 
Examination of current and 
future excess capacity in the 
European automobyle industry -
Ed. 1997 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C 
Video : Fair Competition in 
Europe-Examination of current 
Cat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx= 
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, FI, SV) 
Communication de la 
Commission: Les services 
d'intérêt général en Europe (Ed. 
1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx= 
DE, NL, GR, SV 
Study of exchange of confidential 
information agreements and 
treaties between the US and 
Member States of EU in areas of 
securities, criminal, tax and 
customs (Ed. 1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C 
Survey of the Member State 
National Laws governing vertical 
distribution agreements (Ed. 
1996) 
Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C 
Services de télécomunication en 
Europe: statistiques en bref, 
Commerce, services et transports. 
1/1996 
Cat. No: CA-NP-96-OOl-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR. DE 
Report by the group of experts on 
competition policy in the new 
trade order [COM(96)284 fin.] 
Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European 
merger control: New lessons 
about collective dominance ? (Ed. 
1995) 
Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C 
Proceedings of the European 
Competition Forum (coédition 
with J. Wiley)-Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in 
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the Telecommunications Sector 
(Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition (Ed. 
1995) 
Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C. 
Bierlieferungsverträge in den 
neuen EU-Mitgliedstaaten 
Österreich, Schweden und 
Finnland-Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE 
Surveys of the Member States' 
powers to investigate and sanction 
violations of national competition 
laws (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C 
Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport 
1995 
Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C 
Information exchanges among 
firms and their impact on 
competition (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C 
Impact of EC funded R&D 
programmes on human resource 
development and long term 
competitiveness (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C 
Competition policy in the new 
trade order: strengthening 
international cooperation and 
rules (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C 
Forum consultatif de la 
comptabilité: subventions 
publiques (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: C 184 94 735FRC 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Rapport sur 
l'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C 
Study on the impact of 
liberalization of inward cross 
border mail on the provision of 
the universal postal service and 
the options for progressive 
liberalization (Ed. 1995) Final 
report, 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C 
Meeting universal service 
obligations in a competitive 
telecommunications sector (Ed. 
1994) 
Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control policy 
(Ed. 1994) 
Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1994) 
Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2 
PartC 
Cat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European 
single market (Ed. 1993) 
Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C 
International transport by air, 
1993 
Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR, DE 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Enquête 1992 
(Ed. 1993)-9 languages 
Cat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C 
EG Wettbewerbsrecht und 
Zulieferbeziehungen der 
Automobilindustrie (Ed. 1992) 
Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C 
Green Paper on the development 
of the single market for postal 
services, 9 languages 
Cat. No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C 
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
1st November 99 to 
31st January 2000 
ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONS 
AND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIO 
BY UNDERTAKINGS) 
25.01.2000 
C 21 2000/C 021-0023 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/E-2/37.769)Text 
with EEA relevance 
15.01.2000 
C 12 2000/C 012-0010 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/E-/37.711 )Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 12 2000/C 012-0009 
Notification of an agreement 
(Case COMP/37.718 
EBN)Text with EEA relevance 
13.01.2000 
C 9 2000/C 009-0009 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/E-/37.747)Text 
with EEA relevance 
08.01.2000 
L 5 2000/L 005-0055 
Commission Decision of 20 
July 1999 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty and Article 54 of 
the EEA Agreement (Case 
IV/36.888 - 1998 Football 
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World Cup)Text with EEA 
relevance (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
2295) 
17.12.1999 
C 63 1999/C363-0002 
Communication made pursuant 
to Article 19(3) of Council 
Regulation No 17 concerning 
request for negative clearance 
or for exemption pursuant to 
Article 81(3) of the EC 
Treaty(Case No 37.632 - UEFA 
rule on integrity of the UEFA 
club competitions: 
independence of clubsText with 
EEA relevance 
08.12.1999 
C 355 1999/C 355-0006 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/E-3/37.654 -
Shell/Statoil)Text with EEA 
relevance 
06.12.1999 
L 312 1999/L 312-0001 
Commission Decision of 15 
September 1999 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty (Case IV/36.539 
British Interactive 
Broadcasting/Open) (notified 
under document number 
C(1999/2935)) 
19.11.1999 
C 331 1999/C 331-0003 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/37.659/C 3 -
Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
NV (Philips) and LG 
Electronics Inc. (LGE))Text 
with EEA relevance 
18.11.1999 
C 330 1999/C 330-005 
Notification of an agreement 
between undertakings - Case 
COMP/37.652 
Telefónica/Sogecable/AVS 
IIText with EEA relevance 
29.10.1999 08.10.1999 
C 311 1999/C 311-0004 
Notification of cooperation 
agreements (Case No IV/37.669 
Mediterranean Cable 
Maintenance Agreement)Text 
with EEA relevance 
27.10.1999 
C 308 1999/C 308-0006 
Notification of joint venture 
agreements (Case No IV/E-
2/37.650)Text with EEA 
relevance 
26.10.1999 
L 275 1999/L 275-0017 
Commission Decision of 15 
September 1999 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty and Article 53 of 
the EEA Agreement (Case No 
IV/36.748 - REIMS II)Text 
with EEA relevance (notified 
under document number C( 19 
21.10.1999 
L 271 1999/L 271-0028 
Commission Decision of 8 
September 1999 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty (IV/34.010 -
Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Banken (1991 GS A agreement), 
IV/33.793 - Nederlandse 
Postorderbond, IV/34.234 -
Verenigde Nederlandse 
16.10.1999 
C 298 1999/C 298-0011 
Notification of joint venture 
agreements (Case No IV/E-
2/37.644)Text with EEA 
relevance 
13.10.1999 
C 292 1999/C 292-0005 
Notification of cooperation 
agreements (Case No IV/37.562 
- Eutelsat)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 287 1999/C 287-0005 
Notification of cooperation 
agreements (Case No IV/37.648 
- ScottishTelecom)Text with 
EEA relevance 
CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS / 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
29.01.2000 
C 27 2000/C 027-0020 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1774 
Deutsche BP/DaimlerChrysler 
AG/Union-Tank Eckstein)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 27 2000/C 027-0019 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1633 - RWE 
Umwelt/Vivendi/Berliner 
Wasserbetriebe)Text with EEA 
relevance 
27.01.2000 
C 23 2000/C 023-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1397 
Sanofi/Synthelabo)Text with 
EEA relevance 
26.01.2000 
C 22 2000/C 022-0011 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.23 
Telefonica/Portugal 
Telecom/Medi Telecom)Text 
with EEA relevance 
25.01.2000 
L 20 2000/L 020-0001 
Commission Decision of 9 
March 1999 relating to a 
proceeding under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case IV/M.1313 - Danish 
Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier) 
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(notified under document 
number C(1999) 560)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 21 2000/C 021-0024 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1796 
Bayer/Lyondell)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 21 2000/C 021-0022 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1810 
VW/Europcar)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 21 2000/C 021-0026 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1765 - KKR 
Associates/Siemens Nixdorf 
Retail and Banking 
Systems)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 21 2000/C 021-0027 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.29 
Lafarge/Readymix)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 21 2000/C 021-0026 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1717 
Siemens/Italtel)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 21 2000/C 021-0025 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.38 
KPN/BellSouth/E-Plus)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 21 2000/C 021-0002 Opinion 
of the Advisory Committee on 
Concentrations given at the 
60th meeting on 25 February 
1999 concerning a preliminary 
draft decision relating to Case 
IV/M.1313 - Danish 
Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier 
20.01.2000 
C 16 2000/C 016-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1538 
Dupont/Sabanci)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 16 2000/C 016-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1822 
Mobil/JV Dissolution)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 16 2000/C 016-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1597 
Castrol/Carless/JV)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 16 2000/C 016-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1771 - Sedgwick 
Noble 
Lowndes/Woolwich)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 16 2000/C 016-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1790 - Deutsche 
Bank/BHS/Pago)Text with 
EEA relevance 
19.01.2000 
C 14 2000/C 014-0005 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1782 - American 
Home Products/Warner-
Lambert)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 14 2000/C 014-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1741 - MCI 
WorldCom/Sprint)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 14 2000/C 014-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1791 - UBS 
Capital/Vencap/Stiga)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 14 2000/C 014-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1736 
U LAG/Carlyle/Andritz)Text 
with EEA relevance 
18.01.2000 
C 13 2000/C 013-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1803 
Electrabel/Epon)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 13 2000/C 013-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1787 - Deutsche 
Bahn/NS Groep/JV Service 
Stores)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 13 2000/C 013-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1801 
Neusiedler/American Israeli 
Paper Mills/JV)Text with EEA 
relevance 
15.01.2000 
C 12 2000/C 012-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/ECSC.1322 -
Scholz/Loacker/Saarländische 
Rohprodukte)Text with EEA 
relevance 
14.01.2000 
C 11 2000/C 011-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.17 
Mannesmann/Bell 
Atlantic/OPI)Text with EEA 
relevance 
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C 11 2000/C 011-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1553 
FranceTelecom/Editel/Lince)Te 
xt with EEA relevance 
C 11 2000/C 011-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1681 - AKZO 
Nobel/Hoechst Roussel 
Vet)Text with EEA relevance 
C 11 2000/C 011-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1637 - DB 
Investments/SPP/Öhman)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 11 2000/C 011-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1711 
Tyco/Siemens)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 11 2000/C 011-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1623 - Allied 
Signal/MTU)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 11 2000/C 011-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1794 
Deutsche Post/Air Express 
International)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 11 2000/C 011-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1768 
Schoyen/Goldman 
Sachs/Swebus)Text with EEA 
relevance 
13.01.2000 
C 9 2000/C 009-0012 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1571 - New 
Holland/Case)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 9 2000/C 009-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1701 - Grüner + 
Jahr/Dekra/Faircar)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 9 2000/C 009-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration and napplicability 
of the Regulation to a notified 
operation (Case COMP/M.1587 
- Dana/GKN)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 9 2000/C 009-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1820 - BP/JV 
Dissolution)Text with EEA 
relevance 
12.01.2000 
C 8 2000/C 008-0016 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1797 
Saab/Celsius)Text with EEA 
relevance 
11.01.2000 
C 7 2000/C 007-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1728 
CVC/Torraspapel)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 7 2000/C 007-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1782 
American Home 
Products/Warner-Lambert)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 7 2000/C 007-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.37 
BSkyB/KirchPayTV)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 7 2000/C 007-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.30 - BVI 
Television (Europe) Inc./SPE 
Euromovies Investments 
Inc./Europe Movieco 
Partners)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 7 2000/C 007-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1830 
Finalrealm/United 
Biscuits)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 7 2000/C 007-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1710 - Industri 
Kapital 1997 Ltd 
Marmorandum)/Neste 
Chemicals)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 7 2000/C 007-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1825 - Suzuki 
Motor/Suzuki KG/Fafin)Text 
with EEA relevance 
08.01.2000 
C 5 2000/C 005-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.38 
KPN/BellSouth/E-Plus)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 5 2000/C 005-0007 Initiation 
of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.1671 - Dow 
Chemical/Union Carbide)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 5 2000/C 005-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.35 
Chemag/Beiselen/BayWa)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 5 2000/C 005-0008 Initiation 
of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.1663 
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Alcan/Alusuisse)Text 
EEA relevance 
with 
C 5 2000/C 005-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1640 
Aceralia/Ucin)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 5 2000/C 005-0008 Initiation 
of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.1715 
Alcan/Pechiney)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 5 2000/C 005-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1348 - Archer 
Daniels Midland/Alfred C. 
Toepfer 
International/Intrade)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 5 2000/C 005-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.36 - TXU 
Europe/EDF London 
Investments)Text with EEA 
relevance 
07.01.2000 
C 4 2000/C 004-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1786 - General 
Electric Company/Thomson-
CSF)Text with EEA relevance 
C 4 2000/C 004-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1677 
BT/LGTTelecom)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 4 2000/C 004-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1740 - Heinz/United 
Biscuits Frozen and Chilled 
Food)Text with EEA relevance 
C 4 2000/C 004-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1644 - Wienerberger/ 
DSCB/Steinzeug)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 4 2000/C 004-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1599 -Dupont/Teijin) 
Text with EEA relevance 
28.12.1999 
C 376 1999/C 376-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/ECSC.1321 -
VEBA/VIAG)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 376 1999/C 376-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1816 
Churchill Insurance Group/NIG 
Holdings)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 376 1999/C 376-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1821 
BellSouth/VRT (E-Plus)YText 
with EEA relevance 
22.12.1999 
C 371 1999/C 371-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1673 
VEBA/VIAG)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 371 1999/C 371-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1778 
Freudenberg/Phoenix/JV)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 371 1999/C 371-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1817 
BellSouth/Vodafone (E-
Plus))Text with EEA relevance 
C 371 1999/C 371-0008 Re-
notification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1683 - The Coca-
Cola Company/Kar-Tess Group 
(Hellenic Bottling))Text with 
EEA 
21.12.1999 
C 369 1999/C 369-0024 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case OMP/JV.3 
- BT/Airtel)Text with EEA 
relevance 
18.12.1999 
C 365 1999/C 365-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.6 
Ericsson/Nokia/Psion)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 365 1999/C 365-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.26 
Freecom/Dangaard)Text with 
EEA relevance 
17.12.1999 
C 63 1999/C363-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1800 
Marconi/Bosch Public 
Network)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 63 1999/C363-0005 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1709 
Preussag/Babcock/Celsius)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 63 1999/C363-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1777 
CGU/Hibernian)Text with EEA 
relevance 
16.12.1999 
C 62 1999/C3 62-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1807 
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FNAC/Coin/JV)Text with EEA 
relevance 
15.12.1999 
C 61 1999/C361-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case OMP/ECSC.1319 -
VIAG (ASD)/Richardsons-
Westgarth)Text with EEA 
relevance 
14.12.1999 
C 360 1999/C 360-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1792 
Ahlström/CapMan/Folding 
Carton Partners)Text with EEA 
relevance 
11.12.1999 
C 359 1999/C 359-0033 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1684 
Carrefour/Promodès)Text with 
EEA relevance 
10.12.1999 
C 358 1999/C 358-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1761 - Toyota 
Motor/Toyota France)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 358 1999/C 358-0007 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.1636 - MMS/DASA 
-Astrium)Text with EEA 
relevance 
09.12.1999 
C 357 1999/C 357-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1748 - Industri 
Kapital Limited/Superfos)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 357 1999/C 357-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1652 
D'Ieteren/PGSI)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 357 1999/C 357-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1702 - Vedior/Select 
Appointments)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 357 1999/C 357-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case IV/JV.21 -
Skandia/Storebrand/Pohjola)Te 
xt with EEA relevance 
C 357 1999/C 357-0012 
Corrigendum to prior notice of 
a concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.32 
BT/Autostrade/BLU) (OJ C 
342 of 30 November 1999) 
C 357 1999/C 357-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1719 - Delta Lloyd 
Verzekeringsgroep/Nuts 
Ohra)Text with EEA relevance 
C 357 1999/C 357-0006 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1716 - Gehe/Herba 
Chemosan Apotheker)Text with 
EEA relevance 
08.12.1999 
C 355 1999/C 355-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1799 
BSCH/AC/CGD/Totta/CPP)Te 
xt with EEA relevance 
07.12.1999 
C 353 1999/C 353-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1714 
Föreningssparbanken/FI-
Holding/FIH)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 353 1999/C 353-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1742 - Sun 
Chemical/TotalFina/Coates)Tex 
t with EEA relevance 
04.12.1999 
C 351 1999/C 351-0038 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1772 
Continental Teves/Automotive 
Distance Control)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 351 1999/C 351-0037 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1707 - Gilde Buy-
Out Fund/Synbra)Text with 
EEA relevance 
03.12.1999 
C 347 1999/C 347-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1784 - Delphi 
Automotive Systems/Lucas 
Diesel)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 347 1999/C 347-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1596 
Accor/Blackstone/Colony/Vive 
ndi)Text with EEA relevance 
C 347 1999/C 347-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1694 - EMC/Data 
General)Text with EEA 
relevance 
02.12.1999 
C 345 1999/C 345-0008 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1671 - DOW 
Chemical/Union Carbide)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 345 1999/C 345-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
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(Case COMP/M. 1790 
Deutsche 
Bank/BHS/PAGO)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 345 1999/C 345-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1720 
Fortum/Elektrizitätswerk 
Wesertal)Text with EEA 
relevance 
01.12.1999 
C 344 1999/C 344-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1789 
Ina/LuK)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 344 1999/C 344-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1779 - Anglo 
American/Tarmac)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 344 1999/C 344-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1791 - UBS 
Capital/VenCap/Stiga)Text 
with EEA relevance 
30.11.1999 
C 342 1999/C 342-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.32 
Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May 
Holding)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.33 
Hearst/VNU Magazine Group 
International BV/VNU Hearst 
Romania SRL)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0012 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1588 
Tyco/Raychem)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0012 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1643 - IBM/Sequent) 
C 342 1999/C 342-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1755 
CVC/Acordis)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.27 
Microsoft/Liberty 
Media/Telewest)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.32 
BT/Autostrade/BLU)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1771 
Sedgwick Noble 
Lowndes/Woolwich)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1787 
Deutsche Bahn/NS Groep/JV 
ServiceStores)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 342 1999/C 342-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1775 
Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser-
Rand/Ingersoll-Dresser 
Pump)Text with EEA relevance 
26.11.1999 
C 339 1999/C 339-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1767 
AT&T/IBM/Intesa)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 339 1999/C 339-0012 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1773 - Nordic 
Capital/Trelleborg)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 339 1999/C 339-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1675 
Ducros/Hero France)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 339 1999/C 339-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.29 
Lafarge/Readymix)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 339 1999/C 339-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.25 - Time 
Warner/Sony/CDNow)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 339 1999/C 339-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1763 
Solutia/Viking Resins)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 339 1999/C 339-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1693 
Alcoa/Reynolds)Text with EEA 
relevance 
25.11.1999 
C 337 1999/C 337-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1781 
Electrolux/Ericsson)Text with 
EEA relevance 
24.11.1999 
C 336 1999/C 336-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1765 - KKR 
Associates/Siemens Nixdorf 
Retail and Banking 
Systems)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 336 1999/C 336-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.23 
Telefónica/Portugal 
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Telecom/Médi Telecom)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 336 1999/C 336-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1760 
Mannesmann/Orange)Text with 
EEA relevance 
23.11.1999 
C 335 1999/C 335-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1403 
Astra/Zeneca)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 335 1999/C 335-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1679 - France 
Telecom/STI/SRD)Text with 
EEA relevance 
22.11.1999 
C 332 1999/C 332-0014 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1632 
Reckitt+Colman/Benckiser)Tex 
t with EEA relevance 
C 332 1999/C 332-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1764 
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken/BfG Bank)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 332 1999/C 332-0012 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1712 
Generali/INA)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 332 1999/C 332-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1717 
Siemens/Italtel)Text with EEA 
relevance 
19.11.1999 
C 331 1999/C 331-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.31 
Hearst/Mondadori/H earst 
Mondadori Editoriale Srl)Text 
with EEA relevance 
18.11.1999 
C 330 1999/C 330-005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No OMP/M.1759 -
RMC/Rugby)Text with EEA 
relevance 
17.11.1999 
C 328 1999/C 328-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1728 -
CVC/Torraspapel)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 328 1999/C 328-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1768 -
Schoyen/Goldman 
Sachs/Swebus)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 328 1999/C 328-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
COMP/M.1581 
AT&T/Unisource/AUCS)Text 
with EEA relevance 
16.11.1999 
C 327 1999/C 327-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1709 -
Preussag/Babcock/Celsius)Text 
with EEA relevance 
13.11.1999 
C 326 1999/C 326-0012 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1744 -
UPM-Kymmene/Stora 
Enso/Metsäliitto/JV)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 326 1999/C 326-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1735 -
Seita/Tabacalera)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 326 1999/C 326-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1636 -
MMS/DASA/Astrium)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 326 1999/C 326-0011 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
COMP/M.1708 - Tapis Saint-
Maclou/Allied Carpets 
Group)Text with EEA 
relevance 
12.11.1999 
C 324 1999/C 324-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1739 -
Iveco/Fraikin)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 324 1999/C 324-0010 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No COMP/M.1672 
Volvo/Scania)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 324 1999/C 324-0009 
Renotification of a 
concentration (Case No 
COMP/M.1683 - The Coca-
Cola Company/Kar-Tess Group 
(Hellenic Bottling))Text with 
EEA relevance 
11.11.1999 
C 323 1999/C 323-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/JV.24 -
Bertelsmann/Planeta/BOL 
Spain)Text with EEA relevance 
C 323 1999/C 323-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1716 -
Gehe/Herba Chemosan 
Apotheker)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 323 1999/C 323-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1740 -
Heinz/United Biscuits Frozen 
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and Chilled Foods)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 323 1999/C 323-0011 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
COMP/M.1557 - EDF/Louis 
Dreyfus)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 323 1999/C 323-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1700 -
Avnet/Eurotronics)Text with 
EEA relevance 
10.11.1999 
C 322 1999/C 322-0005 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No COMP/M.1628 
Totalfina/Elf)Text with EEA 
relevance 
09.11.1999 
C 321 1999/C 321-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1671 -
Dow Chemical/Union 
Carbide)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 321 1999/C 321-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1650 -
ACEA/Telefonica)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 321 1999/C 321-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1754 -
Morgan Grenfell/Piaggio)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 321 1999/C 321-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1761 - Toyota 
Motor/Toyota France)Text with 
EEA relevance 
06.11.1999 
C 319 1999/C 319-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1649 - Gefco/KN 
Elan)Text with EEA relevance 
C 319 1999/C 319-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/JV.26 -
FreeCom/Dangaard)Text with 
EEA relevance 
05.11.1999 
C 318 1999/C 318-0015 Non-
opposition to a notified 
(Case No concentration 
IV/JV.22 
Fujitsu/Siemens)Text with EEA 
relevance 
04.11.1999 
C 316 1999/C 316-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No COMP/M.1732 -
Sydkraft/HEW/Hansa Energy 
Trading)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 316 1999/C 316-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1689 
Nestlé/Pillsbury/Häagen-Dazs 
US)Text with EEA relevance 
30.10.1999 
C 313 1999/C 313-0007 
Withdrawal of notification of a 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1703 - Phelps 
Dodge/Asarco)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 313 1999/C 313-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1654 - Telexis/EDS)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 313 1999/C 313-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1691 - Aegon/Guardian 
Life)Text with EEA relevance 
C 313 1999/C 313-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1651 -Maersk/Sea-
Land)Text with EEA relevance 
C 313 1999/C 313-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1710 - Industri 
Kapital Ltd 
(Marmorandum)/Neste 
Chemicals)Text with EEA 
relevance 
29.10.1999 
C 311 1999/C 311-0005 Re-
notification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1538 
DuPont/Sabanci)Text with EEA 
relevance 
28.10.1999 
C 309 1999/C 309-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1669 - Deutsche 
Telekom/One20ne)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 309 1999/C 309-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1748 - Industri 
Kapital Ltd/Superfos A/S)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 309 1999/C 309-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1599 - E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours and 
Company/Teijin Limited)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 309 1999/C 309-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1682 
Ashland/Superfos)Text with 
EEA relevance 
27.10.1999 
C 308 1999/C 308-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1667 -
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BBL/BT/ISP-Belgium)Text 
with EEA relevance 
22.10.1999 
26.10.1999 
C 307 1999/C 307-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/ECSC.1316 -
RAG/Burton)Text with EEA 
relevance 
23.10.1999 
L 274 1999/L 274-0001 
Commission Decision of 3 
February 1999 relating to 
proceedings under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 -
Rewe/Meinl) [notified under 
document number C(1999) 
228]Text with EEA relevance. 
C 306 1999/C 306-0040 
Opinion of the Advisory 
Committee on concentrations 
given at the 59th meeting on 19 
January 1999 concerning a 
preliminary draft Decision 
relating to Case IV/M.1221 -
Rewe/Meinl 
C 306 1999/C 306-0037 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1616 - Antonio De 
Sommer Champalimaud/Banco 
Santander Central 
Hispanoamericano)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 306 1999/C 306-0038 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1736 -
UIAG/Carlyle/Andritz)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 306 1999/C 306-0039 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1701 
DEKRA/Gruner+Jahr/FairCar) 
Text with EEA relevance 
C 305 1999/C 305-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1723 - Illinois 
Tool Works/Premark)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 305 1999/C 305-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1626 -
SAirGroup/SAA)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 305 1999/C 305-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1723 - Illinois 
Tool Works/Premark)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 305 1999/C 305-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1626 -
SAirGroup/SAA)Text with 
EEA relevance 
21.10.1999 
C 304 1999/C 304-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1652 -
D'leteren/PGSIVText with EEA 
relevance 
C 304 1999/C 304-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1452 -Ford/Volvo)Text 
with EEA relevance 
19.10.1999 
C 302 1999/C 302-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/JV.18 
Chronopost/Correos)Text with 
EEA relevance 
16.10.1999 
C 298 1999/C 298-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1711 
Tyco/Siemens)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 298 1999/C 298-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1684 -
Carrefour/Promodès)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 298 1999/C 298-0012 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1703 - Phelps 
Dodge/Arsarco)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 298 1999/C 298-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1526 - Ford/Kwik-
Fit)Text with EEA relevance 
15.10.1999 
C 295 1999/C 295-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1699 - TPG 
Bacchus/BallyYText with EEA 
relevance 
C 295 1999/C 295-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1430 
Vodafone/Airtouch)Text with 
EEA relevance 
14.10.1999 
C 294 1999/C 294-0004 Re-
notification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1681 - Akzo 
Nobel/Hoechst Roussel 
Vet)Text with EEA relevance 
13.10.1999 
C 292 1999/C 292-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1719 - Delta 
Lloyd Verzekeringsgroep/Nuts 
OhraYText with EEA relevance 
C 292 1999/C 292-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1594 -Preussag/Babcock 
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BorsigJText 
relevance 
12.10.1999 
with EEA 
C 290 1999/C 290-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1534 - Pinault-Printemps-
Redoute/Gucci)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 290 1999/C 290-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1348 - Archer 
Daniels 
Midland/InTrade/Alfred C. 
Toepfer International)Text with 
EEA relevance 
09.10.1999 
C 288 1999/C 288-0047 
Renotification of two 
previously notified 
concentrations (Case No 
IV/M.1663 - Alcan/Alusuisse) 
(Case No IV/M.1715 -
Alcan/Pechiney)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 288 1999/C 288-0046 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1677 - BT/LGT 
TeleCom)Text with EEA 
relevance 
08.10.1999 
C 287 1999/C 287-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1396 - AT&T/IBM 
Global Network)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 287 1999/C 287-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1504 
NSR/VSN/CMI/IGO Plus)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 287 1999/C 287-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1631 - Suez 
Lyonnaise/Nalco)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 287 1999/C 287-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1656 Huhtamäki 
OYJ/Packaging Industries van 
Leer)Text with EEA relevance 
C 287 1999/C 287-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1697 - TPG 
Partners II/Piaggio)Text with 
EEA relevance 
07.10.1999 
C 285 1999/C 285-0004 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No IV/M.1641 
Linde/AGA)Text with EEA 
relevance ( 
C 285 1999/C 285-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1687 -
Adecco/01sten)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 285 1999/C 285-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1661 - Crédit 
Lyonnais/Allianz-
Euler/JVVText with EEA 
relevance 
06.10.1999 
C 283 1999/C 283-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1587 -
Dana/GKN)Text with EEA 
relevance 
05.10.1999 
C 282 1999/C 282-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1621 - Pakhoed/Van 
Ommeren (II))Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 282 1999/C 282-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1708 - Tapis 
Saint-Maclou/Allied Carpets 
Group)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 282 1999/C 282-0007 
Corrigendum to the prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1681 - Akzo 
Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet) 
(OJ C 272, 25.9.1999) 
02.10.1999 
C 280 1999/C 280-0040 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1538 -
DuPont/Sabanci)Text with EEA 
relevance 
01.10.1999 
C 278 1999/C 278-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1714 -
FöreningsSparbanken/FI-
Holding/FIH)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 278 1999/C 278-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1653 
Buhrmann/Corporate 
Express)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 278 1999/C 278-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1598 - Hicks, Muse, Tate 
& Furst Investment 
Partners/Hillsdown 
Holdings)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 278 1999/C 278-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1559 - STN Atlas Marine 
Electronics/Sait Radio 
Holland)Text with EEA 
relevance 
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C 278 1999/C 278-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1627 - CU Italia/Banca 
Delle Marche/JVYText with 
EEA relevance 
C 278 1999/C 278-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1670 - Geril/FCC 
Construccion/Engil)Text with 
EEA relevance 
STATE AID 
29.01.2000 
C 27 2000/C 027-0017 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 27 2000/C 027-0013 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning measure C 56/99 
(ex N 668/97) - Measures to 
promote employment - Italy -
Sicily: Article 11(1) of 
Regional Law No 16 of 27 May 
1997Text with EEA relevance 
15.01.2000 
C 12 2000/C 012-0007 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 12 2000/C 012-0006 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 12 2000/C 012-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
12.01.2000 
L 7 2000/L 007-0006 
Commission Decision of 28 
July 1999 on state aid granted 
by the Federal Republic of 
Germany to Brockhausen Holze 
GmbHText with EEA relevance 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 2914) 
08.01.2000 
C 5 2000/C 005-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
06.01.2000 
C 3 2000/C 003-0005 
Authorisation of State aid 
pursuant to Article 61 of the 
EEA Agreement and Article 
1(3) of Protocol 3 to the 
Surveillance and Court 
Agreement - EFTA 
Surveillance Authority decision 
not to raise objections 
C 3 2000/C 003-0004 
Authorisation of State aid 
pursuant to Article 61 of the 
EEA Agreement and Article 
1(3) of Protocol 3 to the 
Surveillance and Court 
Agreement - EFTA 
Surveillance Authority decision 
not to raise objections 
31.12.1999 
C 379 1999/C 379-0012 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 379 1999/C 379-0011 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 379 1999/C 379-0004 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 67/99 (ex NN 
148/98) in favour of 
Dampfkesselbau Hohenturm 
GmbH, GermanyText with 
EEA relevance 
24.12.1999 
C 375 1999/C 375-0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 375 1999/C 375-0003 State 
aid - C 3/98 (ex NN 162/97) -
AustriaText with EEA 
relevance 
18.12.1999 
L 326 1999/L 326-0057 
Commission Decision of 28 
July 1999 on State aid granted 
by the Federal Republic of 
Germany to Kranbau 
Eberswalde GmbHText with 
EEA relevance (notified under 
document number CÍ1999) 
2915) 
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C 365 1999/C 365-0007 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 365 1999/C 365-0008 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 365 1999/C 365-0009 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 365 1999/C 365-0008 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 365 1999/C 365-0003 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the aid C 34/99 (ex 
N 576/97) - Recapitalisation of 
the company Siciliane Acque 
Minerali SrlText with EEA 
relevance 
.12.1999 
C 359 1999/C 359-0027 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid C 71/99 (ex N 
258/98) - Germany 
Investment in an on site 
environmental sugar beet 
cleaning method 
C 359 1999/C 359-0013 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning the aid measure C 
72/99 (ex NN 149/98) Sweden -
Aid to Nya Holmlunds Livs AB 
C 359 1999/C 359-0007 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid C 70/99 (ex N 
79/99) - France - Aid for 
adapting the vineyards in 
Charentes 
C 359 1999/C 359-0005 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 359 1999/C 359-0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 359 1999/C 359-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
04.12.1999 
L 310 1999/L 310-0056 
Commission Decision of 28 
July 1999 on state aid granted 
by the Federal Republic of 
Germany to Everts Erfurt 
GmbHText with EEA relevance 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 3024) 
C 351 1999/C 351-0020 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the aid C 62/99 (ex 
NN 140/98) - Capital increase 
and other support measures in 
favour of RAIText with EEA 
relevance 
C 351 1999/C 351-0012 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC 
Treaty,concerning aid C 69/99 
(ex NN 83/99) - training aid 
granted to Sabena by the 
Flemish RegionText with EEA 
relevance 
C 351 1999/C 351-0029 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning tax aid in the form 
of a 45 % tax credit in the 
Province of Guipúzcoa (Spain) 
- C 53/99 ex NN 33/99 - and in 
the Province of Vizcaya Spain) 
- C 54/99 ex NN 60/99Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 351 1999/C 351-0035 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 351 1999/C 351-0036 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 351 1999/C 351-0002 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
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concerning the measure C 
58/99 (ex N 289/99) - Regional 
aid map - Belgium (2000 to 
2006)Text with EEA relevance 
27.11.1999 
C 340 1999/C 340-0064 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning the aid C 25/99 (ex 
N 702/98) Germany - Common 
Guidelines of Berlin Land for 
the use of the economic 
development fundText with 
EEA relevance 
C 340 1999/C 340-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
ECTreaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 340 1999/C 340-0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
ECTreaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 340 1999/C 340-0005 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
ECTreaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 340 1999/C 340-0007 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 340 1999/C 340-0008 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the aid measure C 
47/99 (ex N 195/99) - New 
delimitation of assisted areas of 
the Joint Action Programme 
Improvement of the regional 
economic structure in Ge 
C 340 1999/C 340-0052 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid C 51/99 (ex NN 
31/99) - Tax aid in the form of 
50 % tax relief on corporation 
tax for newly established firms 
in the Autonomous Community 
ofNa 
C 340 1999/C 340-0057 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning the aid C 60/99 (ex 
NN 167/95) - Capital increases 
and other ad hoc subsidies in 
favour of France 2 and France 
3Text with EEA relevance 
22.11.1999 
C 332 1999/C 332-0011 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 332 1999/C 332-0002 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning measure C 59/99 
(ex N 352/99) - France -
Regional aid map 2000 to 
2006Text with EEA relevance 
C 332 1999/C 332-0009 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) (ex Article 93(2)) of the 
EC Treaty, concerning the aid 
C 19/99 (ex N 125/98, N 
126/98 and N 341/98) -Italy -
Uva Lamiere e Tubi SpA and 
Siderumbra SpAText with EEA 
relevance 
C 332 1999/C 332-0008 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
13.11.1999 
L 292 1999/L 292-0027 
Commission Decision of 8 July 
1999 on State aid granted by 
Germany to Gröditzer 
Stahlwerke GmbH and its 
subsidiary Walzwerk Burg 
GmbH (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
2264)Text with EEA 
relevance(notified under 
document number C(1999) 
903)Text with 
L 292 1999/L 292-0023 
Commission Decision of 30 
March 1999 on State aid which 
France is planning to grant as 
development aid in the sale of 
two cruise vessels to be built by 
Chantiersde l'Atlantique and 
operated by Renaissance 
Financial in French Polynesia 
(notified under doc 
L 292 1999/L 292-0001 
Commission Decision of 24 
February 1999 concerning State 
aid granted by Spain to Daewoo 
Electronics Manufacturing 
España SA (Demesa) (notified 
under document number 
C(1999) 498)Text with EEA 
relevance. 
C 326 1999/C 326-0002 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
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concerning the measure C 
66/99 (ex N 245/99) ­ Regional 
aid map ­ The Netherlands 
(2000 to 2006)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 326 1999/C 326­0008 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 326 1999/C 326­0009 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC T r e a t y ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 326 1999/C 326­0010 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Trea ty ­ Cases where the 
Commission r a i s e s no 
objections 
C 326 1999/C 326­0011 Authorisation f o r S t a t e a i d pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 (ex A r t i c l e s 92 and 93) of the EC T r e a t y ­ Cases where the Commission raises n o 
objections 
50. Hi. il <W 
L 2§» 11W>:L 2MWW~ 
ConMimissiiMBi Etecisiffim off' 2*J 
Jluilly ÌWD <ora tibe snaffle aid 
tinwiplleiimaiotiioá fey Ae 
NeAertamás; (far fc?3 Diuitdb 
sioruioe stottMmts IlocalEsil msssr Ése 
Cwanmœroi taéafTe\1i wiíA EEA 
mdlevjumoe Krooaiiffiaái uimwäar 
dmoiraroamtt nnuiamrtónar CiiWWij 
253®))) 
C 313 1999/C 313­0004 State 
aid ­ C 4/96 (ex N 360/95) ­
Italy 
C 313 1999/C 313­0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
ECTreaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 313 1999/C 313­0003 State 
aid ­ C 6/94 (ex NN 151 B 93) ­
Italy 
C 313 1999/C 313­0002 
uthorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
10.1999 
L 274 1999/L 274­0037 
Commission Decision of 20 
July 1999 concerning presumed 
aid allegedly granted by France 
to Sécurìpost [notified under 
document number Q19991 
2537]Text with EEA relevance 
L 274 1999 L 2 "4­0023 
Commission Decision of 3 
February 1999 relating to 
proceedings under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4 0 « S9 
(Case No IVA LI 221 
Rewe/Meinl) [notified under 
document number C(19"*9> 
22S]Te\1 with EEA relevance. 
C 306 ì9mC M^Oftìll Stats 
aid ­ invitation to subirait 
røraiments pmursuamt to Article 
¡SSO.» of Ae EC Treaty. 
cMKCiiiiHig Ae aid C' 6 5 ' ^ lex 
\ 2iBWi ­ NeAertands ­
aáiJitiewal] measures 
sHûùDepamyimg Ae irefoirra of Ae 
pig sector 
C 306 1999/C 306­0019 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning State aid C 63/99 
(ex NN 84/99), Germany, 
Impact of new electricity tax on 
feed­in price under 
StromeinspeisungsgesetzText 
with EEA relevance 
C 306 1999/C 306­0025 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid measure C 
61/99 (ex NN 153 96) ­ State 
aid to Deutsche Post AGText 
with EEA relevance 
C 306 1999 C 306­0002 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning the C 64 99 (ex NN 
68' 99) ­ Italy. State aid to the 
Gruppo Tirrenia di Navigazione 
companiesText with EEA 
relevance 
C 30­6 1999/C 306­0036 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to .Articles 87 and SS 
lex Articles 92 and 93ï of Ae 
EC Treaty ­ Cases where Ae 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 306 I W C 3CIHMB37 
Authorisation tor State aid 
pursuant So Articles 87 and ¡8$ 
«ex Articles <*2 and «K» of Ae 
EC Treaty· ­ Cases vbetre Ae 
Commission] raises mo 
objectionsText wiA E.EA 
reSevaitoe 
L 272 IWi'L 27243» Il ê 
Commiissíom Dcciskw of 3 
Fefommaty I W torn Saate må 
«Aneti Geirtrosuiw is ptlanumAs; tø 
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introduce for Graphischer 
Maschinenbau GmbH, 
BerlinText with EEA relevance 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 327 
L 272 1999/L 272-0016 
Commission Decision of 3 
February 1999 on State aid 
which Germany is planning to 
introduce for Graphischer 
Maschinenbau GmbH, 
BerlinText with EEA relevance 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 327 
21.10.1999 
L 271 1999/L 271-0025 
Commission Decision of 25 
February 1998 concerning aid 
which Germany intends to grant 
under the 26th framework plan 
of the joint scheme for 
improving regional economic 
structures with a view to 
promoting teleworking (26. 
Rahmenplan der Gemei 
19.10.1999 
L 269 1999/L 269-0029 
Commission Decision of 3 
March 1999 concerning aid 
granted by Italy to firms 
affected by the bankruptcy of 
Sirap SpAText with EEA 
relevance (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
584) 
L 269 1999/L 269-0036 
Commission Decision of 26 
May 1999 on State aid granted 
by Germany to Dow/Buna 
SOW Leuna Olefinverbund 
GmbH (BSL)Text with EEA 
relevance (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
1469) 
16.10.1999 
L 268 1999/L 268-0019 
Commission Decision of 1 July 
1999 on State aid which Spain 
is planning to implement in 
favour of Brilén SAText with 
EEA relevance (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
2131) 
L 268 1999/L 268-0025 
Commission Decision of 20 
July 1999 which Germany is 
planning to implement for 
Saxonylon Textil GmbHText 
with EEA relevance (notified 
under document number 
C(1999)2535) 
C 298 1999/C 298-0002 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid C 29/99 (ex NN 
20/99) - France - Presumed aid 
for Manufacture Corrézienne de 
Vêtements (MCV) and planned 
aid for the new company 
MCVText with E 
C 298 1999/C 298-0008 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 298 1999/C 298-0010 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
15.10.1999 
L 267 1999/L 267-0051 
Commission Decision of 22 
December 1998 concerning aid 
granted by Germany to Riedel-
de Ha%on AGText with EEA 
relevance (notified under 
document number C(1998) 
4566) 
09.10.1999 
L 263 1999/L 263-0019 
Commission Decision of 9 
December 1998 on State aid 
granted by Germany to 
Maschinenfabrik Sangerhausen 
(Samag)Text with EEA 
relevance (notified under 
document number C(1998) 
4274) 
C 288 1999/C 288-0024 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid C 40/99 (ex NN 
178/97) - Belgium - for 
Verlipack (Wallonia)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 288 1999/C 288-0037 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning the aid Cases C 
5/99 (ex N 728/97) - Italy - Fiat 
Mirafïori Carrozzeria, C 8/99 
(ex N 834/97) - Italy - Fiat 
Rivalta and C 9/99 (ex N 
838/97) - Italy - Fiat Mi 
C 288 1999/C 288-0022 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 288 1999/C 288-0002 
Community Guidelines on State 
aid for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty 
(Notice to Member States 
including proposals for 
appropriate measures)Text with 
EE relevance 
C 288 1999/C 288-0019 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
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Commission 
objections 
raises no 
C 288 1999/C 288­0020 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 288 1999/C 288­0039 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
6(5) of the Commission 
Decision 2496/96/ECSC, 
ncerning aid C 35/99 (ex N 
106/99) ­ Italy ­ Ferriere 
NordText with EEA relevance 
(Italy ­ Fiat Mirafïori 
eccanicaText with 
C 288 1999/C 288­0021 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
06.10.1999 
L 260 1999/L 259­0019 
Commission Decision of 3 
March 1999 on the aid which 
Germany has granted by way of 
development assistance to 
Indonesia in connection with 
the construction of two 
dredgers by Volkswerft 
Stralsund and the sale of the 
dredgers to Pengerukan 
L 260 1999/L 260­0019 
Commission Decision of 16 
December 1998 on German aid 
in favour of Addinol Mineralöl 
GmbH i.GV and the newly 
established separate hive­off 
vehicle Addinol Lube Oil 
GmbH & Co. KG (notified 
under document number 
C(1998) 3867)Text with EEA 
relevance 
L 260 1999/L 260­0001 
Commission Decision of 25 
November 1998 on measures 
by Germany to assist 
InfraLeuna Infrastruktur und 
Service GmbH (notified under 
document number C(1998) 
3840)Text with EEA relevance. 
L 260 1999/L 259­0023 
Commission Decision of 8 July 
1999 on the measure which 
Germany is planning to 
implement for Neue Maxhütte 
Stahlwerke GmbH i.K.Text 
with EEA relevance (notified 
under document number 
C(l 999) 2269) 
02.10.1999 
C 280 1999/C 280­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objections 
C 280 1999/C 280­0003 State 
aid ­ FranceText with EEA 
relevance 
C 280 1999/C 280­0008 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) (ex Article 93(2)) of the 
EC Treaty, concerning the aid 
C 13/99 (ex NN 78/98) ­
Germany ­ activities of the 
Landesentwicklungsgesellschaf 
t Thüringen mbH in relation to 
industrial ρ 
C 280 1999/C 280­0012 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 44/99 ­ (ex 
NN 23/99 (ex Ν 678/98) ­ Ewe 
supplementary measure (1998)) 
and (ex NN 79/99 (ex Ν 90/99) 
­ Scheme of Assistance for 
Winter Fodder Losse 
C 280 1999/C 280­0022 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning Aid No C 33/98 (ex 
Ν 332/99 and C 33/98) ­ Spain: 
New capital contribution to 
Babcock Wilcox Espana 
SAText with EEA relevance 
C 280 1999/C 280­0024 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the aid C 55/99 (ex 
N 534/97) Netherlands ­
Modification of parafiscal taxes 
financing existing aid for 
capacity reduction in the cattle 
slaughtering se 
C 280 1999/C 280­0029 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
6(5) of Commission Decision 
No 2496/96/ECSC, concerning 
the aid C 57/99 (ex N 601/98) ­
Environmental aid to Sidmar, 
ECSC steelText with EEA 
relevance 
COURT OF JUSTICE / COURT 
OF FIRST INSTANCE 
D E V A N T L E TRIBUNAL 
Devant le Tribunal 
Aff. T­l 12/99 
Métropole Télévision ­ M6 e.a. 
Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) 
/ Commission 
Annulation des art. 2 et 3 de la 
décision de la Commission, du 3 
mars 1999, relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 85 du traité 
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CE (IV/36.237 ­ TPS), en ce qu'elle 
ne prévoit pas une attestation 
négative ou, subsidiairement, une 
exemption d'une durée supérieure à 
trois ans concernant certaines des 
clauses contenues dans les accors 
portant création de la société de 
télévision par satellite (TPS) 
Aff. T­l 15/99 
Société Système Européen 
Promotion (SEP) / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 8 mars 1999, 
rejetant la plainte déposée par la 
requérante contre Renault France, 
Renault Nederland et Renault 
Autocenter et concernant des 
prétendues entraves aux 
importations parallèles des 
mandataires ainsi qu'une demande 
de retrait du bénéfice de l'exemption 
par catégorie aux contrats de 
distribution de Renault résultant du 
règlement (CE) n. 1475/95 
Aff. T­l 16/99 
Ilmailulaitos / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
1999/198/CE de la Commission du 
10 février 1999 relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'art. 86 
du traité (IV/35.767 
Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket) 
concernant le système de rabais sur 
les redevances d'atterrissage dans 
les aéroports de Finlande 
Aff. T­126/99 
Graphischer Maschinenbau 
GmbH / Commission 
Annulation partielle de la décision 
K(1999) 327 endg. de la 
Commission, du 3 février 1999, (aff. 
Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. C 54/98 /ex 
NN 101/98) en ce qu'elle limite à 
DM 4.435 mio. le montant de l'aide 
que le Land de Berlin peut accorder 
à la requérante 
Aff. T­l 27/99 
Diputación Foral de Alava / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision C(1999) 
498 final de la Commission, du 24 
février 1999, relative à l'aide 
accordée par les autorités 
espagnoles à la société Daewoo 
Electronics Manufacturing España 
SA (DEMESA) dans la mesure où 
celle­ci déclare aides incompatibles 
avec le marché commun les 
avantages fiscaux octroyés par la 
«Diputación Foral de Alava» 
Aff. T­129/99 
Comunidad Autónoma del País 
Vasco et Gasteizkolndustria 
Lurra SA / Commission 
Annulation de la décision C(1999) 
498 final de la Commission, du 24 
février 1999, relative à l'aide 
accordée par les autorités 
espagnoles à la société Daewoo 
Electronics Manufacturing España 
SA (DEMESA) 
Aff. T­144/99 
Institut des mandataires agréés 
près l'Office Européen des 
Brevets (IMA) / Commission 
Annulation partielle de la décision 
de la Commission, du 7 avril 1999, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 81 CE 
(IV/36.147 : Code de conduite de 
ΓΙΜΑ (EPI), en ce qu'elle concerne 
les dispositions du code de conduite 
de l'Institut des mandataires agréés 
auprès de l'Office européen des 
brevets (IMA) qui interdisent la 
publicité comparative ainsi que 
celles qui se réfèrent à l'offre de 
services aux utilisateurs qui ont déjà 
été clients d'autres mandataires 
Aff. T­148/99 
Daewo Electronics Manufacturing 
España SA / Commission 
Annulation de la décision C(1999) 
498 final de la Commission, du 24 
février 1999, relative à l'aide 
accordée par les autorités 
espagnoles à la société Daewoo 
Electronics Manufacturing España 
SA (DEMESA) 
Aff. T­l 52/99 
Hijos de Andrés Molina SA (en 
liquidación) / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C(1999) 41 final, du 3 
février 1999, concernant l'aide 
accordée par le gouvernement 
espagnol en faveur de Hijos de 
Andrés Molina SA (HAMSA) 
Aff. T­161/99 
Navigazione Libera del Golfo SpA 
/ Commission 
Recours en carence visant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre 
une décision suite à la plainte 
déposée par la requérante sur le 
fondement des articles 92 et 93 du 
traité CE (devenus articles 87 et 88 
CE) relative aux aides prétendument 
accordées par les autorités italiennes 
à l'entreprise publique CAREMAR 
Aff. T­l68/99 
Diputación Foral de Alava / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission (SG(99)D/2945), du 31 
mars 1999, d'engager la procédure 
prévue au paragraphe 2 de l'article 
93 du traité CE (devenu article 88 
CE) en ce qui concerne l'aide 
accordée par les autorités 
espagnoles à la société Ramondin 
SA, dans la mesure où celle­ci 
considère aides incompatibles avec 
le marché commun les avantages 
fiscaux octroyés par la «Diputación 
Foral de Alava» 
Aff. T­l 70/99 
RJB Mining pic / Commission 
Annulation d'une décision de la 
Commission, du 4 mai 1999, 
autorisant les interventions 
financières de l'Espagne en faveur 
de l'industrie houillère en 1999 
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Aff. T-l 75/99 
UPS Europe SA / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 10 juin 1999, 
rejetant la plainte introduite par la 
requérante sur le fondement de 
l'article 82 CE et relative à 
l'acquisition partielle de DHL par la 
Deutsche Post AG 
Aff. T-187/99 
AGRANA Zucker GmbH / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission 1999/342/CE, du 30 
septembre 1998, concernant les 
projets d'aide de l'Autriche à la 
société AGRANA Stärke-GmbH 
pour la création et la transformation 
d'installations de production 
d'amidon [notifiée sous le numéro 
C(1998)3023] 
Aff. T-l 90/99 
Sniace SA / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 28 octobre 1998, 
concernant l'aide d'Etat accordée par 
l'Espagne à la partie requérante, 
dans la mesure où elle qualifie 
d'aides d'Etat incompatibles avec le 
marché commun les accords de 
rééchelonnement de dettes passés 
avec les autorités de la sécurité 
sociale ainsi que les accords passés 
avec le FOGASA (fonds de la 
protection des salariés en cas 
d'insolvabilité de l'employeur) en ce 
qu'ils prévoyaient un taux d'intérêt 
inférieur au taux du marché 
Aff. T-l95/99 
SIM 2 Multimedia SpA / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision n. 
C(1999) 1524 de la Commission, du 
2 juin 1999, concernant l'aide d'Etat 
accordée par la région Friuli-
Venezia et le gouvernement italien à 
Seleco SpA, dans la mesure où elle 
considère la requérante 
solidairement responsable pour la 
partie de l'aide non récupérée auprès 
de Seleco 
Aff. T-210/99 
Johan Henk Gankema / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C( 1999)2539 def, du 
20 juillet 1999, relative aux aides 
accordées par les Pays-Bas à 633 
stations-services situées dans la 
région frontalière entre les Pays-Bas 
et l'Allemagne 
Aff. T-219/99 
British Airways pic / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission , du 14 juillet 1999, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 82 du traité 
(IV/D-2/34.780 - Virgin / British 
Airways) concernant des accords 
conclus entre British Airways et les 
agences de voyage établissant des 
systèmes de commission et d' autres 
avantages liés à l'augmentation du 
volume de vente de tickets de ladite 
compagnie aérienne 
Aff. T-224/99 
European Council of Transport 
Users ASBL e.a. / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission n. SG(99) D/6480, 
communiquée aux parties 
requérantes par lettre du 6 août 
1999, de ne pas soulever 
d'objections, au sens de l'article 12, 
paragraphe 3, du règlement (CEE) 
n. 1017/68 du Conseil, et d'accorder, 
en conséquence, une exemption en 
faveur de la version révisée du 
«Trans-Atlantic Conference 
Agreement» (TACA) (affaire n. 
IV/37.396 - TACA révisé et affaire 
n. IV/37.527 - European Shippers 
Council (ESC) / TACA révisé) 
Aff. T-227/99 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C 66/98, du 8 juillet 
1999, concernant une aide accordée 
par les autorités allemandes à la 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft 
Aff. T-228/99 
Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
K( 1999)2265 de la Commission, du 
8 juillet 1999, concernant une 
mesure prise par les autorités 
allemandes en faveur de la banque 
Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale («WestLB») 
dans le cadre de l'absorption par 
celle-ci de la 
«Wohnungsbauforderungsanstalt 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen» 
Aff. T-231/99 
Colin Joynson / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 16 juin 1999, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 81 du traité 
CE (Affaire IV/36.081/F3 - Bass), 
accordant une exemption 
individuelle à durée déterminée aux 
contrats types de louage («baux 
type») appliqués par la société Bass 
aux locataires de ses débits de 
boissons, ainsi qu'à l'obligation 
d'achat exclusif et à l'obligation de 
non-concurrence («beer tie») qu'ils 
comportent 
Aff. T-232/99 
Margaret Mary McKenzie 
Campbell / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 16 juin 1999, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 81 du traité 
CE (Affaire IV/35.992/F3 - Scottish 
and Newcastle), accordant une 
exemption individuelle à durée 
déterminée aux contrats types de 
louage («baux type») appliqués par 
la société Scottish and Newcastle 
aux locataires de ses débits de 
boissons, ainsi qu'à l'obligation 
d'achat exclusif et à l'obligation de 
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non-concurrence («beer tie») qu'ils 
comportent 
Aff. T-235/99 
Garage Bergsteyn BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-236/99 
Direcks Service Station Bocholtz 
BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-237/99 
BP Nederland vof e.a. / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-238/99 
Paulina Catharina Petronella Van 
Oppen-Veger / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-239/99 
J.J.L. Alofs / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-242/99 
Esso Nederland BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-244/99 
Sadam Abruzzo SpA / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission du 11 mai 1999 [C 
(1999) 1363 défi] relative aux aides 
accordées par l'Italie en faveur du 
secteur du sucre - Aides octroyées à 
deux fabriques de sucre de 
betteraves 
Aff. T-245/99 
Sadam Castiglionese SpA / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-244/99 
Aff. T-246/99 
Tirrenia di Navigazione SpA e.a. / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 6 août 1999, 
concernant le système d'aides 
accordées par les autorités italiennes 
aux entreprises de transport 
maritime du groupe Tirrenia di 
Navigazione SpA 
Aff. T-248/99 
Autobedrijf Diepenmaat vof/ 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-249/99 
Gebr. Jongste BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-250/99 
Shell Nederland Verkoop-
maatschappij BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-251/99 
Texaco Nederland BV e.a. / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-252/99 
Total Nederland NV et Fina 
Nederland BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-253/99 
Oliehandel Van den Belt BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-254/99 
Maja Sri / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 5 août 1999, 
portant suppression de l'aide 
accordée à la requérante pour la 
modernisation d'une unité de 
production aquicole à Contarina 
(Veneto) dans le cadre du règlement 
(CEE) n. 4028/86 du Conseil, du 18 
décembre 1986, relatif à des actions 
communautaires pour l'amélioration 
et l'adaptation des structures du 
secteur de la pêche et de 
l'aquaculture 
Aff. T-256/99 
Fédération nationale 
d'agriculture biologique des 
régions de France / Conseil 
Annulation du règlement (CE) n. 
1804/1999 du Conseil du 19 juillet 
1999 modifiant, pour y inclure les 
productions animales, le règlement 
(CEE) n. 2092/91 concernant le 
mode de production biologique de 
produits agricoles et sa présentation 
sur les produits agricoles et les 
denrées alimentaires 
Aff. T-258/99 
Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel 
CV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-259/99 
Tankstation Jagt BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-262/99 
Anthony Goldstein / Commission 
Recours en indemnité visant à 
obtenir réparation du préjudice 
prétendument subi par le requérant 
suite au défaut de la part de la 
Commission d'avoir fourni, en 
application de l'article 10 CE (ex 
article 5) et conformément à la 
Communication relative à la 
coopération entre la Commission et 
les juridictions nationales pour 
l'application des articles 85 et 86 du 
traité CEE, certains renseignements 
demandés par la juridiction 
nationale saisie par le requérant 
Aff. T-263/99 
Autobedrijf Chr. Kerres BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-264/99 
Demarol BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-265/99 
Algemene Service- en 
Verkoopmaatschappij Arnhemse 
Poort BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
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Aff. T-267/99 
Grooters Rekken BV e.a. / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-210/99 
Aff. T-269/99 
Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, (SG/99/D/6873), du 
17 août 1999, d'engager la 
procédure prévue au paragraphe 2 
de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerne 
les aides fiscales à l'investissement 
octroyées par la «Diputación Foral 
de Gipuzkoa» sous forme d'un 
crédit d'impôt de 45 % 
Aff. T-271/99 
Diputación Foral de Alava / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission (SG/99/D/6873), du 17 
août 1999, d'engager la procédure 
prévue au paragraphe 2 de l'article 
88 CE en ce qui concerne les aides 
fiscales à l'investissement octroyées 
par la «Diputación Foral de Alava» 
sous forme d'un crédit d'impôt de 45 
% 
Aff. T-272/99 
Diputación Foral de Bizkaia / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission (SG/99/D/6871), du 17 
août 1999, d'engager la procédure 
prévue au paragraphe 2 de l'article 
88 CE en ce qui concerne les aides 
fiscales à l'investissement octroyées 
par la «Diputación Foral de 
Bizkaia» et par la «Diputación Foral 
de Gipuzkoa» sous forme d'un 
crédit d'impôt de 45 % 
Aff. T-273/99 
Autoservice J. van Deursen BV / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C( 1999)2539 def, du 
20 juillet 1999, relative aux aides 
accordées par les Pays-Bas à 633 
stations-services situées dans la 
région frontalière entre les Pays-Bas 
et l'Allemagne 
Aff. T-274/99 
Self Service Station Borne BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-275/99 
Self Service de Bleek BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-276/99 
Self Service Station Hasselerbaan 
BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-277/99 
Self Service Station Weghorst BV 
/ Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-278/99 
Shell Hengelo Zuid BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-279/99 
De Haan Minerale Oliën BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-280/99 
Van Gelder Aardolie BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-281/99 
Visser's Oliehandel Horst BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-282/99 
Visser's Tankstations BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-283/99 
Vlutters Handelsonderneming BV 
/ Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-284/99 
Vlutters Kapitein BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-285/99 
Maria Gerardus Wilhelmus 
Ruypers / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-286/99 
Tankstation en Automobielbedrijf 
Tromp CV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-287/99 
Autobedrijf G. Nelissen St. 
Geertruid vof/ Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-288/99 
Evers vof/ Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-289/99 
Heiliger vof/ Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-290/99 
Autobedrijf Ueffing / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-291/99 
Autobedrijf Vruggink / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-292/99 
Bouw- en Handelsonderneming J. 
Peeters BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-293/99 
Brand Oil Service Stations BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-294/99 
Gebr. Derks Beers BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
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Aff. T-295/99 
Diesel Oil Company BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-296/99 
Driessen Oosterbeek BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-297/99 
Emos BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-298/99 
Firma Erkens Servicestation en 
Verhuurbedrijf vof / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-299/99 
Firma Fieten / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-300/99 
Firma Reuvekamp vof/ 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-301/99 
Dirk Adrianus Gaikhorst / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-302/99 
Haagmans Taxicentrale voor 
Valkenburg e.o. BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-303/99 
Hoogendijk ATW BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-304/99 
Oliehandel Kuster BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-305/99 
OK Nederland BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-306/99 
Oliecentrum Nederland BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-307/99 
Oliecentrum Strijbos BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-308/99 
H. Peeters Service BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-309/99 
Snijders Olie BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-310/99 
Strijbos en zoon BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-311/99 
Tankstation Haarhuis BV / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-312/99 
Technische Handelsonderneming 
van Dooren BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-313/99 
Veka BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-314/99 
Weghorst-Oliko BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-315/99 
J.H.Th. Verlinden / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
Aff. T-316/99 
Theresia Lucia Pierik-Bomers / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-273/99 
DEVANT LA COUR 
Aff. C-261/99 
Commission / France 
Manquement d'Etat - Défaut d'avoir 
adopté dans le délai imparti les 
mesures nécessaires pour récupérer 
auprès de leur bénéficiaire, 
«Nouvelles Filatures Lainière de 
Roubaix», les aides déclarées 
illégales et incompatibles avec le 
marché commun par la décision de 
la Commission du 4 novembre 1998 
Aff. C-275/99 
Adidas Sarragan France SARL 
et Directeur des services fiscaux 
du Bas-Rhin 
Préjudicielle - Tribunal administratif 
de Strasbourg - Validité de la 
décision 89/487/CEE du Conseil, du 
28 juillet 1989, autorisant la 
République française à appliquer 
une mesure dérogatoire à l'art. 17, 
par. 6, deuxième alinéa, de la 
sixième directive 77/388/CEE en 
matière d'harmonisation des 
législations des Etats membres 
relatives aux taxes sur le chiffre 
d'affaires - Principe de 
proportionnalité 
Aff. C-276/99 
Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
K( 1999) 1123 final dans une 
procédure au titre de l'art. 88 CA 
concernant une aide d'Etat de 
l'Allemagne en faveur de Neue 
Maxhütte Stahlwerke AG 
Modalités de la répétition d'une aide 
incompatible avec le marché 
commun - Obligation d'étendre les 
poursuites judiciaires au montant 
total de l'aide à rembourser, à 
l'exclusion d'une poursuite «pour le 
principe» - Obligation de combattre 
une décision de sursis du juge 
national en attendant une décision 
du juge communautaire 
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Aff.jtes. C­280/99 Ρ, C­281/99 Ρ et 
C­282/99 Ρ 
Moccia Irme SpA e.a. / 
Commission e.a. 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie) , rendu 
le 12 mai 1999, dans les affaires 
jointes T­l 64/96, T­l 65/96, Τ­
Ι 66/96, Τ­167/96, Τ­122/97 et Τ­
Ι 30/97 opposant Moccia Irme SpA 
e.a. à la Commission ­ Refus 
d'annuler la décision de la 
Commission C(96) 2385 def., du 30 
juillet 1996, déclarant incompatible 
avec le marché commun les aides 
d'Etat que le gouvernement italien 
projette d'accorder à certaines 
entreprises, dans le cadre de la 
restructuration du secteur 
sidérurgique 
Aff. C­302/99 Ρ 
Commission/ 
Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) 
France 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 3 juin 1999, dans l'affaire T­l7/96 
opposant Télévision française 1 SA 
à la Commission, en ce que le 
Tribunal a jugé recevable un recours 
en carence dirigé contre l'abstention 
de la Commission d'agir au titre de 
l'art. 90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86 
CE) 
Aff. C­308/99 Ρ 
France et Télévision française 1 
SA (TF1) Commission 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 3 juin 1999, dans l'affaire T­l7/96 
opposant Télévision française 1 SA 
(TF1) à la Commission, en ce que le 
Tribunal a jugé recevable un recours 
en carence dirigé contre l'abstention 
de la Commission d'agir au titre de 
l'art. 90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86 
CE) et en ce que le Tribunal a 
condamné la France aux dépens 
exposés en raison de son 
intervention par TF1 
Aff. C­309/99 
J.C.J. Wouters 
Raad van de Balies van de 
Europese Gemeenschap 
J.W. Savelbergh et Price 
Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs 
BV et Algemene Raad van de 
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten 
Préjudicielle ­ Nederlandse Raad 
van State ­ Interprétation des art. 85, 
86 et 90 du traité CE (devenus art. 
81, 82 et 86 CE) ­ Notions d' 
«association d'entreprises» et 
«entreprise» (exploitant une 
position dominante) ­ Législation 
nationale organisant le barreau en 
organisme de droit public avec 
pouvoir d'établir des règles de 
déontologie ­ Décision du barreau 
ainsi organisé interdisant aux 
avocats de s'associer avec des 
experts comptables («accountants») 
­ Interprétation des art. 52 à 58 du 
traité CE (devenus art. 43 à 48 CE) 
(liberté d'établissement) et 59 à 66 
du traité CE (devenus art. 49 à 55 
CE) (libre prestation de services) 
Aff. C­318/99 
Italie / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission du 11 mai 1999 [C 
(1999) 1363 def.] relative aux aides 
accordées par l'Italie en faveur du 
secteur du sucre ­ Aides octroyées à 
deux fabriques de sucre de 
betteraves 
Aff. C­321/99 Ρ 
Associação dos Refinadores de 
Açúcar Portugueses (ARAP) e.a. 
et Commission Portugal DAI ­
Sociedade de Desenvolvimento 
Agro­Industrial SA 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(quatrième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 17 juin 1999, dans l'affaire T­
82/96 opposant Associação dos 
Refinadores de Açúcar Portugueses 
(ARAP) e.a. à la Commission ­
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 19 mars 1996, 
refusant d'ouvrir une procédure au 
titre de l'art. 93, par. 3, du traité CE 
(devenu art. 88, par.3, CE) suite à 
une plainte des requérants relative à 
une aide accordée par le 
gouvernement portugais dans le 
secteur du sucre, ainsi que de la 
décision de la Commission, du 11 
janvier 1996, autorisant l'aide en 
question 
Aff.C­328/99 
Italie / Commission 
Annulation partielle d'une décision 
de la Commission, du 2 juin 1999, 
relative à une aide d'Etat concédée 
par l'Italie à la société Seleco SpA 
Aff. C­334/99 
Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
K(99)2264 endg. de la Commission, 
du 8 juillet 1999, relative aux aides 
accordées par le gouvernement 
allemand à l'entreprise Gröditzer 
Stahlwerke GmbH et à sa filiale 
Walzwerk Burg GmbH 
Aff. C­337/99 
Commission / Belgique 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Défaut d'avoir 
transposé, dans le délai prévu, l'art. 
4 bis, par. 4, de la directive 
90/388/CEE de la Commission, du 
28 juin 1990, relative à la 
concurrence dans les marchés des 
services de télécommunication, telle 
que modifiée par la directive 
96/19/CE de la Commission, du 13 
mars 1996 ­ Réalisation de la pleine 
concurrence sur le marché des 
télécommunications 
Aff. C­340/99 
TNT Traco SpA et Poste Italiane 
SpA Michele Carbonne e.a. 
Préjudicielle ­ Tribunale di Genova 
­ Concurrence ­ Compatibilité avec 
les art. 86 et 90 du traité CE 
(devenus art. 82 et 86 CE) d'une 
réglementation nationale soumettant 
la pres­tation des services de courrier 
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exprès par les entités n'ayant pas la 
gestion exlusive des services 
universels au paiement de droits 
postaux normalement appliqués aux 
services universels classiques ­
Attribution des bénéfices découlant 
du paiement desdits droits à l'entité 
chargée de la gestion des services 
universels 
Aff. C­345/99 
Commission / France 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Art. 17, par. 2, 
de la directive 77/388/CEE : 
Sixième directive du Conseil, du 17 
mai 1977, en matière 
d'harmonisation des législations des 
Etats membres relatives aux taxes 
sur le chiffre d'affaires ­ Système 
commun de taxe sur la valeur 
ajoutée : assiette uniforme ­
Déductibilité de la taxe grevant 
l'acquisition de véhicules utilisés 
pour les besoins d'opérations taxées 
­ Limitation aux véhicules affectés à 
l'enseignement de la conduite de 
façon exclusive 
Aff. C­364/99 P(R) 
DSR­Senator Lines GmbH / 
Commission e.a. 
Pourvoi formé contre l'ordonnance 
en référé du Tribunal (Président) du 
21 juillet 1999, DSR­Senator 
Lines/Commission (T­l91/98 R) ­
Rejet de la demande du requérant de 
surseoir à l'exécution de la décision 
de la Commission, du 16 septembre 
1998, relative à la procédure 
d'application des art. 85 et 86 du 
traité CE (devenus art. 81 et 82 CE) 
(affaire n. IV/35.134 ­ Trans 
Atlantic Conference Agreement) 
Aff. C­376/99 
Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
K(99)2265 de la Commission du 8 
juillet 1999 concernant 
une mesure de la République 
fédérale d'Allemagne en faveur de 
la banque Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale 
(«WestLB») ­ Absorption de la 
«Wohnungsbauförderungsanstalt 
des Landes Nordrhein­Westfalen» 
par la WestLB ­ Rémunération de 
l'augmentation des fonds propres en 
résultant ­ Aide d'Etat 
Aff. C­382/99 
Pays­Bas / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C(1999)2536 déf. de la Commission 
concernant les aides accordées par 
les autorités néerlandaises à 633 
stations­service situées dans la zone 
frontalière avec l'Allemagne ­
Application prétendument erronée 
de la communication de la 
Commission concernant les aides 
«de minimis» 
Aff. C­391/99 
Portugal / Commission 
Annulation de la décision C (1999) 
2406 final de la Commission du 20 
juillet 1999 relative à une procédure 
au titre de l'art. 21, du règlement 
(CEE) n. 4064 du Conseil, du 21 
décembre 1989, relatif au contrôle 
des opérations de concentration 
entre entreprises (Proc. IV/M. 1616 
­ A. Champalimaud/BSCH) 
Aff.jtes C­396/99 et C­397/99 
Commission / Grèce 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Défaut d'avoir 
transposé, dans le délai prévu, l'art. 
2, par. 1, de la directive 96/2/CE de 
la Commission, du 16 janvier 1996, 
modifiant la directive 90/388/CEE 
en. ce qui concerne les 
communications mobiles et 
personnelles, en combinaison avec 
l'art. 3a, par. 2 et 3 de la directive 
90/388/CEE de la Commission, du 
28 juin 1990, relative à la 
concurrence dans les marchés des 
services de télécommunication, telle 
que modifiée par la directive 
96/2/CE 
Aff. C­400/99 
Italie / Commission 
Annulation de la lettre de la 
Commission SG (99) D 6463, du 6 
août 1999, relative au 
commencement d'une procédure 
d'enquête formelle sur les aides 
octroyées par la République 
italienne à des entreprises du 
Gruppo Tirrenia di Navigazione 
Aff. C­427/99 Ρ 
RJB Mining pic / Commission 
Pourvoi formé contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal (première chambre élargie) 
du 9 septembre 1999, RJB Mining / 
Commission (T­l 10/98) rejetant, en 
ce qu'il se fondait sur deux moyens 
déterminés, un recours en 
annulation d'une décision de la 
Commission portant sur des 
interventions financières de 
l'Allemagne en faveur de l'industrie 
houillière en 1997 
Aff. C­429/99 
Commission / Portugal 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Art. 2, par. 4, 
2., de la directive 90/388/CEE de la 
Commission, du 28 juin 1990, 
relative a la concurrence dans les 
marchés des services de 
télécommunication, tel que modifié 
par la directive 96/19/CE de la 
Commission, du 13 mars 1996 ­
Interdiction du service «call back» 
international ­ Délai supplémentaire 
accordé au Portugal pour l'abolition 
des droits exclusifs de Portugal 
Telecom en ce qui concerne la 
prestation de services de téléphonie 
vocale ­ 97/310/CE : Décision de la 
Commission du 12 février 1997 
concernant l'octroi au Portugal de 
délais supplémentaires pour la mise 
en oeuvre des directives 
90/388/CEE et 96/2/CE en ce qui 
concerne la pleine concurrence dans 
les marchés des télécommunications 
(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour 
l'EEE) 
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Aff. C­462/99 
Connect Austria Gesellschaft für 
Telekommunikation GmbH et 
Telekom­Control­Kommission 
Mobilkom Austria AG 
Préjudicielle 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof 
Interprétation de l'art. 5 bis, par. 3, 
de la directive 90/387/CEE du 
Conseil, du 28 juin 1990, relative à 
l'établissement du marché intérieur 
des services de télécommunication 
par la mise en oeuvre de la 
fourniture d'un réseau ouvert de 
télécommunication, telle que 
modifiée par la directive 97/51 /CE 
du Parlement européen et du 
Conseil du 6 octobre 1997 ­ Pourvoi 
devant une instance indépendante 
contre les décisions de l'autorité 
réglementaire ­ Effet direct ­
Interprétation de l'art. 86 du traité 
CE (devenu article 82 CE), de l'art. 
90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86 CE), 
de l'art. 2 de la directive 96/2/CE de 
la Commission, du 16 janvier 1996, 
modifiant la directive 90/388/CEE 
en ce qui concerne les 
communications mobiles et 
personnelles, et des art. 9 et 11 de la 
directive 97/13/CE du Parlement 
européen et du Conseil du 10 avril 
1997 relative à un cadre commun 
pour les autorisations générales et 
les licences individuelles dans le 
secteur des services de 
télécommunications ­ Législation 
nationale en matière d'attribution de 
fréquences dans la bande 1800 
MHZ 
Aff. C­480/99 Ρ 
Gerry Plant e.a. / 
Commission 
South Wales Small Mines 
Association 
Pourvoi formé contre l'ordonnance 
du Tribunal de première instance 
(deuxième chambre) du 29 
septembre 1999, J.G. Evans e.a. / 
Commission (T­148/98 et Τ­
Ι 62/98), par laquelle le Tribunal a 
rejeté comme irrecevables des 
recours visant à l'annulation d'une 
décision de la Commission, du 30 
juillet 1998 (affaire IV/E­
3/SWSMA), rejetant les plaintes 
déposées par les requérants contre le 
Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB) et British Coal, 
relatives à une prétendue entente 
concernant les prix de vente du 
charbon destiné à la production 
d'électricité 
Aff. C­482/99 
France / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C(l 999)3148 final de la 
Commission concernant les aides 
accordées par la France à 
l'entreprise Stardust Marine 
Aff. C­497/99 Ρ 
Irish Sugar pic / Commission 
Pourvoi formé contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal de première instance 
(troisième chambre) du 7 octobre 
1999, Irish Sugar pic / Commission 
(T­228/97) ­ Annulation de la 
décision de la Commission, du 14 
mai 1997, relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 86 du traité CE 
(devenu art. 82 CE) (IV/34.621, 
35.059/F­3 ­ Irish Sugar pic) 
Aff. C­499/99 
Commission / Espagne 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Défaut de 
s'être conformé aux décisions 
91/1/CEE de la Commission, du 20 
décembre 1989, concernant les aides 
accordées en Espagne par le 
gouvernement central et plusieurs 
gouvernements automomes à 
MAGEFESA, producteur 
d'ustensiles de cuisine en acier 
inoxydable et de petits appareils 
électriques et C( 1998)3211 final de 
la Commission, du 14 octobre 1998, 
relative à une aide accordée aux 
entreprises du groupe MAGEFESA 
COMPETITION D G ' S ADDRESS 
O N T H E W O R L D W I D E W E B 
http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dg04/index_en.htm 
COMING UP 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 
­ June ­
European Community Competition 
Policy­1999 
XXIX Report on Competition 
Policy 1999 
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Agreement to approve energy efficiency of washing machines 
Carel de producteurs de tubes d'aciers 
FEG - TU 
Mergers 
Airtours/First Choice 
Exxon/Mobil 
BP Amoco/Atlantic Richfield 
Telia/Telenor 
Sanitec/Sphinx 
Honeywell/Alliedsignal 
Air Liquide/BOC 
Linde/AGA 
Totalfina/Elf Aquitaine 
Onex/Air Canada/Canadian Airlines 
Volvo/Scania 
Alcan/Alusuisse 
Alcoa/Reynolds 
MMS/DASA/Astrium 
Dow Chemical/Union Carbide 
Pakhoed/Van Ommeren 
EDF/Louis Dreyfus 
New Halland/Case 
Akzo Nobel/Hoechst 
Fujitsu/Siemens 
Deutsche Post/Trans-o-flex 
KLM/Martinair 
BBL/BT/ISP Belgium 
Incorrect or misleading information in competition procedures 
Freecom/Dangaard Holding 
BOL Spain/Bertelsmann/Planeta Corporación 
Cdnow/Time Warner/Sony 
Hearst Mondadori Editoriale 
State Aid 
Regional aid 
Rockwool Peninsular S.A. 
Marina di Stabia s.p.a. 
Benfil s.r.l. 
Tessival s.r.l. 
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